I’m not sure what has evoked the bumper crop of articles on the situation in which the Democrats find themselves. Maybe it’s the dog days of summer. Writing always slows down then. Maybe they’re being written by ChatGPT. Maybe it’s Zohran Mamdani’s campaign for mayor of New York. Maybe it’s polls like the most recent Quinnipiac poll:

Fewer than 2 in 10 voters (19 percent) approve of the way the Democrats in Congress are handling their job, while 72 percent disapprove and 10 percent did not offer an opinion. This is a record low since March 2009 when the Quinnipiac University Poll first began asking this question of registered voters.

Among Democrats, 39 percent approve of the way the Democrats in Congress are handling their job, while 52 percent disapprove and 9 percent did not offer an opinion.

The Republicans don’t fare a lot better:

One-third of voters (33 percent) approve of the way the Republicans in Congress are handling their job, while 62 percent disapprove and 5 percent did not offer an opinion.

Among Republicans, 77 percent approve of the way the Republicans in Congress are handling their job, while 20 percent disapprove and 3 percent did not offer an opinion.

Quinnipiac doesn’t ask about “own Congressman”. But that’s a significant difference in approval between Democrats and Republicans. I suspect that Karl Rove (of all people) has the thinking of the Democratic leadership about right in his most recent WSJ column:

Maybe blind opposition to anything Mr. Trump does will be enough to sweep the midterms, especially if the economy weakens.

but he’s right about his as well:

Even so, effective leadership that shaped a forward-looking agenda and undercut the White House on important issues would produce a bigger Democratic victory.

There are explanations being forwarded other than lack of effective leadership. The gang at Liberal Patriot (Ruy Teixeira, John Halpin, etc., Democrats all) continue to beat the drum that the Democratic leadership must embrace positions held by more than 20% of the electorate if they seek to be a “big tent” party. That 20% is coincidentally quite close to the approval rating for Congressional Democrats reports by the Quinnipiac poll.

Some think that the Democrats’ problem is that they’re just not radical enough. I would venture that’s the view of Mamdani’s supporters in New York.

My own opinion is that while opposition to Trump might, as Mr. Rove says, be enough to gain some seats in the midterms, it won’t tell the 70% who disapprove of them anything about what they actually support.

The editors of the Washington Post point out that furnishing additional weapons to Ukraine and applying sanctions against China, India, and Brazil as long as their purchases of Russian oil and gas finance Russia’s war against Ukraine aren’t “done deals”:

President Donald Trump on Monday finally announced he would send more weapons to Ukraine, a sign of renewed attention to and appreciation of the besieged country’s position. He also issued a risky ultimatum to Russian President Vladimir Putin, warning he would apply punishing “secondary sanctions” on countries that continue to trade with Russia if the Kremlin fails to reach a peace deal with Ukraine within 50 days. If the sanctions kick in, they could hurt Russia — but also the whole world economy.

and

For the sake of Ukraine specifically and American credibility generally, Trump cannot back down.

Trump is clearly frustrated with Putin. On Monday, he described having “pleasant” and “lovely” telephone conversations with the Russian president, only to find out soon after that Russian missiles and drones were pulverizing yet another Ukrainian city. Whether that frustration manifests in strong, sustained U.S. support for Ukraine, in weapons shipments and other measures, will determine how this conflict finally ends.

There are plenty of reasons to be doubtful. President Trump is famously mercurial. What he says he’ll do or support today may or may not be what he’ll do or support tomorrow.

Additionally, sending additional weapons to Ukraine is a more complex process than you might think. What’s being discussed is our NATO allies sending additional weapons to Ukraine and then paying us to replace them. That is like herding cats. We don’t know what will actually be accomplished.

We also do not know just how many replacement weapons systems will be needed, how many of those sent to Ukraine have been destroyed, or how many we can produce. 740 Patriot are scheduled to be produced through the end of 2025 and that can’t be expanded ad libitum.

I’m still waiting for someone to enunciate a clear plan on how Ukrainian President Zelensky’s 10 point plan can be accomplished or whether he’ll accept anything short of that. The editors mention President Putin’s maximalist demands without any reference to President Zelensky’s. Is U. S. support conditional on both sides accepting something less than their maximalist demands and how will that be accomplished?

