The Houthis continued to attack ships passing through the Red Sea subsequent to U. S., U. K., etc. counter-attacks on Houthi positions. Their claim has been that they are attacking ships that are “affiliated with Israel”. Judging by the reports by Ambrey Analytics, that’s a stretch. In practice it seems to mean any ship other than a Russian or Chinese ship regardless of destination or cargo.
I continue to be puzzled about the tactical or strategic objective of our attacks on Houthi positions. If it’s to end Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping it certainly looks like a flop. If it’s to show resolve, that’s not a tactical or strategic objective but a message intended for domestic audiences.
If protecting US and western commercial interests is of interest, and the goal is actually to be effective, then taking out an Iranian refinery or two is in order.
Otherwise, we are just whacking off.
The Biden Admin apparently still has designs on a nuke treaty. So, I hope they have plenty of towels.
“I continue to be puzzled about the tactical or strategic objective of our attacks on Houthi positions. ”
The ultimate goal is to stop the Houthis from attacking shipping. Is one set of strikes going to accomplish that? Probably not.
But you’ve got to start somewhere, and a punch in the nose is a good place to start. Attacking their capacity to interdict sea lanes is not nothing. They don’t have endless supplies of anti-ship and ballistic missiles. They are difficult to use without the necessary supporting capabilities like radar and command-and-control which were also attacked.
The simple equation for “Threat” is capability+intent. Hard to know if this impacts Houthi intent, but it sure does impact their capability.
It’s not like there are other viable alternatives that would change that equation.
Most of what I’ve read has said that without an amphibious offensive the effects of our attacks on Houthi positions are unlikely to be effective.
Also, I’m pretty confident that North Korea would be happy to sell the Houthis anything they want. The gating factor is money and IMO Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping are essentially a fund-raising campaign that is likely to be successful.
Sure, in theory, North Korea could sell the Houthis stuff. Paying for it, training the Houthis, getting it to Yemen, and using it are non-trivial problems that take time, at which point the war in Gaza may be over, and the whole ginned-up excuse will be gone.
This isn’t a decisive battle over the future of control of the Red Sea here – I see these more along the lines of Operation Praying Mantis and the Gulf of Sidra incidents that built up to El Dorado Canyon.
The US takes freedom of navigation in international waters very seriously. For better or worse, we are the global guarantor of that. If the Houthis, like the Iranians and Libyans before them, are going to challenge that and throw punches at us in the form of missiles, then we are going to punch back each time they try. And our punches hit a lot harder.
Iran and Libya learned their lesson. Maybe the Houthis won’t, maybe they will. But in the absence of alternatives, if the Houthis want to pick a fight over freedom of the seas, then I am more than happy to have the US step into that ring.
I have no problem with our taking freedom of navigation seriously or our responding to Houthi threats to Red Sea navigation. The only thing I have a problem with is not responding successfully and I don’t measure success in terms of number of responses or number of missiles fired but whether we achieve our objectives. At this point it does not seem like we are achieving our objectives.
Cf. here https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/15/politics/houthi-missile-strikes-us-owned-ship/index.html