You owe it to your to take at least a glimpse at this roundtable on the U. S. grand strategy after Ukraine at Foreign Policy. Here are a couple of snippets:
The bottom line is that Europe can handle a future Russian threat on its own. NATO’s European members have always had far greater latent power potential than the threat to their east: Together, they have nearly four times Russia’s population and more than 10 times its GDP. Even before the war, NATO’s European members were spending three to four times as much on defense each year than Russia. With Russia’s true capabilities now revealed, confidence in Europe’s ability to defend itself should increase considerably.
and
Past use of sanctions rarely—if ever—brought regime change or ended wars. As we can all see in Ukraine, even massive sanctions have yet to deliver recognizable victories. The West will find that sanctions are not without fallout and even casualties. Shortfalls and price spikes induced by sanctions will wrack the U.S. and European economies. Civilians, especially in poorer countries around the world, could die as food prices skyrocket and houses get unbearably hot or cold when electricity fails.
and
Seeing the unity of the West and its partners in response to Russia’s war, Beijing may just now be learning how dangerous a game it is to attempt to change the status quo by force. It will become increasingly difficult for China to justify a Sino-Russian partnership with “no limits,†as Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping jointly described it shortly before the invasion. China may emphasize that it is not an outlaw state like Russia while doubling down on establishing a sphere of influence through nonmilitary coercion, as it is already doing. In Washington, it appears as if the battle between advocates of strategic competition and those of engagement has been settled in favor of the former, but we may see pushback by those who favor engagement based on the argument that China is behaving more responsibly than Russia.
I think there are a couple of factors they all miss. One is that to a greater extent than any other major power American grand strategy is an emergent phenomenon, the product not only of the White House but the White House, Pentagon, State Department, private companies, NGOs, and individuals. Our grand strategy can be shaped by decisive White House action but it cannot be dictated by it, however the sitting president might wish to do so.
The DoD has its own grand strategy and that has not been completely aligned with that of the White House or State Department for decades. Part of its grand strategy is for the U. S. military to be the only one at the highest level of preparedness. Note how much at odds that is with Europe taking primary responsibility for its own defense. There is a coming Donnybrook over these matters and I have no idea what the outcome will be.
The economic numbers are askew. Russia’s GDP is at least 20% larger than Germany’s, and it may be twice as large. If the latter is true, Russia’s GDP is almost half ours, which would make its defense spending about one-third of ours.
Nonetheless, Europe has the people and resources to defend itself against Russia. But implementing that potential capability would require a nuclear-armed Germany, complete with ICBM’s (to reach Vladivostok), and a reborn Wehrmacht.
While I agree that sanctions don’t work, what we are doing now is pretty much unprecedented and implemented on a very short timeline. It’s not clear what the result will be over time as the effects grow and compound.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/russia-surges-past-iran-to-become-world-s-most-sanctioned-nation
I think the US strategy is to continue to try to be the global hegemon promoting the international order with the US at the center of it. Russia’s challenge to that order seems dead at this point. China will probably learn good lessons, and the global south will remain sitting on the sidelines.
It looks like part of the lesson is to subsidize some key industries. How much of this do we really want to do?
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senate-approves-52-bln-chips-bill-bid-reach-compromise-2022-03-28/
Steve
Subsidies might be required but without regulatory reform and confidence that the reforms are permanent (or least have long horizons) it won’t change much. To my ear it sounds like the Senate is indulging a very bad habit: picking winners and losers.
For example, the US government is subsidizing solar panels which are mostly made in China. To the people who care enough about “green energy” to prioritize that above other considerations, “cheap” solar panels from China are a good thing.
80% of the solar panels sold in the U. S. are made in China. There is presently an anti-dumping suit against China. As the link I’ve displayed before points out, the low cost of Chinese solar panels isn’t due to factory automation (since the factories where they’re made aren’t automated) and only a relatively small proportion of their low cost if due to technological advance. Yes, they’re dumping.
I agree they are dumping – the point is that people in the US who prioritize renewables either don’t care or think it’s a good thing since it makes solar cheaper.
One of the “features” of advocacy in US politics is never admitting there are any tradeoffs, despite the fact that tradeoffs keep biting us in the ass.
How are we subsiding solar panels from China? I thought China was subsidizing them? Anyway, note that the cost of making panels has also dropped a lot in the US. Second, I find myself ambivalent out this. If China is paying for part of our solar panels I am not sure that is entirely bad.
Steve
Ran this past the visiting computer historian. I am not sure how they pick winners. There are very few chip producers of note. The big 3 are TSMC, Samsung and Intel. Global Foundries is significant even if not in the same class the first 3. Then you have to drop down to TI. Intel and TI are US based. GF sort of. Not a lot to choose from.
Steve
” If China is paying for part of our solar panels I am not sure that is entirely bad.”
And there we have it. Your callous disregard for US businesses and workers is duly noted, steve. Spoken like a product of one of the most US subsidized industries.
Dumping.
You don’t say. Its been known to happen.
I didnt say it was entirely good either, just not sure how we pay for all of this. (Remember when you were the kind of Republican who cared about that kind of stuff? Before Trump.) So $52 billion to subsidize the chip makers. When you look at the number of chip makers we had in the past and how many now it is amazing how few we have. Its so capital intensive and when they make a mistake they lost lots of money and go under. It may be true that they are going to need subsidies to flourish. That is what Taiwan does with TSMC and Korea with Samsung.
But for how many industries or products can we do this? All those manufacturing jobs left because the companies sending them there could make more money by doing so, in general because it was cheaper to make stuff there. Are those companies going to be willing to bring back jobs and lose money just because we ask, or are we subsidizing them too? Are we going to decide whom to subsidize based upon national need. security issues, economic benefits or do we hand out subsidies to the people who lobby best? (Rhetorical question I know.)
I find it hard to believe that China is subsidizing everything. I am generally a bit skeptical. How do they do that without building up massive debt? Anyway, I think economic realities mean we will probably have to be realistic about who we subsidize and letting China or someone else help pay for stuff we need for a while may not be our worst option. This is what the libertarians push for all of the time anyway.
Steve
They’re using our trade deficit to do it. It’s pretty much a perfect system for them. Plus they are building up enormous debt. So are we. The difference is that they’re using debt to build productive capability and we’re consuming it.