As to the secondary sanctions, as I said yesterday, I’ll believe them when I see them. Sanctions to be applied in 50 days remind me of the story of the Caliph, the Grand Vizier, and the donkey.

My reaction to our present political situation is disappointment. I’m disappointed with both of our political parties.

The Republicans accomplished a veronica (definition 3) in passing the “big beautiful bill”. Unfortunately, they were more motivated to extend the tax reforms of the first Trump administration than they were to improve on them. They didn’t rebuild the U. S. military, basically cutting military spending in real terms. Their “cutting” of Medicaid isn’t nearly as draconian as their political opponents would have you believe but they will certainly make for good campaign ads for the 2026 midterms. My concerns about the BBB are that I suspect it isn’t likely to spur investment much if at all but it will reduce consumption, particularly in combination with import duties.

I’m no happier with the Democrats. We are in circumstances which if not unique are at least unusual. I don’t believe we’ve had a situation in which the the president’s political party controlled both houses of Congress by such small numbers in my lifetime—I think the closest was when Woodrow Wilson was president. Under the circumstances, I think the Democrats should have produced an alternative budget proposal. That has been the practice within recent history. Instead they opposed any proposed budget. That doesn’t tell us much about what they support only what they oppose. We already knew they detested Trump.

Past assessments of allowing the tax cuts of Trump’s first term to expire, for example from the CBO, have suggested doing so would cause a reduction in GDP in the short term but that continuing to run at a deficit would enhance growth in the long term. I continue to look for complete assessments of the consequences of the enacted budget from reliable sources. Those I have read to date are partial assessments, typically not including both the spending and tax portions of the legislation.

The editors of the Washington Post call for an end to the fighting in Gaza:

After 21 months of devastating warfare, Israel and the terrorist group Hamas appear tantalizingly, frustratingly close to a ceasefire that could lead to the release of some Israeli hostages and a flow of desperately needed food and medical supplies into Gaza. But close is not a deal. We’ve been here before, only to see hoped-for ceasefires fall apart.

They say that the “outlines of a deal” are obvious.

The contours of a new ceasefire deal — and a permanent end to the conflict — are plain to see. In the first phase, a 60-day truce, Hamas needs to account for the 50 remaining Israeli hostages (some of whom are believed to be dead), and release at least half. Israel must release hundreds of Palestinians and let the United Nations and other international aid agencies into Gaza to start providing food, fresh water, cooking oil, infant formula, diapers, medicines and other essentials.

During the ceasefire, Hamas must be forced to accept — through Qatari and Egyptian mediators — that its reign of terror over Gaza’s population must end. Now might be a good time to coerce Hamas. The group’s main benefactor, Iran, has been weakened by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, and Israel has degraded Iran’s main regional proxy, Hezbollah.

I’m completely baffled by that. Such polling data as exists tells us that the majority of Gazans still support Hamas and blame Israel for, well, everything.

Other than the situation in Iran little has changed since October 8. Hamas continues to reject any ceasefire and is supported by Gazans. It continues to hold hostages including the population of Gaza. What is there for Hamas if its control over Gaza ends? How do they envision that Qatar and Egypt will “coerce” Hamas?

Why should Israel accept that Hamas remain in place, holding half of the remaining hostages? Showing mercy on the Gazans? It is to laugh.

My personal view remains the same: the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians remains a “wicked problem”. It has no solution acceptable to both parties and the role in it most favorable to the United States is sorrowful silence.

In the many reactions to the flooding in Texas I’ve read one with which I agreed wholeheartedly from Tim Palmer in the New York Times. His message is simple: stop building in floodplains.

Most of the rest have been partisan bickering.

Just for the record I think that Federal Emergency Management Agency should continue to exist and has a valuable role to perform. But I have a question. What should FEMA’s role be?

In FEMA’s empowering legislation, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, FEMA role is set out as to provide assistance from the federal government to state and local governments, development mitigation plans as guidelines for how the damage from natural disasters, may be minimized, etc. It doesn’t empower FEMA to take the lead in all disaster situations. That remains the responsibility of state and local governments. I agree with that.

