Reciprocity

At the Wall Street Journal Patrick Thomas reports on the Trump Administration’s efforts to bar Chinese ownership of U. S. farmland:

The Trump administration has a message for China: Keep off the farm.

Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins said Tuesday the administration will work with state lawmakers to ban sales of U.S. farmland to buyers from China and other countries of concern, citing national-security interests.

Rollins, joined by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, said the government is ratcheting up scrutiny on existing land owned by Chinese buyers and is looking at ways to potentially claw back past purchases.

“We’ll never let foreign adversaries control our land,” said Rollins.

State and federal lawmakers for years have warned that China and other countries could use U.S. farmland to facilitate spying or wield influence over the U.S. food-supply chain. Chinese-owned entities hold nearly 300,000 acres—roughly 0.02%—of U.S. farmland, according to Agriculture Department data, an area about the size of Los Angeles.

Republicans and Democrats alike have sought to curb foreign ownership of American farmland, at times seeking to increase government scrutiny of purchases and investments. Critics have raised fears that foreign owners could drive up land prices or sidestep environmental rules.

In general “fee simple” is the private ownership of real property in which the owner has the right to control, use, and transfer the property at will. It is the form of real estate ownership that is the norm in the United States but not worldwide. I have long believed in reciprocity with respect to land ownership, that is, foreign individuals and entities should only be allowed to own U. S. land if American individuals and entities are allowed to own land in those countries in fee simple ownership. You might be surprised at how many countries in which that is not the case.

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Battle of the Kevins

I found this piece from the Wall Street Journal by Brian Schwartz and Nick Timiraos about prospective Federal Reserve chairs interesting:

WASHINGTON—Two Republicans named Kevin are vying to be the next chairman of the Federal Reserve. One is rising to the top of the list of potential candidates, while the other is facing skepticism from President Trump’s allies.

Kevin Hassett, one of Trump’s closest economic advisers, is emerging as a serious contender to be the next Fed chair, according to people familiar with the matter. Hassett’s rise threatens the other Kevin—former Fed governor Kevin Warsh—an early favorite for the job who has angled for the position ever since Trump passed him over for it eight years ago. Some people close to the president worry that Warsh, who isn’t in Trump’s inner circle, won’t be a champion of lower rates.

What is unfolding is quintessential Trump: two ambitious men competing for his approval in a high-stakes contest that echoes the boardroom drama he once promoted on “The Apprentice.”

Hassett met with Trump about the Fed job at least twice in June, according to people familiar with the matter. The discussions marked a shift for Hassett, who previously had told allies he wasn’t interested, but now says he would take the job if offered.

Warsh has discussed traveling to Washington this month to meet with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent about the Fed position, according to people familiar with the matter.

Hassett and Warsh didn’t respond to requests for comment. “President Trump has been clear about the need for the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy to complement the Administration’s pro-growth agenda,” White House spokesman Kush Desai said. “He will continue to nominate the most qualified individuals who can best serve the American people.”

I only have two observations.

First, we should have more bankers and fewer economists as governors of the Federal Reserve, particularly as members of the FOMC. The difference between bankers and economists resembles that between chemical engineers and chemists. Historically, Federal Reserve governors have tended to have been bankers.

Second, here’s a graph, courtesy of MacroMicro of the Fed funds rate (short-term interest rate) implied by the Taylor Rule vs the effective Fed funds rate:

I think that’s a powerful argument for automating the operation of the FOMC, at least more than at present. Note, too, that it suggests President Trump’s assessment of the present EFFR is wrong.

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Populism Not Policy

I agree with the observation that Gerald Baker makes in his latest Wall Street Journal column—that the appeal of New York City mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani resembles that of Donald Trump:

But while we may mock the radicalism of Mr. Mamdani and his fellow socialists seemingly on the rise in the Democratic Party, I see in the man’s appeal, his evident popularity among a certain type of young voter especially, more signs of the continuing crack-up of American politics. Many Republicans like to think that the extremism represented by the likes of Mr. Mamdani and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is a signal of the Democrats’ growing irrelevance and unelectability. But his ascent—provisional though it may still be—is more likely a reflection of the fissures that continue to stretch our national cohesion than some proof of the marginalized nature of Donald Trump’s opponents.

