I have been thinking quite a bit about Ukraine lately, spurred by the increasing severity of Russia’s bombardments and its slow advance into Ukrainian territory. The results of my researches and the references I’ve used are listed in the table at the bottom of this post.
One of the things I’ve noticed is that the prevailing wisdom seems to assume that the United States is able to provide as much support in terms of missiles and munitions as the Ukrainians need to fend off the Russians. A typical example of the prevailing wisdom is in this column by Lee Hockstader at the Washington Post:
Any failure to provide anything the Ukrainians might want is treated as foolhardy, faint-hearted, and politically motivated. That appears to be the prevailing wisdom but no one seems to produce evidence to support it. Is that the case?
My own view is that the United States of thirty years ago is not the United States of today. Today we are simply unable to increase our production of missiles and munitions faster than the Ukrainians can use them without sacrificing our own security.
That is not to say that we couldn’t. But it would take a fullscale wartime mobilization and that is politically impossible. The reaction of the New York Times and Washington Post to any attempt at a fullscale wartime mobilization by the Trump Administration can only be imagined.
| Key Strategies/Elements |
Feasibility (Likelihood of Success) |
| Zelenskyy’s 10-Point Peace Formula (Government of Ukraine) |
First announced Oct 2022 (G20 Bali), reiterated 2023–24 |
- Full Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory;
- restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Crimea & Donbas included).
- Justice: prosecution of war crimes and a mechanism for Russia to pay reparations for damages.
- Security guarantees for Ukraine’s future (e.g. Kyiv Security Compact leading to NATO/EU membership) to prevent renewed aggression.
- Addresses global concerns: nuclear safety (revoke Russia’s control of Zaporizhzhia NPP),
- food security (reopen grain export routes),
- energy security (price caps, protect infrastructure),
- release of POWs/deportees,
- and an environmental recovery plan.
|
Low (Short-Term) – Russia currently rejects all ten points, as they amount to Russian defeat. While morally and legally sound, this plan requires a major shift in the balance of power – essentially a Ukrainian victory or regime change in Moscow. Widely backed by the West (and affirmed in U.N. GA votes) as the ideal outcome, it sets a maximalist benchmark. In practice, achieving it soon is unlikely unless ongoing military support yields decisive gains. Viewed as the “long-term goal” for a just peace, but near-term prospects are poor unless Russia’s calculus changes dramatically. |
| Chatham House Plan(“Dangers of a False Peace”) – Timothy Ash et al. |
May 2023 (Chatham House report) |
“Peace through victory”: categorically oppose any premature ceasefire or territorial concessions to Russia, which would reward aggression.
– Maximize military pressure: significantly increase Western arms deliveries (tanks, long-range missiles, air defenses, etc.) to enable Ukraine to reclaim territory and convince Putin he cannot win.
– Maintain and tighten sanctions on Russia to strain its war effort; prepare for long-term isolation of Russia unless it withdraws.
– Emphasize that only a Russian defeat will bring a durable peace – otherwise any pause will be used by Moscow to rearm (cites lessons of Minsk agreements). Warn against “false peace” proposals that sound appealing but undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. |
Moderate to Long-Term – This strategy underpins current Western policy, but its success hinges on Ukraine’s battlefield performance and sustained international support. If Ukraine eventually pushes Russia into a corner (or at least stalemate) so that the Kremlin sues for peace, a just peace on Ukrainian terms becomes feasible. However, in the interim, this approach means a prolonged war with attendant risks (escalation, war fatigue). Politically, Western unity is required; any wavering could imperil it. Overall, it’s credible only if the coalition stays committed and Russia’s military continues to erode. If those conditions hold, it could yield a highly favorable outcome for Ukraine – albeit after a potentially high cost in time and lives. |
| Haass–Kupchan “Sequenced” Plan (CFR, Foreign Affairs) |
Apr 2023 |
Two-phase strategy: (1) “Fight then talk” – boost Ukraine’s military capability through summer 2023 to gain ground; (2) in late 2023, push for a **ceasefire** as front lines stabilize, moving diplomacy front and center.