There would appear to be several alternatives:

1. FEMA could retain its statutory responsibility and act as a backup to state and local governments.
2. It could automatically take the lead in all disaster situations.
3. Some hybrid of the two?

What should FEMA’s role be?

I certainly don’t think it should facilitate states maintaining low taxes or allow high-tax states to use their funds for other priorities. The moral hazard of that is obvious.

The statistics tell us that crime is decreasing. That’s truth of both violent and non-violent crimes. You don’t need to take my word for it. A quick Google search reveals that.

However, indirect measures seem to tell a somewhat different story. Those indirect measures include businesses leaving major cities, individuals leaving major cities, one-way van rental, etc.

As it turns out I’m not the first person to notice this apparent discrepancy. Alan Ehrenhalt wrote at Governing back in January:

As I write this, we are witnessing a decline in violent crime approaching the one that occurred in the 1990s. If the lessons of that decade are a reliable guide, public confidence in urban safety should be bouncing back again. This time, though, it isn’t happening.

The numbers themselves, especially the latest ones, are pretty striking. According to the FBI, the number of murders in the United States fell in 2023 by the steepest rate ever recorded. That pattern persisted in 2024. As of October, homicides were down about 16 percent nationwide, just compared with the previous year.

Not all cities enjoyed the same relief, but most did. Detroit was on track in 2023 to record its lowest homicide rates in 57 years. Washington, D.C., which had a disturbingly high rate of violent crime in 2023, saw it drop precipitately in 2024. Killings in the district fell from 273 to 190 during the same period. After a spike in violence that coincided with the worst period of COVID-19, the numbers in many places were lower than they were before the pandemic came along.

The streets may have grown significantly safer in a remarkably short time, but so far at least the public doesn’t seem to be buying it. A 2024 Gallup poll found that 25 percent of respondents identified crime as an extremely serious problem, one of the highest rates of concern in a long time. In another survey, two-thirds of respondents said they believed crime was increasing.

He went on to remark on how shoplifting, in particular, was increasing and becoming more organized and how random many crimes seemed to be.

I’ve already documented why there’s plenty of room to be suspicious of crime statistics here in Chicago except for homicides. However, our homicide rate adjusted for population is at the lowest level since 2015.

Do the statistics actually reflect the reality? Or is people’s behavior a better gauge of reality than the statistics? Or is it possible the statistics to tell us the crime is down are right but people are correct in believing it isn’t?

One last point. As this article at the Council on Criminal Justice notes, there is a disparity between the trends for violent non-lethal crime about black Americans and other races and ethnicities.

Here’s something else I’ll believe when I see it. I just heard Sens. Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal declaring their joint support for a piece of legislation that would grant President Trump the authority (without additional Congressional supervision) to impose additional 500% tariffs on goods from China, India, and Brazil on the grounds that those counties are financing Russia’s war against Ukraine by purchasing oil and reselling it.

There are so many “ifs” in that statement that sounds to me more like a campaign promise than a policy. If Congress passes the bill… If President Trump imposes the tariffs without suspending them… If sky-high tariffs are enough to deter China, India, and Brazil from purchasing Russian oil… If removing Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian purchases of Russian oil is sufficient to bring Russia to end its aggression on Ukraine…

And, of course, if that can be done without producing a serious recession in the United States.

Frankly, I’m skeptical.

At USA Today Secretary of State Marco Rubio lauds our NATO allies for their pledge to spend 5% of GDP on security:

Winston Churchill once stated, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”

Although the United States has been united by treaty with its NATO allies for nearly 80 years, in the years before Donald Trump becoming president, the United States would have had to fight any major war in Europe effectively alone.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s combined military capabilities had steadily degraded to the point of almost total impotence. Fortunately, President Trump’s decade-long calls for NATO allies to contribute more to shared security have recently been answered with a historic commitment among allies to spend a once-unthinkable 5% of gross domestic product on defense ? a number that reflects both fairness and strategic wisdom.