Confronted with the electoral success of a radical shift by their opponents, political parties have two choices. They can accommodate the new electoral reality, acknowledge that the other side has captured fresh truths that command popular majorities, and accept that the Overton window has shifted. In these circumstances the distinctive proposition they offer to the voters becomes a promise merely to moderate the more extreme elements of the new governing dispensation, softening its edges to appeal to those most skittish about it, without fundamentally challenging its supremacy. The so-called abundance Democrats seem inclined to this sort of accommodation.

Alternatively, they can reject the revolution, refuse to reconcile with the new order, and put their faith in the physics of Newton’s third law of motion to produce an equal and opposite reaction. The successful radicalism of the other side has demonstrated not a rightward (in this case) shift in the nation’s center of gravity, but a potent popular openness to radical solutions of all sorts.

The latter seems closer to the temper of our times. While Mr. Trump and the Republicans have enjoyed not only electoral superiority but remarkable governing success in the past six months, there is little evidence of a wider political paradigm shift. The president and his party have succeeded in executing radical new approaches to immigration, foreign policy, trade and international economics, and have just passed one of the largest and most consequential pieces of fiscal legislation in the past 20 years, but with very few exceptions, Democrats seem in no mood to endorse the change. Not a single Democrat in either house voted for the One Big Beautiful Bill Act; few have shown any sign of temporizing on any of the other MAGA Republican initiatives.

Instead the temptation for Mr. Trump’s opponents may be to double down on the resistance and take their chances on the easy appeal of radical ideas. They can take inspiration from the apparent success of a reality-challenging radicalism evidenced in key elements of the MAGA agenda.

but I disagree as to the nature of the resemblance. I don’t think that the resemblance is the radicalism of their policies but that both are populists and both have made effective use of social media.

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You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet

At Liberal Patriot John Halpin asks whether Americans can “escape their overly emotional politics”?

Lost in the emotional propaganda of contemporary politics is any rational discussion of the pros and cons of various policy choices, neutral evaluations of legislative language and motives, and measured examination of actual outcomes and necessary adjustments to help improve complex legislation or executive actions. Partisan path dependency requires Democrats to uniformly hate and despise everything that Trump is doing and it also requires Republicans to uniformly love and praise his every action. Dissidents, meaning Democrats who might be okay with some of Trump’s policies or Republicans who might disagree with others, are not allowed in the arena and will be subjected to the partisan star chamber online and in the media.

Agonistic expression is characteristic our post-literate culture just as it was characteristic of pre-literate culture. Reason and temperate, logical modes of expression were typical of a very short period of our past, when many of us relied on the written word for information.

Now we’re relying on increasingly visual forms. Charts, graphs, videos. The post-literate period has just begun and it will get much, much worse.

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Thinking About Ukraine

I have been thinking quite a bit about Ukraine lately, spurred by the increasing severity of Russia’s bombardments and its slow advance into Ukrainian territory. The results of my researches and the references I’ve used are listed in the table at the bottom of this post.

One of the things I’ve noticed is that the prevailing wisdom seems to assume that the United States is able to provide as much support in terms of missiles and munitions as the Ukrainians need to fend off the Russians. A typical example of the prevailing wisdom is in this column by Lee Hockstader at the Washington Post:

PARIS — Soviet losses in World War II exceeded those of all other Allied forces combined and were roughly double those of Nazi Germany, whose capital, Berlin, ultimately fell to Red Army troops.

Keep that in mind when you hear that Moscow can’t possibly sustain the colossal military and economic costs it is suffering from the Ukrainian bloodbath Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated three years ago in pursuit of his neo-imperial fever dream. It can.

Ukraine has proved its own ferocious resilience in the course of fighting a war of survival. But as the war grinds on into its 41st month, it’s worth questioning the conventional wisdom that neither side can win on the battlefield.

Any failure to provide anything the Ukrainians might want is treated as foolhardy, faint-hearted, and politically motivated. That appears to be the prevailing wisdom but no one seems to produce evidence to support it. Is that the case?

My own view is that the United States of thirty years ago is not the United States of today. Today we are simply unable to increase our production of missiles and munitions faster than the Ukrainians can use them without sacrificing our own security.

That is not to say that we couldn’t. But it would take a fullscale wartime mobilization and that is politically impossible. The reaction of the New York Times and Washington Post to any attempt at a fullscale wartime mobilization by the Trump Administration can only be imagined.

