I had to mull this Washington Post editorial over for a while before I recognized what the actual question being raised was. The editorial opens with a condemnation of equity in an Australian mining company owned by the federal government:
The United States government became the second-largest shareholder in an Australian mining company last week. If there’s a compelling case to gamble taxpayer money like this, the Trump administration hasn’t made it.
and continues with an explanation of it:
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced plans Wednesday to convert a $31 million loan to Syrah Resources, which operates a graphite mine in Mozambique, into a 20 percent equity stake. The move is an attempt to counter China’s control of the world’s supply of graphite, which is essential for rechargeable batteries that power electric vehicles and energy storage systems for the U.S. grid.
and a bit later notes that the federal government has equity stakes in a number of other foreign concerns:
The administration has already used taxpayer dollars to buy equity stakes in other critical mineral companies, such as Trilogy Metals, Lithium Americas, MP Materials, Vulcan Elements, Korea Zinc and USA Rare Earth. It’s also entered into an agreement to take a 10 percent stake in Intel, the chip manufacturer, and secured a “golden share” of U.S. Steel while negotiating the acquisition of that company by Japan’s Nippon.
before making the following recommendation:
There may be a case for limited government intervention to guarantee the supply of certain inputs into products crucial for national security. But a better way to ensure that happens is reducing trade barriers with allies rather than allowing bureaucrats to bet on which firms might be successful.
They never address the underlying questions: should the federal Development Finance Corporation (DFC) exist at all and, if so, what should it do?
The DFC was created as part of the 2018 BUILD Act which had broad bipartisan support. It makes loans to foreign corporations and takes equity stakes in them, ostensibly for national security reasons. Both loans to foreign corporations and equity stakes taken by it are treated as subsidy costs without consideration of possible future earnings.
I understand the editors’ concerns. They accept the goal of secure supply chains. They would prefer trade liberalization over government investment. They never come to terms with whether that’s actually feasible under present geopolitical constraints.
Gold is where you find it—we can’t control where the materials we need will originate from. And, yes, private companies can take equity stakes in overseas companies but will they? CEOs evaluate investments based on cost, risk, and return. Must the federal government guarantee those investments in some way? Should the federal government be in the business of guaranteeing private investments?
Trade with allies does not change the geographic concentration of minerals, China’s dominance of some strategic commodities, or reduce the risks that political instability in some of the places that produce strategic materials introduces. Are the editors concerned about the risks involved or how the DFC’s investments are scored?
I have mixed feelings about all of this. I think we should maintain low tariffs with Canada and Mexico and encourage U. S. companies to invest in Canadian and Mexican companies. I’m not as confident about concerns in countries that are separated from the U. S. by 10,000 miles of ocean. Many but not all of the strategically sensitive materials we’re trying to secure with the DFC we continue to have in considerable amounts but block companies from producing with environmental and other federal regulations. Liberalizing or eliminating those would go far to solve the problem the DFC was intended to.







