Among those skeptical about our ability to deter the Houthis is Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain. She expresses her thoughts in a piece at The National Interest. Basically, she thinks we’re trying to deter the Houthis on the cheap. A sample
In the early hours of Friday, January 12, the United States and the United Kingdom launched strikes against the Houthi rebel group in Yemen. The first strikes were aimed at more than sixty targets across sixteen different sites and were focused on missile, radar, and drone facilities controlled by the Houthis. A second wave targeted twelve additional sites, while a follow-on attack in the early hours of Saturday, January 13, struck a Houthi radar site. Although the strikes damaged or destroyed ninety percent of their targets, the Houthis retained approximately three-quarters of their drone and missile capabilities.
At this point our strikes have had the opposite effect if any. She explains:
In my book, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States, I examine why the United States struggles to coerce weak states like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. The argument draws on the logic of costly signaling, which asserts that signals must be costly for the sender in order to effectively signal high levels of commitment; by contrast, “cheap talk†cannot convince the receiver that the sender is highly resolved. In other words, signals that are cheap and easy to send do not convey any information about the sender’s underlying resolve or motivation.
While I agree with her conclusion I don’t agree with her reasoning. I don’t believe that the problem is that we’re not spending enough. The opposite, if anything. What we’re doing isn’t cost-effective. As I see it the problem is similar to the one we faced in Afghanistan. The Houthis have no centralized command and control. For an airpower strategy to be effective we’d need to strike a lot of worthless targets and kill a lot of people who don’t have much to do with the attacks on Red Sea shipping. Not only would an air-sea-land invasion of Yemen be horrendously expensive, we’d need to be prepared to occupy the entire country to eliminate the attacks on shipping.
And, as I’ve pointed out before, one of the effects of our attacks is to boost their repute which attracts money not just from Iran but from others in the Gulf who hate us and there’s no lack of those.
To use an analogy I’ve applied before in a different context, when a neighbor’s dog bites your kid, don’t talk to the dog. Talk to the neighbor.