Key Strategies/Elements Feasibility (Likelihood of Success)
Zelenskyy’s 10-Point Peace Formula (Government of Ukraine) First announced Oct 2022 (G20 Bali), reiterated 2023–24
  • Full Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory;
  • restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Crimea & Donbas included).
  • Justice: prosecution of war crimes and a mechanism for Russia to pay reparations for damages.
  • Security guarantees for Ukraine’s future (e.g. Kyiv Security Compact leading to NATO/EU membership) to prevent renewed aggression.
  • Addresses global concerns: nuclear safety (revoke Russia’s control of Zaporizhzhia NPP),
  • food security (reopen grain export routes),
  • energy security (price caps, protect infrastructure),
  • release of POWs/deportees,
  • and an environmental recovery plan.
Low (Short-Term) – Russia currently rejects all ten points, as they amount to Russian defeat. While morally and legally sound, this plan requires a major shift in the balance of power – essentially a Ukrainian victory or regime change in Moscow. Widely backed by the West (and affirmed in U.N. GA votes) as the ideal outcome, it sets a maximalist benchmark. In practice, achieving it soon is unlikely unless ongoing military support yields decisive gains. Viewed as the “long-term goal” for a just peace, but near-term prospects are poor unless Russia’s calculus changes dramatically.
Chatham House Plan(“Dangers of a False Peace”) – Timothy Ash et al. May 2023 (Chatham House report)
“Peace through victory”: categorically oppose any premature ceasefire or territorial concessions to Russia, which would reward aggression.
– Maximize military pressure: significantly increase Western arms deliveries (tanks, long-range missiles, air defenses, etc.) to enable Ukraine to reclaim territory and convince Putin he cannot win.
– Maintain and tighten sanctions on Russia to strain its war effort; prepare for long-term isolation of Russia unless it withdraws.
– Emphasize that only a Russian defeat will bring a durable peace – otherwise any pause will be used by Moscow to rearm (cites lessons of Minsk agreements). Warn against “false peace” proposals that sound appealing but undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Moderate to Long-Term – This strategy underpins current Western policy, but its success hinges on Ukraine’s battlefield performance and sustained international support. If Ukraine eventually pushes Russia into a corner (or at least stalemate) so that the Kremlin sues for peace, a just peace on Ukrainian terms becomes feasible. However, in the interim, this approach means a prolonged war with attendant risks (escalation, war fatigue). Politically, Western unity is required; any wavering could imperil it. Overall, it’s credible only if the coalition stays committed and Russia’s military continues to erode. If those conditions hold, it could yield a highly favorable outcome for Ukraine – albeit after a potentially high cost in time and lives.
Haass–Kupchan “Sequenced” Plan (CFR, Foreign Affairs) Apr 2023
Two-phase strategy: (1) “Fight then talk” – boost Ukraine’s military capability through summer 2023 to gain ground; (2) in late 2023, push for a **ceasefire** as front lines stabilize, moving diplomacy front and center.
– Ceasefire & DMZ: Implement a ceasefire along the new line of contact; create a demilitarized zone with both sides pulling back and neutral observers (U.N./OSCE) verifying compliance.
– Parallel negotiations: Ukraine and Russia engage in peace talks (facilitated by mediators) on issues like occupied territories’ status, while NATO/allies open talks with Russia on European security arrangements (arms control, NATO posture).
– No forced concessions: Ukraine would not be required to recognize Russian annexations – disputed areas would be “frozen” (status quo maintained) pending further negotiation.
– Incentives: Limited sanctions relief offered to Russia for good-faith participation; in return, Russia to accept international peacekeepers/monitors. Security pact offered to Ukraine (by US/UK/France etc.) to guarantee its safety during and after talks; EU aid/accession process accelerated as part of peace dividend.
Medium (Conditional) – This plan assumes a stalemate scenario where both sides are looking for an off-ramp. It’s plausible if by a certain point neither Ukraine nor Russia can make further major gains (a “hurting stalemate”) and external pressure (from the West, China, etc.) is applied for a pause. The ceasefire-without-settlement approach could stop the bloodshed and preserve Ukraine’s statehood, but risks creating a Korean War–like frozen conflict if final talks drag on without resolution. Ukraine might accept it only if confident of ongoing Western support (to avoid the ceasefire becoming permanent partition). Russia might accept if it’s facing battlefield exhaustion and sees a ceasefire as a way to keep some territorial gains. In late 2023, conditions weren’t yet ripe – fighting continued. But in a future war-weary moment, this sequenced approach could gain traction. Likelihood: moderate if military deadlock and Western unity to push Kyiv for talks; until then, Ukraine resists a pause.
