Rejecting Austerity Means the Germans Must Blink

Tongues are wagging today about a Greek withdrawal from the euro sooner rather than later. The Wall Street Journal:

NEW YORK—U.S. blue-chips were on pace for their eighth loss in nine sessions, as worry mounted about Greece’s possible exit from the euro zone.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 92 points, or 0.7%, to 12728 in midday trading. The Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index declined 10 points, or 0.7%, to 1343 and the Nasdaq Composite shed 17 points, or 0.6%, to 2916.

Art Cashin:

Many floor types think that there is a kind of “rationality put” in the markets. It evolved in the post-Lehman chaos. The premise goes something like this: world leaders were shocked and stunned by the scope and size of the nearly instant damage from Lehman’s fall. That shock caused them to rescue AIG, a far, far bigger project than Lehman.

Since then, central banks and governments have stepped in quickly as each new crisis emerged. (Think things like QE; LTRO; the first Greek bailout, etc., etc). As long as the crises remained in the financial arena, they could be softened and postponed (not cured). Now it is likely there will be a new Greek election and the risk that the Greeks may see it as a chance to make a loud and clear anti-austerity statement. Others, however, seeing the proximity of payment deadlines, and such, may see it as a vote on exiting the Euro.

The smart kids think that everybody including the Greeks are bluffing:

Is a Greek departure from the Eurozone imminent? The smart set in the world media seems to have decided overnight that it is, but I’m not so sure.

The key player, pictured above, is Alexis Tsipras the 37 year-old leader of Syriza, the Coalition of the Radical Left. Greek politics has long been dominated by to main parties, the center-right New Democracy and the center-left PASOK both of which are more patronage networks than real ideological parties. Then off on the far-left was a Communist Party. That party, like many European Communist parties, split between a Moscow-dominated faction and a more independent-minded Eurocommunist tendency. Syriza is coalition of far-left parties with the Eurocommunist faction of the old Communist party at its held. Tsipras, at the age of 37, is obviously too young to be a cold warrior but the point is that the party’s origins are outside of the Greek mainstream. Except that at the most recent elections Syriza emerged as the second-largest party—bigger than PASOK—and even a New Democracy / PASOK grand coaltion couldn’t govern without Syriza participation. Syriza refused to participate, and Greece now looks to be headed to new elections in which Tsipras will do even better.

So what’s his view?

Well on the face of it, his policy makes no sense. He says he rejects the EU-imposed austerity program but wants to stay in the Euro and in the European Union. But Greece has a large primary budget deficit and no source of market financing. The EU is insisting on an austerity program, but it’s also giving them cold hard cash in the interim. Reject the austerity program and you lose the EU/IMF money and need to implement an even harsher austerity program. Tsipras is a bit like a guy standing in your living room threatening to blow his own brains out unless you pay him money, a proposition he offers on the theory that you’d rather not see your furniture ruined.

I have a question for anybody who thinks that austerity for Europe, particularly for Greece, is a bad policy, austerity presumably defined as taxing more and spending less. Austerity is the price that the French and German bankers and European central bankers are demanding of Greece to continue lending money to Greece. If Greece leaves the euro, the new drachma will, presumably, have a value 30 to 50% lower than the euro it replaces and Greece will experience even more austerity than they are under the extend and pretend scenario that’s been going on for well over a year.

What’s Greece’s alternative? I think the only other alternative is for Germans to blink and accept a Greece that spends more than it produces, much of that spending being money “borrowed” from Germany. Needless to say the Germans don’t think much of that plan.

Update

Here’s Felix Salmon’s take:

Up until now, only pariah countries have defaulted to the IMF, but Greece is the exception to many rules. And given the choice between default and devaluation, it seems to me that Greek politicians — and the Greek population as a whole — clearly prefers the former to the latter.

Once you strip out Greece’s debt payments, the country’s primary deficit is pretty modest — just 1% of GDP or so. So could Greece make one more round of cuts, default on all its debts, and remain within the Eurozone?

I think the answer is no — and the reason is the banks. If the ECB were to stop funding the Greek banks, and if Greece were to default on its debts, all of Greece’s banks would be insolvent. And you can’t have a functioning economy without banks. Basically, Greek depositors need to be able to withdraw something from their checking accounts. And if the EU stops supporting the banks, that something can’t be euros any more.

