I think that Walter Russell Mead’s latest Wall Street Journal column is one of his best. It is primarily a critique of the Biden Administration’s Middle East policy. After cataloguing the administration’s many failed overtures, he arrives here:
Mr. Biden has fundamentally misjudged what diplomacy is and what it can and can’t do. As a man who came of age politically during the Vietnam War and was politically and personally scarred by his support for the Iraq war, the president knows in his bones that military power projection unrelated to an achievable political goal often leads to expensive disasters.
He isn’t wrong about this, but like many in the Democratic policy world, Mr. Biden rejected a misguided overconfidence in military force only to attribute similar magic powers to diplomacy. Diplomacy in quest of an unachievable political goal is as misguided as poorly conceived military adventurism and can ultimately be as costly.
However, I think he errs here:
In the 1930s, the U.S. thought Japan’s attempt to conquer China was both immoral and bad for American interests, but a mix of naive pacifism and blind isolationism blocked any serious response. Instead, Washington settled on a diplomatic stance of nonresistance to Japanese aggression mixed with nonrecognition of Japanese conquests and claims. The policy failed to help China. What it accomplished was to persuade a critical mass of Japanese leaders that America was irredeemably decadent. They gradually came to believe that a nation so foolishly led would respond to the destruction of its Pacific fleet with diplomats rather than aircraft carriers.
Japan invaded China (Manchuria) in September 1931. I honestly don’t know if Americans considered the invasion immoral. What I have read does not reflect that. I suspect that American missionaries in China did but that is not synonymous with Americans. What is unclear to me is whether Americans saw that as damaging to American interests or were largely disinterested. I suspect the latter. Smoot-Hawley had been enacted the year before and what little trade we had with China had been sharply curtailed. IMO during the 1930s Americans were more concerned about survival.
The second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937. I think that Japanese atrocities during that war aroused some humanitarian concerns in the United States. Lend-Lease, considerably more expansive than our support for Britain and France, began in 1941, in significant part a response to those concerns. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was at the end of 1941 and it was a “Hail Mary”on Japan’s part, intended to prevent active U. S. participation in war in the Pacific and at least some Japanese leaders understood that at the time. Note that I do not sympathize with the Japanese. I do think they held a very bad hand and they gambled and lost.
I think that Dr. Mead is not particularly well-informed on pre-WWII U. S.-China bilateral trade. I suspect he’s imposing neoliberal ideas on the 1930s. I also suspect that racism played a role in the U. S. response to Japan’s invading Manchuria and then China proper. I haven’t studied the matter in detail but I think it’s a reasonable presumption.
Dr. Mead continues:
Allies as well as adversaries increasingly disregard American wishes and discount its warnings.
That isn’t good for American interests, and it won’t bring peace to the region. As events slide out of control, Mr. Biden’s diplomats can do little more than wring their hands and wish for better times. The failure isn’t their fault. Like soldiers sent into a war their leaders don’t know how to win, America’s diplomats were tasked with an impossible mission their leader never thought through.
I think that Dr. Mead has the diagnosis wrong here. American prestige due completely to
- American economic might and
- American military might
with the latter being downstream from the former. We have had multiple military failures since 2001 including
- the attack on 9/11
- invasion and occupation of Afghanistan
- invasion and occupation of Iraq
and how do you characterize actions like removing Qaddafi in Libya? Or supporting Saudi Arabia in its war with Yemen? Were those moral and in our national interest?
I don’t honestly see how the U. S. can retain military and economic preeminence while deindustrializing and reducing our military budget. And that doesn’t even get into the “magical thinking on diplomacy” theme that is Dr. Mead’s main topic.
I’m not sure I see the Biden Administration’s problem as “magical thinking” so much as the strategy it, apparently, learned from the Obama Administration: preconceding what your interlocutor actually wanted. I do not understand the reasoning behind that. The other party will be so grateful it will do what you want in exchange? Now that’s magical thinking.