RAND “Avoiding a Long War” (Charap & Priebe) Jan 2023
Prioritize ending the war sooner to reduce risks of escalation (direct NATO-Russia clash, nuclear use) and global economic harm. “The longer the war, the greater the danger,” so Western policy should pivot from open-ended support to facilitating a peace process.
– Acknowledge stalemate: Recognize that neither side is likely to achieve absolute victory – Russia cannot conquer Ukraine entirely, and Ukraine (without NATO troops) is unlikely to expel Russia from all occupied lands in the near term. Therefore, prepare for a compromise outcome.
– Diplomatic surge: The U.S. and allies to “spur talks” by communicating potential endgame parameters privately. For example, explore a deal around Russia withdrawing to the Feb 23, 2022 lines (giving up Kherson/Zaporizhzhia advances, but Crimea and parts of Donbas remain under de facto Russian control for now) in exchange for an armistice and phased sanction relief.
– Limit aims: Subtly encourage Ukraine to moderate its war aims (e.g. not insist on regaining Crimea before talks) by conditioning some support. Emphasize securing Ukraine’s core sovereignty and Western orientation, while deferring more contentious issues.
– Internationalize talks: possibly involve U.N. or neutral states to broker ceasefire terms; ensure any agreement includes monitoring and enforcement clauses to prevent Russian relapse.
Uncertain/Controversial – While logically highlighting real risks, this approach faces major political hurdles. At the time of release, it was seen as undermining Ukrainian morale and unity – effectively asking Ukraine to compromise when it felt momentum (after Russian setbacks in Kharkiv/Kherson). For Western leaders, actively pushing Kyiv to negotiate (and possibly withholding aid as leverage) is politically fraught, given the moral stance against Russian aggression. Additionally, Russia had shown no serious interest in a fair settlement, so urging talks might have simply resulted in demands Ukraine couldn’t accept. Thus, the RAND approach had low uptake in 2023. However, its premise – that an indefinite war carries grave costs and that at some point the West might recalibrate – could gain traction if frontline dynamics stagnate and domestic opposition to aid grows in Western countries. It’s a plan more attuned to U.S. strategic interests (focus on China, avoid nuclear scenarios) than to Ukrainian aspirations, so its success would require careful diplomacy to not fracture the alliance. In summary: possible in a future scenario of war-weariness, but not likely until both Washington and Kyiv see no better alternative.
Quincy Institute Plan (Beebe & Lieven) Feb 2024
Negotiation over attrition: Argues Ukraine’s position is deteriorating in a war of attrition; thus, seek a negotiated settlement ASAP to preserve a sovereign Ukraine.
– Address Russia’s core demands through diplomacy: Signal openness to discuss NATO expansion concerns – e.g., Ukraine could adopt a form of neutrality or NATO non-membership as part of a deal. In return, Russia must halt aggression and accept Ukraine’s Western integration in other forms (EU membership, economic ties).
– Territorial compromise: A possible deal might involve Russia withdrawing from areas seized in 2022 (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, parts of Donbas), but Crimea and parts of Donbas occupied since 2014 could be temporarily excepted – their status to be settled later via international agreement. Ukraine would not recognize Russia’s sovereignty over these, but agree to a long-term freeze or administration arrangement.
– Enforced security: Use Cold War–style verified arms control and U.N.-backed guarantees. E.g., prohibit Russia from stationing heavy forces near a new border, and correspondingly Ukraine could limit deployment of certain systems as well – all under international monitoring. Establish a robust U.N. or great-power guarantor group to monitor compliance (perhaps akin to Istanbul draft’s guarantor concept).
– U.S.–Russia bargaining: The U.S. to offer Russia a face-saving path: relief from some sanctions and a roadmap to rejoin global economy if Russia genuinely makes peace and respects the deal. Simultaneously, make clear that if Russia reneges, consequences will snap back (sanctions, military aid to Ukraine, etc.). Essentially, give Putin a stark choice between ongoing war (with unwinnable costs) or a negotiated truce that secures some of Russia’s stated interests.
Low (Presently) – This plan is the most conciliatory to Russia, making it politically toxic in Ukraine absent a drastic shift in battlefield fortunes. As of early 2024, Ukrainians are not willing to trade NATO aspirations or accept a loss of territory in exchange for peace – especially given the atrocities suffered. Any Ukrainian leader agreeing to permanent neutrality or conceding Crimea would face public outrage. Moreover, trust in Russia honoring any deal is near zero; strong guarantees would be needed, but even those might not assuage Ukrainian fears. From the Western side, openly signaling willingness to limit NATO enlargement or lift sanctions could be seen as rewarding aggression, unless packaged within a clear Russian climb-down. That said, if military options were exhausted – e.g., a stalled front for years, mounting casualties, and Western aid diminishing – a version of this compromise might gain consideration as a least-worst option. It aligns with what some realpolitik voices suggest (prioritize ending war over reversing every aggression immediately). Ultimately, its success would require firm enforcement mechanisms and probably a different Russian leadership to be remotely acceptable. As things stand, it’s unlikely to be implemented, but it contributes to thinking about how to stop the war before total victory, should that become necessary.