– Ceasefire & DMZ: Implement a ceasefire along the new line of contact; create a demilitarized zone with both sides pulling back and neutral observers (U.N./OSCE) verifying compliance.
– Parallel negotiations: Ukraine and Russia engage in peace talks (facilitated by mediators) on issues like occupied territories’ status, while NATO/allies open talks with Russia on European security arrangements (arms control, NATO posture).
– No forced concessions: Ukraine would not be required to recognize Russian annexations – disputed areas would be “frozen” (status quo maintained) pending further negotiation.
– Incentives: Limited sanctions relief offered to Russia for good-faith participation; in return, Russia to accept international peacekeepers/monitors. Security pact offered to Ukraine (by US/UK/France etc.) to guarantee its safety during and after talks; EU aid/accession process accelerated as part of peace dividend. |
Medium (Conditional) – This plan assumes a stalemate scenario where both sides are looking for an off-ramp. It’s plausible if by a certain point neither Ukraine nor Russia can make further major gains (a “hurting stalemate”) and external pressure (from the West, China, etc.) is applied for a pause. The ceasefire-without-settlement approach could stop the bloodshed and preserve Ukraine’s statehood, but risks creating a Korean War–like frozen conflict if final talks drag on without resolution. Ukraine might accept it only if confident of ongoing Western support (to avoid the ceasefire becoming permanent partition). Russia might accept if it’s facing battlefield exhaustion and sees a ceasefire as a way to keep some territorial gains. In late 2023, conditions weren’t yet ripe – fighting continued. But in a future war-weary moment, this sequenced approach could gain traction. Likelihood: moderate if military deadlock and Western unity to push Kyiv for talks; until then, Ukraine resists a pause. |
| RAND “Avoiding a Long War” (Charap & Priebe) |
Jan 2023 |
Prioritize ending the war sooner to reduce risks of escalation (direct NATO-Russia clash, nuclear use) and global economic harm. “The longer the war, the greater the danger,” so Western policy should pivot from open-ended support to facilitating a peace process.
– Acknowledge stalemate: Recognize that neither side is likely to achieve absolute victory – Russia cannot conquer Ukraine entirely, and Ukraine (without NATO troops) is unlikely to expel Russia from all occupied lands in the near term. Therefore, prepare for a compromise outcome.
– Diplomatic surge: The U.S. and allies to “spur talks” by communicating potential endgame parameters privately. For example, explore a deal around Russia withdrawing to the Feb 23, 2022 lines (giving up Kherson/Zaporizhzhia advances, but Crimea and parts of Donbas remain under de facto Russian control for now) in exchange for an armistice and phased sanction relief.
– Limit aims: Subtly encourage Ukraine to moderate its war aims (e.g. not insist on regaining Crimea before talks) by conditioning some support. Emphasize securing Ukraine’s core sovereignty and Western orientation, while deferring more contentious issues.
– Internationalize talks: possibly involve U.N. or neutral states to broker ceasefire terms; ensure any agreement includes monitoring and enforcement clauses to prevent Russian relapse. |
Uncertain/Controversial – While logically highlighting real risks, this approach faces major political hurdles. At the time of release, it was seen as undermining Ukrainian morale and unity – effectively asking Ukraine to compromise when it felt momentum (after Russian setbacks in Kharkiv/Kherson). For Western leaders, actively pushing Kyiv to negotiate (and possibly withholding aid as leverage) is politically fraught, given the moral stance against Russian aggression. Additionally, Russia had shown no serious interest in a fair settlement, so urging talks might have simply resulted in demands Ukraine couldn’t accept. Thus, the RAND approach had low uptake in 2023. However, its premise – that an indefinite war carries grave costs and that at some point the West might recalibrate – could gain traction if frontline dynamics stagnate and domestic opposition to aid grows in Western countries. It’s a plan more attuned to U.S. strategic interests (focus on China, avoid nuclear scenarios) than to Ukrainian aspirations, so its success would require careful diplomacy to not fracture the alliance. In summary: possible in a future scenario of war-weariness, but not likely until both Washington and Kyiv see no better alternative. |
| Quincy Institute Plan (Beebe & Lieven) |
Feb 2024 |
Negotiation over attrition: Argues Ukraine’s position is deteriorating in a war of attrition; thus, seek a negotiated settlement ASAP to preserve a sovereign Ukraine.