Not so fast, says Gabriel Elefteriu at Brussels Signal:

Last month’s NATO summit in The Hague gave off the disturbing impression of an alliance finally crossing the fine line between serious defence policy into the realm of make-believe. The main outcome was presented to the world as a “new 5 per cent defence spending pledge” by all allies. The previous target, dating from 2014, was 2 per cent. President Trump naturally claimed the new benchmark as a “big win”, with the White House calling it a “monumental victory” and a “dramatic” increase in defence contributions across the alliance. Yet hardly any of this is true.

Of the 5 per cent, 1.5 is to be counted as any spending intended to “protect critical infrastructure, defend networks, ensure civil preparedness and resilience, innovate, and strengthen the defence industrial base”. In other words, this part of the grand new defence commitment is really an exercise in accounting, as a variety of existing types of rolling domestic investments can simply be designated as “NATO spending”. Italy already plans to declare a €13.5 billion bridge to Sicily as a contribution towards defending Europe – which would be funny if it weren’t a logical outcome of what NATO defence policy has devolved to.

It’s the other 3.5 per cent that is supposed to provide the real (so-called “core”) defence uplift, though. But even this – leaving aside the separate 1.5 per cent nonsense just mentioned – is merely a target to be achieved by 2035, ten full years from now. Given that Russia is supposed to invade us much sooner than that – according to the usual hysterical European warnings – a 2035 target becomes superfluous as it is clearly disconnected from all official strategic calculations. Not to mention that the previous target from 2014 remains unmet 10 years on, with several NATO members not spending even 2 per cent on defence – among them, major countries like Italy (1.49 per cent), Spain (1.28) or Canada (1.37) – and most of the others hovering just above the threshold by intense cooking of the accounting books.

He goes on to document two reasons these countries won’t live up to these pledges. The first is that they lack the fiscal headroom to do it:

Of course, more money for defence could be raised, in principle – in the UK just as in any other European country – either by cutting spending on welfare, by increasing taxes, or by somehow growing the economy. The well-known problem is that neither Britain nor most of its European peers can afford any of these, let alone hope in some miraculous economic growth. They are too weighed down by regulation, taxes, Green costs, expensive energy, deindustrialisation, an aging population and a migrant onslaught to be able to splurge on rearmament at scale.

The second that they lack the political will to do it:

The third main issue standing in the way of getting even to the 3 per cent is that the the domestic situation across many European countries, especially the deeply sclerotic and mismanaged West European ones is becoming more, not less, socially and economically explosive as time goes by. This means more instability going forward, and therefore more need to divert resources and attention to domestic issues as opposed to worrying about Ukraine. Indeed, it is likely that in the coming years – if it takes that long – more politicians might come to see substantial benefits in extricating their country from the Ukraine imbroglio, as a way to save money, tap into new voting pools, and even obtain better energy prices for their debilitated industries.

He concludes:

For all these reasons, and more, it is almost clear that not only the “5 per cent” NATO target is a chimera, but also the 3.5 by 2035 and even the 3 per cent by 2030 (or later). Whether we believe our own fantasies is neither here nor there, except for the fact that it undermines the credibility of the defence capacity we do have. The problem is that the adversary likely doesn’t share in our beliefs – because, whether it is the Russians or the Chinese, they look at facts and realities as they are and make their strategic moves accordingly.

We, on the other hand, choose to live in a world of our own artificial making, increasingly disconnected from the realities and the real balance of power. What we have now is a make-believe European defence policy, in which the US pretends it still guarantees our security and we pretend to pay for it. Let’s hope we won’t be tested anytime soon.

That last witticism is from a Soviet-era wisecrack: “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us”.

Will the Europeans reform their economies, reduce their spending on welfare, and increase their spending on defense? I’ll believe it when I see it. Here’s France’s military spending as a percent of GDP from MacroTrends:

Can someone explain to me why Jared Bernstein is referred to as an “economist’? My understanding is that his undergraduate degree is in music and his graduate degrees in social work. I’ve never looked at his transcripts but it’s quite possible he’s never taken a course in economics.

BTW that’s my main argument against technocracy. Just because you’re an expert on something does not mean you’re an expert on everything. Indeed, my experience is that it’s almost the opposite of that. The more focused you are on a single subject the less you tend to know about other subjects. There aren’t a lot of true generalists out there.