China’s 12-Point Plan Feb 2023
Ceasefire and Talks: Calls for a quick ceasefire and the start of negotiations, asserting that “dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution”. Does not spell out withdrawal of Russian troops, effectively implying a freeze in-place.
– Respect Sovereignty (in principle): States that sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries should be upheld, but simultaneously urges “abandoning Cold War mentality,” meaning Russia’s security concerns about NATO should be addressed. This ambiguity left it unclear how Ukraine’s sovereignty is restored if Russian forces remain.
– Humanitarian and economic measures: Urges protection of civilians and POWs, support for humanitarian aid, and continuation of the grain export deal. Opposes use of nuclear weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities (a clear reference to Zaporizhzhia NPP and nuclear rhetoric). Calls for ending unilateral sanctions on Russia and taking steps to stabilize global supply chains and inflation.
– Post-conflict vision: Mentions facilitating post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, without details. Suggests that the international community (with China’s participation) would help rebuild, implicitly after a negotiated settlement.
Very Low (as a roadmap) – While diplomatically notable, China’s plan is seen as too vague and one-sided to achieve a real peace. It fails to identify aggressor vs. victim or demand Russia undo its invasion, which is why Ukraine and its allies responded coolly. A ceasefire with Russian troops on Ukrainian soil is a non-starter for Kyiv, as it would validate occupation. Western officials suspect China’s plan was more about political positioning than a serious solution. Indeed, China has not applied pressure on Russia to adhere even to the spirit of Point 1 (sovereignty) – Chinese officials continue to blame NATO expansion for the war and haven’t condemned Russia’s invasion. However, if down the line Russia were ready for talks, China could play a role as a mediator, given its influence. The 12-point paper could then serve as a baseline for initial talks (e.g. ceasefire, humanitarian exchange) if supplemented by specifics on troop withdrawals and international supervision. As it stands, it’s more of a diplomatic statement than a operational peace plan, and its likelihood of directly leading to peace is minimal unless it is substantively built upon in a broader negotiation framework.
African Leaders’ 10-Point Proposal (Ramaphosa & others) June 2023 (mission to Kyiv/Moscow)
Phase 1 – Confidence Building: Proposed immediate steps to reduce tension: some Russian troop pullback (e.g. from certain areas or as a goodwill gesture); removal of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus (installed during the war); suspension of the ICC arrest warrant for Putin during negotiations; and a degree of sanctions easing to incentivize Moscow. Also urged return of Ukrainian POWs and children taken to Russia (humanitarian gesture).
– Phase 2 – Ceasefire: Using the above measures to create a conducive atmosphere, push for a ceasefire agreement with a halt to all hostilities. This might involve formalizing the current lines as a temporary truce line.
– Phase 3 – Negotiations: Launch Ukraine-Russia peace talks “to resolve the conflict”, while separately having talks between Russia and the West (U.S./EU) on strategic issues like missiles and nuclear threats. The African leaders emphasized addressing both the Ukraine-specific issues and the broader NATO-Russia standoff (they referenced medium-range missile deployments, etc.).
– Global South considerations: Highlighted how war and sanctions harm African economies, calling for unblocking grain exports and fertilizers. Implicitly, a settlement should restore trade flows (which means securing the Black Sea routes and possibly lifting sanctions that impede Russian food/fertilizer exports).
Low – While diplomatically significant, this initiative did not substantially shift either side’s stance. Ukraine appreciated Africa’s concern but reiterated that Russian troops on its soil are the fundamental issue – and the proposal didn’t ensure their removal. The idea of suspending Putin’s war crimes warrant or easing sanctions was also hard to swallow for Ukraine and many Western backers absent real Russian concessions. Russia, for its part, did not seriously entertain pulling back or withdrawing (in fact, it continued offensive operations). That said, some elements (prisoner exchanges, grain deal revival) had more traction and saw partial progress via separate channels. The African plan’s emphasis on “global South voices” and neutrality did increase diplomatic pressure in the U.N. for addressing the war. In terms of ending the conflict, however, its chances were slim unless paired with a major change in war dynamics. It served as a reminder that many countries want the war ended sooner (even at cost of some compromise) – a point Ukraine must navigate as it seeks continued worldwide support.