– Address Russia’s core demands through diplomacy: Signal openness to discuss NATO expansion concerns – e.g., Ukraine could adopt a form of neutrality or NATO non-membership as part of a deal. In return, Russia must halt aggression and accept Ukraine’s Western integration in other forms (EU membership, economic ties).
– Territorial compromise: A possible deal might involve Russia withdrawing from areas seized in 2022 (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, parts of Donbas), but Crimea and parts of Donbas occupied since 2014 could be temporarily excepted – their status to be settled later via international agreement. Ukraine would not recognize Russia’s sovereignty over these, but agree to a long-term freeze or administration arrangement.
– Enforced security: Use Cold War–style verified arms control and U.N.-backed guarantees. E.g., prohibit Russia from stationing heavy forces near a new border, and correspondingly Ukraine could limit deployment of certain systems as well – all under international monitoring. Establish a robust U.N. or great-power guarantor group to monitor compliance (perhaps akin to Istanbul draft’s guarantor concept).
– U.S.–Russia bargaining: The U.S. to offer Russia a face-saving path: relief from some sanctions and a roadmap to rejoin global economy if Russia genuinely makes peace and respects the deal. Simultaneously, make clear that if Russia reneges, consequences will snap back (sanctions, military aid to Ukraine, etc.). Essentially, give Putin a stark choice between ongoing war (with unwinnable costs) or a negotiated truce that secures some of Russia’s stated interests. |
Low (Presently) – This plan is the most conciliatory to Russia, making it politically toxic in Ukraine absent a drastic shift in battlefield fortunes. As of early 2024, Ukrainians are not willing to trade NATO aspirations or accept a loss of territory in exchange for peace – especially given the atrocities suffered. Any Ukrainian leader agreeing to permanent neutrality or conceding Crimea would face public outrage. Moreover, trust in Russia honoring any deal is near zero; strong guarantees would be needed, but even those might not assuage Ukrainian fears. From the Western side, openly signaling willingness to limit NATO enlargement or lift sanctions could be seen as rewarding aggression, unless packaged within a clear Russian climb-down. That said, if military options were exhausted – e.g., a stalled front for years, mounting casualties, and Western aid diminishing – a version of this compromise might gain consideration as a least-worst option. It aligns with what some realpolitik voices suggest (prioritize ending war over reversing every aggression immediately). Ultimately, its success would require firm enforcement mechanisms and probably a different Russian leadership to be remotely acceptable. As things stand, it’s unlikely to be implemented, but it contributes to thinking about how to stop the war before total victory, should that become necessary. |
| China’s 12-Point Plan |
Feb 2023 |
Ceasefire and Talks: Calls for a quick ceasefire and the start of negotiations, asserting that “dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution”. Does not spell out withdrawal of Russian troops, effectively implying a freeze in-place.
– Respect Sovereignty (in principle): States that sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries should be upheld, but simultaneously urges “abandoning Cold War mentality,” meaning Russia’s security concerns about NATO should be addressed. This ambiguity left it unclear how Ukraine’s sovereignty is restored if Russian forces remain.
– Humanitarian and economic measures: Urges protection of civilians and POWs, support for humanitarian aid, and continuation of the grain export deal. Opposes use of nuclear weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities (a clear reference to Zaporizhzhia NPP and nuclear rhetoric). Calls for ending unilateral sanctions on Russia and taking steps to stabilize global supply chains and inflation.