It really appears to me that exiting the euro, in all likelihood shortly followed by other countries, is not only in Greece’s future but in Greece’s interests. But even default, exiting the euro, and devaluing is likely to mean more austerity for Greece. Unless the Greeks want to risk becoming Zimbabwe on the Aegean.

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Skyrim Main Quest

Last week I completed the Skyrim main quest. A bit anti-climactic. Even more so than most computer RPGs. That’s consistent with the general tone of Skyrim in which the main quest is pretty secondary to just roaming around and exploring the game world. At the point that I completed the main quest I was Level 38 with 100s in Smithing, One-Handed, and Heavy Armor, 50 or more in Enchanting, Speech, and Lockpicking. BTW, the Legendary Daedric Armor is probably the best-looking armor in the game. By comparison the Dragon Armor is pretty disappointing.

Rather than continue adventuring with that character I elected to start the game over with a new character. This time I’m going for something a little less heavy-handed. Still dual-wielding as I did with the last character but I’ll be going for the Light Armor skill tree and Sneaking and Pickpocketing along with Speech, Enchanting, and Lockpicking. I’ve also tweaked the difficulty level up a notch.

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The WaPo Romney Bullying Article

I haven’t commented on the Washington Post article about Mitt Romney’s holding a classmate down and forcibly cutting his hair 47 years ago when he was in prep school because this isn’t a scandal du jour blog. If there were some pattern of behavior from then to the present day, the story might have some significance. However, the family of the alleged victim of the incident has objected to the factual content of the story, one of the classmates cited in the story has already denied aspects of the reporting, the alleged victim is now deceased and unavailable for comment, and the Post is doing some after-publication editing of the story. We’ll need to see what develops, if anything. Those activities are characteristic of a weak story which re-reporting may cause the Post more embarrassment than Mr. Romney.

However, if (and I emphasize the “if”) the incident took place as reported I think that Joe Gandelman’s take, in which he echoes Andrew Sullivan and Joe Klein, is a good one: if there’s a pattern to Mr. Romney’s behavior it’s one of lying when the truth is potentially politically painful.

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Puzzled

Can someone please explain this comment of Bill McBride’s about the JPMorgan debacle to me:

JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon said the losses were due to “egregious mistakes”, “sloppiness” and that the “portfolio still has risk”. This doesn’t appear to be a systemic risk, just poor risk management at JPMorgan.

I thought that the reason that the big banks were bailed out was because failure on the part of any one of them posed risk to the entire banking system. Is Mr. McBride saying that JPMorgan’s failure wouldn’t produce a risk to the entire system, that poor risk management at JPMorgan doesn’t present a risk of failure for the bank, or that the level of poor risk management doesn’t pose a risk of failure for the bank?

If it’s the latter, which seems more reasonable, how does he know? It seems to me that where there’s smoke there’s fire. It seems to me that this incident does put more ammunition in the armory of those who pointed out that bailing out the banks would produce moral hazard.

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Sitting on Cash

Mike Shedlock posts a graphic which should put to bed the claim that businesses have a huge amount of sidelined cash. With the exception of a few anomalies like Apple which is notoriously resistant to increasing its domestic workforce the companies sitting on big wads of cash are sitting on big debts as well.

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Green Shoots?

Check out Mark Perry’s collection of evidence that the housing market is on the mend. Interesting to me is the emphasis in the good news on high-end sales. That would imply either that there are a lot of cash buyers with big wads of cash out there or that jumbo mortgages are being offered again. Perhaps some of both.

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Succumbing to Policy Failure

John Tamny at RealClearMarkets has a lengthy transcript of a speech given at the Jonathan Club in Los Angeles, a private social club with political overtones. The speech traces the ways in which recessions have been caused by failures of public policy from 1929 to the present. It certainly provides food for thought.

A couple of portions caught my eye. For example,

In short, the rush to housing this decade was the recession because it drove limited capital into the ground, and away from the productive parts of the economy. If you buy a house, you’re putting money into the ground, but if you save instead, your capital reaches businesses eager to grow, and if you invest in the stock market over the purchase of a home, you’re providing capital to entrepreneurs as opposed to a housing investment that does very little to enhance productivity.