Indonesia’s Ceasefire & Referendum Plan June 2023 (Shangri-La Dialogue)
Immediate Ceasefire: Both sides to stop fighting unconditionally and freeze positions.
– Demilitarized Buffer Zone: Create a U.N.-monitored demilitarized zone \~15 km deep on either side of the ceasefire line. Troops withdraw from this zone to prevent clashes. Deploy U.N. peacekeepers to patrol the DMZ (Indonesia offered this idea to ensure neither side resumes hostilities).
– UN-Supervised Referenda: Hold referendums in the “disputed areas” (the territories claimed by both Ukraine and Russia) under U.N. auspices. The vote would “ascertain objectively” the will of the local inhabitants regarding which country they wish to be part of. The implicit areas in question were Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia (and possibly Crimea).
– International Endorsement: Indonesia sought a statement from the Shangri-La Dialogue participants supporting this plan, hoping global backing would pressure the parties. It framed the proposal as a balanced solution respecting self-determination and peace.
Very Low – Ukraine flatly rejected this plan within hours. From Kyiv’s perspective, there are no “disputed” territories – only Ukrainian land illegally occupied. A referendum under occupation (especially after so many Ukrainians have fled and with censorship/propaganda in those regions) would be far from fair. Even a U.N.-run vote would effectively reward Russia’s ethnic cleansing and could legitimize outcomes achieved by force. Additionally, Ukraine argues that its people already chose independence and unity in 1991 (when all regions, including Donbas and Crimea, voted to be part of Ukraine). The ceasefire aspect was also a non-starter at that time, as Ukraine was gearing up for counteroffensive and believed a pause would help Russia. As for Russia, it didn’t formally comment, but in past conflicts Russia has sometimes favored referendums (it orchestrated sham ones in 2022 to claim annexations). However, a truly neutral referendum might risk Russia losing, so it’s not clear Putin would agree either. Overall, this plan, while creative, gained no traction. It highlighted a core dilemma: Ukraine cannot accept anything undermining its territorial integrity, and Russia isn’t interested in internationally validated processes it can’t control.
2022 Istanbul Draft (Historic Reference) March 2022 (negotiations in Istanbul)
Permanent Neutrality of Ukraine: Ukraine would amend its constitution to affirm a neutral, non-aligned status (no NATO membership) and no foreign military bases on its soil.
– Security Guarantees: In return, a group of guarantor states (including NATO’s major powers and also Russia, China, Turkey) would sign a treaty to guarantee Ukraine’s security. If Ukraine is attacked, guarantors would consult immediately and could act to defend Ukraine (though Russia sought to dilute this).
– Territorial Issues Deferred: Status of Crimea would be put aside for 15 years of negotiations (effectively agreeing to disagree for now). During that period, neither side undertakes hostile acts regarding Crimea. Similar arrangements for parts of Donbas were discussed (likely autonomous status within Ukraine, but details not finalized).
– Troop Withdrawal: Russia would withdraw forces to positions held pre-invasion (Feb 23, 2022 lines). Ukraine would likely accept some limits on the size of its armed forces (caps on troop numbers and certain weapons) as part of the deal.
– Language/Cultural Rights: Draft texts included Ukraine agreeing to protect the Russian language rights and perhaps reconsider some nationalist laws, addressing one of Russia’s stated pretexts for invasion.
N/A (Talks Collapsed) – This near-agreement is illustrative of what might have been possible early in the war, before atrocities and full mobilization poisoned the atmosphere. It met both sides partway: Ukraine gave on NATO, Russia (ostensibly) gave on regime change and allowed Ukraine’s independence with security guarantees. However, events overtook it – war fortunes shifted, and neither side ultimately signed it. In today’s context, the Istanbul terms are mostly overtaken by events: Ukraine has since formally applied for NATO and is less inclined to trust any Russian guarantees, and Russia in September 2022 claimed to annex more territory, hardening its demands. Still, the Istanbul draft is a historical blueprint showing that compromise was once imaginable. If severe stalemate hits, future negotiators might dust off some of these concepts (neutrality, deferring disputed regions, guarantees by major powers). But implementing a similar deal now would require tremendous goodwill and verification, given the brutality of the war since.