– Post-conflict vision: Mentions facilitating post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, without details. Suggests that the international community (with China’s participation) would help rebuild, implicitly after a negotiated settlement. |
Very Low (as a roadmap) – While diplomatically notable, China’s plan is seen as too vague and one-sided to achieve a real peace. It fails to identify aggressor vs. victim or demand Russia undo its invasion, which is why Ukraine and its allies responded coolly. A ceasefire with Russian troops on Ukrainian soil is a non-starter for Kyiv, as it would validate occupation. Western officials suspect China’s plan was more about political positioning than a serious solution. Indeed, China has not applied pressure on Russia to adhere even to the spirit of Point 1 (sovereignty) – Chinese officials continue to blame NATO expansion for the war and haven’t condemned Russia’s invasion. However, if down the line Russia were ready for talks, China could play a role as a mediator, given its influence. The 12-point paper could then serve as a baseline for initial talks (e.g. ceasefire, humanitarian exchange) if supplemented by specifics on troop withdrawals and international supervision. As it stands, it’s more of a diplomatic statement than a operational peace plan, and its likelihood of directly leading to peace is minimal unless it is substantively built upon in a broader negotiation framework. |
| African Leaders’ 10-Point Proposal (Ramaphosa & others) |
June 2023 (mission to Kyiv/Moscow) |
Phase 1 – Confidence Building: Proposed immediate steps to reduce tension: some Russian troop pullback (e.g. from certain areas or as a goodwill gesture); removal of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus (installed during the war); suspension of the ICC arrest warrant for Putin during negotiations; and a degree of sanctions easing to incentivize Moscow. Also urged return of Ukrainian POWs and children taken to Russia (humanitarian gesture).
– Phase 2 – Ceasefire: Using the above measures to create a conducive atmosphere, push for a ceasefire agreement with a halt to all hostilities. This might involve formalizing the current lines as a temporary truce line.
– Phase 3 – Negotiations: Launch Ukraine-Russia peace talks “to resolve the conflict”, while separately having talks between Russia and the West (U.S./EU) on strategic issues like missiles and nuclear threats. The African leaders emphasized addressing both the Ukraine-specific issues and the broader NATO-Russia standoff (they referenced medium-range missile deployments, etc.).
– Global South considerations: Highlighted how war and sanctions harm African economies, calling for unblocking grain exports and fertilizers. Implicitly, a settlement should restore trade flows (which means securing the Black Sea routes and possibly lifting sanctions that impede Russian food/fertilizer exports). |
Low – While diplomatically significant, this initiative did not substantially shift either side’s stance. Ukraine appreciated Africa’s concern but reiterated that Russian troops on its soil are the fundamental issue – and the proposal didn’t ensure their removal. The idea of suspending Putin’s war crimes warrant or easing sanctions was also hard to swallow for Ukraine and many Western backers absent real Russian concessions. Russia, for its part, did not seriously entertain pulling back or withdrawing (in fact, it continued offensive operations). That said, some elements (prisoner exchanges, grain deal revival) had more traction and saw partial progress via separate channels. The African plan’s emphasis on “global South voices” and neutrality did increase diplomatic pressure in the U.N. for addressing the war. In terms of ending the conflict, however, its chances were slim unless paired with a major change in war dynamics. It served as a reminder that many countries want the war ended sooner (even at cost of some compromise) – a point Ukraine must navigate as it seeks continued worldwide support. |
| Indonesia’s Ceasefire & Referendum Plan |
June 2023 (Shangri-La Dialogue) |
Immediate Ceasefire: Both sides to stop fighting unconditionally and freeze positions.