I’m not so sure of that. Absent the “rush to housing” would there have been more saving or capital investment in the United States? I don’t see it. What I see instead in the housing boom is betting on what was believed to be a sure thing, something hinted at here:

It’s very simple, and it involves the dollar. The dollar collapsed this decade, and as global history reveals in living color, when currencies are debased limited capital flows into hard assets – Ludwig von Mises referred to this as a flight to the real – least vulnerable to devaluation. To put it simply, housing is the ultimate middle class hedge against inflation because it’s a commodity-like asset that does relatively well during periods of currency devaluation, and even better, it’s an investment that can be lived in.

I think that this:

To put it in a very basic way, the recession was once again the rush to housing due to capital flight away from the productive economy, so when companies and banks started to collapse as a result of this inflationary flight to the real, the collapses were a sign that the economy was healing itself. In short, the marketplace was fixing our economy by ridding it of poor banking and business practices that had for several years been camouflaged by a weak-currency money illusion. Had we allowed this necessary process to run its course, the recession would have been just that. Light and short.

But sadly, this time around, there was a collective blink on both sides of the U.S. political aisle in 2008, and I believe it explains what ultimately got us here. Horrific dollar policy led to the very malinvestment that would have given us a slowdown, but our bailout/stimulus culture truly tanked the economy on the way to a crisis.

is likely to be controversial. Absent the extraordinary federal government intervention would the recession have been “light and short” or would the entire financial system have collapsed? I honestly don’t know. The even thornier question is whether collapse would have been worse than what we have, continue to, and will experience? Again, I honestly don’t know but I suspect it’s a question that economists will be debating for generations.

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It’s a Floor Wax and a Dessert Topping

In considering the persistence of unemployment after the late recession, Cardiff Garcia at FT Alphaville argues that the decline in construction employment is solely cyclical:

There’s a decline that immediately precedes or coincides with each recession, and an increase (at what appears to be a very similar slope) that begins shortly after each recession ends. And each time, construction employment climbed to levels well above the previous peak.

Far from being bubblicious, this is simply what you would expect in a developed country with a growing population and generally rising living standards. And although the US faces some difficult demographic issues, they’re not so dramatic just yet that you should anticipate a radically different trend in this recovery

Take a look at the post which has plenty of charts, graphs, and links to support the claim.

I’ve taken the liberty of producing a graph of my own:

This represents total construction workers related to population over the period 1952 to the present. I’ve also introduced two trend lines, one linking peak to peak, the other trough to trough. They’re obvious enough in the graph over at FT but there are three anomalies in the cyclical construction employment story: the sharp deviation from trend on the upside in the 1990s and continuing until the Great Recession, the deviation from trend on the downside in the early Aughts, and the very sharp downwards decline following the last recession. I don’t see a cyclical explanation for any of them and, particularly, I think the “growing population” is clearly irrelevant. If anyone can produce a cyclical explanation for those anomalies, I’d welcome it.

My explanation is that there are both cyclical and structural forces at work in the present situation in construction employment and the present decline is approximately a reversion to the old trend. If that’s the case, it suggests that construction employment will, indeed, grow in the coming years but is unlikely to return to its heights of before the late recession.

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The Council Has Spoken!

The Watcher’s Council has announced its winners for last week.

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

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Bad Assumptions

There’s a post over at the Wall Street Journal, summarizing a paper from the Federal Reserves of Atlanta and Boston on the mortgage crisis that you might want to take a look at. Extracting the bullet points here are their findings:

Fact 1: Resets of adjustable-rate mortgages did not cause the foreclosure crisis.

Fact 2: No mortgage was “designed to fail.”

Fact 3: There was little innovation in mortgage markets in the 2000s.

Fact 4: Government policy toward the mortgage market did not change much from 1990 to 2005.

Fact 5: The originate-to-distribute model was not new.

Fact 6: MBS, CDOs, and other “complex financial products” had been widely used for decades.

Fact 7: Mortgage investors had lots of information.

Fact 8: Investors understood the risks.

Fact 9: Investors were optimistic about house prices.

Fact 10: Mortgage market insiders were the biggest losers.

Fact 11: Mortgage market outsiders were the biggest winners.

Fact 12: Top-rated bonds backed by mortgages did not turn out to be “toxic.” Top-rated bonds in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) did.

One thing that struck me about the post (I haven’t read the Fed paper itself yet) is that I don’t think they understand compounding very well. That’s not surprising. Human beings really aren’t built to understand exponential growth.

The summary might be further summarized as that there were a lot of very bad assumptions going around, among them that a sharp, prolonged decline in housing prices was impossible.

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