References
Zelensky’s peace plan: ten essential points
Comparing Pathways to Peace in Ukraine—Davis Center
How to Win: a Seven Point Plan for Sustainable Peace in Ukraine—CEPA
The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine—Russia Matters
The argument for settling for talks and avoiding a “long war” in Ukraine—Washington Post
The Diplomatic Path to a Secure Ukraine—Quincy Institute
African leaders to propose ‘confidence building measures’ to Russia, Ukraine—Reuters
What happened the last time Russia and Ukraine held peace talks?—Reuters
China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis—Wikipedia
Indonesia proposes demilitarised zone, UN referendum for Ukraine peace plan—Reuters
In Search of a Formula for Lasting Peace in Ukraine—USIP

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What Would Metternich Do?

Those who do not know history are doomed to say stupid things about it, I guess. At UnHerd Wolfgang Munchau writes:

The greatest diplomats of all time were a Frenchman and an Austrian. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord was a master of political opportunism, rivalled only by his Habsburg counterpart, Klemens von Metternich. Talleyrand and Metternich were the chief diplomats of global powers. After Napoleon’s defeat, France was a much-diminished country with no military leverage. Talleyrand’s masterstroke consisted of carving out a niche for France by playing everyone off against each other — the British against the Prussians, and the Austrians against the Russians. He did not exactly invent the notion of a balance of power, but he exploited it with unrivalled genius.

Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) was born into the petty nobility and elevated to prince for his services to the Austrian Empire. He hated liberalism, democracy, and nationalism and was committed to the advancement of empire in Europe. The corresponding figure, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838) had a similar biography and views.

What would Metternich have done done about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? He would have gleefully engineered a division of Ukraine between Russia and Poland. As Mr. Munchau observes, he would have played China and the United States off against each other to the benefit of neither but fostering European imperialistic designs. He would have been delighted with a European Union, so long as it was ruled by an emperor and aristocrats. How he would have felt about the influx of Middle Easterners and Africans into Europe can only be imagined.

I suspect there are plenty of would-be Metternichs in Europe right now but they all belong to the Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) or the corresponding party in France, Rassemblement national (National Rally formerly National Front) or the corresponding parties in the Netherlands, Italy, etc. That’s something that grimly amuses me. I think it’s foolish for any American to seek fellowship with right-wing European parties. European politics is just too different from ours.

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Fourth of July 2025

For the first time in years I took no pictures of the Sauganash Fourth of July parade. It rained immediately before the parade and during the first part of it and attendance was down, both by participants and viewers. There was only one band (the Shannon Pipers) and relatively few groups marching.

Still, quite a few of my neighbors paraded down the street—considerably more than the number in the audience. As I’ve said before “parade” is a verb here.

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The Challenge of a Millennium

Nearly three-quarters of people with “white collar” jobs have four year college degrees or higher. Keep that in mind as you read this article by Chip Cutter and Haley Zimmerman at the Wall Street Journal:

CEOs are no longer dodging the question of whether AI takes jobs. Now they are giving predictions of how deep those cuts could go.

“Artificial intelligence is going to replace literally half of all white-collar workers in the U.S.,” Ford Motor Chief Executive Jim Farley said in an interview last week with author Walter Isaacson at the Aspen Ideas Festival. “AI will leave a lot of white-collar people behind.”