– Demilitarized Buffer Zone: Create a U.N.-monitored demilitarized zone \~15 km deep on either side of the ceasefire line. Troops withdraw from this zone to prevent clashes. Deploy U.N. peacekeepers to patrol the DMZ (Indonesia offered this idea to ensure neither side resumes hostilities).
– UN-Supervised Referenda: Hold referendums in the “disputed areas” (the territories claimed by both Ukraine and Russia) under U.N. auspices. The vote would “ascertain objectively” the will of the local inhabitants regarding which country they wish to be part of. The implicit areas in question were Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia (and possibly Crimea).
– International Endorsement: Indonesia sought a statement from the Shangri-La Dialogue participants supporting this plan, hoping global backing would pressure the parties. It framed the proposal as a balanced solution respecting self-determination and peace. |
Very Low – Ukraine flatly rejected this plan within hours. From Kyiv’s perspective, there are no “disputed” territories – only Ukrainian land illegally occupied. A referendum under occupation (especially after so many Ukrainians have fled and with censorship/propaganda in those regions) would be far from fair. Even a U.N.-run vote would effectively reward Russia’s ethnic cleansing and could legitimize outcomes achieved by force. Additionally, Ukraine argues that its people already chose independence and unity in 1991 (when all regions, including Donbas and Crimea, voted to be part of Ukraine). The ceasefire aspect was also a non-starter at that time, as Ukraine was gearing up for counteroffensive and believed a pause would help Russia. As for Russia, it didn’t formally comment, but in past conflicts Russia has sometimes favored referendums (it orchestrated sham ones in 2022 to claim annexations). However, a truly neutral referendum might risk Russia losing, so it’s not clear Putin would agree either. Overall, this plan, while creative, gained no traction. It highlighted a core dilemma: Ukraine cannot accept anything undermining its territorial integrity, and Russia isn’t interested in internationally validated processes it can’t control. |
| 2022 Istanbul Draft (Historic Reference) |
March 2022 (negotiations in Istanbul) |
Permanent Neutrality of Ukraine: Ukraine would amend its constitution to affirm a neutral, non-aligned status (no NATO membership) and no foreign military bases on its soil.
– Security Guarantees: In return, a group of guarantor states (including NATO’s major powers and also Russia, China, Turkey) would sign a treaty to guarantee Ukraine’s security. If Ukraine is attacked, guarantors would consult immediately and could act to defend Ukraine (though Russia sought to dilute this).
– Territorial Issues Deferred: Status of Crimea would be put aside for 15 years of negotiations (effectively agreeing to disagree for now). During that period, neither side undertakes hostile acts regarding Crimea. Similar arrangements for parts of Donbas were discussed (likely autonomous status within Ukraine, but details not finalized).
– Troop Withdrawal: Russia would withdraw forces to positions held pre-invasion (Feb 23, 2022 lines). Ukraine would likely accept some limits on the size of its armed forces (caps on troop numbers and certain weapons) as part of the deal.
– Language/Cultural Rights: Draft texts included Ukraine agreeing to protect the Russian language rights and perhaps reconsider some nationalist laws, addressing one of Russia’s stated pretexts for invasion. |
N/A (Talks Collapsed) – This near-agreement is illustrative of what might have been possible early in the war, before atrocities and full mobilization poisoned the atmosphere. It met both sides partway: Ukraine gave on NATO, Russia (ostensibly) gave on regime change and allowed Ukraine’s independence with security guarantees. However, events overtook it – war fortunes shifted, and neither side ultimately signed it. In today’s context, the Istanbul terms are mostly overtaken by events: Ukraine has since formally applied for NATO and is less inclined to trust any Russian guarantees, and Russia in September 2022 claimed to annex more territory, hardening its demands. Still, the Istanbul draft is a historical blueprint showing that compromise was once imaginable. If severe stalemate hits, future negotiators might dust off some of these concepts (neutrality, deferring disputed regions, guarantees by major powers). But implementing a similar deal now would require tremendous goodwill and verification, given the brutality of the war since. |