At JPMorgan Chase Marianne Lake, CEO of the bank’s massive consumer and community business, told investors in May that she could see its operations head count falling by 10% in the coming years as the company uses new AI tools.

The comments echo recent job warnings from executives at Amazon Anthropic and other companies.

Amazon CEO Andy Jassy wrote in a note to employees in June that he expected the company’s overall corporate workforce to be smaller in the coming years because of the “once-in-a-lifetime” AI technology.

“We will need fewer people doing some of the jobs that are being done today, and more people doing other types of jobs,” Jassy said.

Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei said in May that half of all entry-level jobs could disappear in one to five years, resulting in U.S. unemployment of 10% to 20%, according to an interview with Axios. He urged company executives and government officials to stop “sugarcoating” the situation.

Slight more than thirty years ago policy makers of both parties whole-heartedly embraced the notion that higher education was the key to a bright future. That has guided policy ever since. I have always thought it was short-sighted for relatively simple mathematical, psychological, and pragmatic reasons.

Those who benefit from a college education have IQs between one and two standard deviations above normal (less than 15% of the population). Individuals with IQs much below that struggle in college. Many will drop out having incurred considerable debt. Individuals with IQs much above that don’t actually need college. They’ll learn well enough without it.

In the olden days when I was in school about 10% of those of age went on to graduate from college. They were mostly pre-professional or pre-managerial. Nowadays nearly 40% of young people graduate from college and nearly 60% of young people have at least some college, degree or not. Many of them are doing jobs that would previously have been done without college educations.

No “white collar” jobs for them will not make them happy or erase their educational debts.

I suspect that “half” is understating the problem. I suspect that every “white collar” job that is not legally protected or that lacks the power to protect itself is at risk whether it makes sense or not. I doubt that many Fortune 500 CEOs will lose their jobs due to AI (even if AI could do those jobs better and cheaper).

That in turn will create a new problem. Why go to college? I daresay that most of those going to college do it as job preparation. What if college doesn’t prepare you for any jobs? Indeed, I suspect that problem is already here. Almost 90% of college students are already using AI. How much sense does it actually make to pay upwards of $50,000 per year to have AI do your work for you?

Oxford and the University of Bologna were founded in the 11th century. Cambridge and the Sorbonne were founded in the 13th century. In my view artificial intelligence presents an existential challenge to higher education greater than any they’ve faced in the more than a millennium during which higher education has existed.

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The Persistence Theory

It’s also called “hasty generalization”. An example of the persistence theory is “if it rained today, it will probably rain tomorrow”.

IMO a remarkable amount of bad policy relies on the persistence theory.

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AI vs. AI

If you’re not familiar with it, ADP is the largest payroll processing company in the United States. As such its reports on payroll numbers garner some attention as Shannon Carroll reports at Quartz:

The U.S. labor market just hit a serious speed bump.

Private employers cut 33,000 jobs in June, according to fresh data on private payroll numbers from ADP — the worst showing in more than two years (since March 2023) and a surprise move in the wrong direction. After months of sluggish but steady hiring, the engine appears to have stalled.

The numbers came in sharply below economists’ expectations, which aimed for gains between 95,000 and 103,000. It’s a stark reversal from May’s revised modest growth of 29,000 jobs (down from 37,000).

And the losses weren’t spread evenly: June’s decline was largely driven by small- and medium-cap, service-producing companies. Large companies (with 500-plus employees) added jobs. Professional and business services took a massive hit, shedding 56,000 roles, while education and health services lost 52,000. Meanwhile, some traditionally volatile sectors — such as leisure and hospitality — managed to notch gains, suggesting a growing mismatch regarding where jobs are growing versus where they’re disappearing.

“Though layoffs continue to be rare, a hesitancy to hire and a reluctance to replace departing workers led to job losses last month,” ADP’s chief economist, Dr. Nela Richardson, said in a statement. “Still, the slowdown in hiring has yet to disrupt pay growth.”

I have a sneaking suspicion that artificial intelligence is a significant part of this downturn in more ways than one.

One of the ways, of course, is that firms don’t know whether the job for which they’re hiring will be more effectively done using generative or agentic artificial intelligence than a human employee or how soon. But there’s another way, too.

I think that employers are using AI for screening and applicants are using AI to prepare applications, resumes, etc. so widely that employers don’t know whether to hire the applicants or not.

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