The United Nations Security Council in a late night session approved a resolution to halt the fighting in Lebanon unanimously in a vote of 15-0:
UNITED NATIONS, Aug. 11 – The Security Council passed a resolution Friday calling for a halt in the fighting in Lebanon, the deployment of Lebanese and United Nations forces in southern Lebanon, and the withdrawal “in parallel” by Israel.
The resolution, drafted by France and the United States, was passed unanimously.
Secretary General Kofi Annan said he would be in touch with the Lebanese and Israeli governments this weekend to determine when the full cessation of hostilities would take effect.
The measure would expand the existing 2,000-man United Nations peacekeeping force, known as Unifil, to 15,000 and dispatch it into southern Lebanon to assist a 15,000-man Lebanese force that Fouad Siniora, Lebanon’s prime minister, has pledged to send there.
In addition, it would give Unifil, a peace monitoring force that has been long criticized as under-resourced and ineffective, greatly enhanced authority, equipment, responsibilities and scope of operation.
The resolution extends Unifil’s mandate a year and empowers it to take action “to insure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind” and “to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent if from discharging its duties.”
The resolution also urges countries to contribute troops to the beefed up Unifil, and diplomats said that France, Australia, Italy and Turkey were among those expected to help fill the international complement. President Bush has said that the United States would offer no troops but could contribute logistical assistance.
The force would be what is referred to as a “Chapter VI†i.e. peacekeeping force rather than the “Chapter VII†or peacemaking force wanted by the United States. The complete text of the resolution is here. The resolution calls for:
- a full cessation of hostilities, specifically a cessation of all hostilities by Hezbollah and a cessation of offensive military operations by Israel
- deployment of forces by Lebanon and the UN in southern Lebanon and a parallel withdrawal by Israel
- Lebanon to take control of its own land and disarm forces in Lebanon other than those of the government itself
- support for the Blue Line
- support for the boundaries of Lebanon as stated in 1949
- humanitarian access on behalf of civilian populations
- an increase in the size of UNIFIL to 15,000
among other measures.
The resolution does not
- call for the release of prisoners or hostages
- call for Israel to end defensive measures against Hezbollah
- suggest how Lebanon or a force without aggressive rules of engagement will disarm Hezbollah
It’s a bit early to decide who the winners and losers are at this point but, undaunted, I’ll try anyway.
Winners
Olmert
I don’t agree with those who’ve proclaimed Olmert’s government dead. Before the resolution was adopted Olmert’s approval rating stood at 66%—a fall from the dizzying 73% to which it had risen (the highest in Olmert’s career). At least some of the fall was undoubtedly factoring in the UN resolution and its acceptance. Although trending the wrong way for Olmert (one of the many reasons to accept the resolution as quickly as possible) at this point there’s still quite a bit of room before Olmert’s government is threatened.
Olmert was in desperate need of a face-saving measure and the UNSC has kindly provided one.
Hezbollah
This is an enormous victory for Hezbollah generally, Nasrallah in particular. While Israel has certainly done some damage to Hezbollah’s forces and infrastructure, it’s far from critical and can be re-built over time. It has not been weakened enough to allow the Lebanese army to control or disarm it. There are virtually no enforcement measures in the resolution capable of actually disarming it. I think this snippet from the Associated Press puts it pretty well:
But it will be nearly impossible to rid south Lebanon of the Islamic guerrillas, who are now in the Lebanese Cabinet and run clinics and other charities that are considered essential in rebuilding the region. Their ability to withstand the Israeli military assault has also made Hezbollah heroes across the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Nasrallah is now a figure of international significance, particularly in the Muslim world.
Hezbollah has gone toe-to-toe with Israel and emerged bloodied (possibly) but unbowed.
Most of all the UNSC is treating Hezbollah very nearly as if it were a government rather than what it is: a band of thugs.
Syria
Its government is still in place; Israel has been weakened (at least in reputation); Lebanon has been weakened which will make it easier for Syria to re-assert its influence there.
Iran
Israel has been weakened; attention has been deflected from Iran’s nuclear development program.
Civilians in Lebanon
A cessation of Israeli bombing is without question a major benefit to civilians in Lebanon.
Losers
Israel
Israel has lost soldiers and civilians. Hezbollah rockets are now known to be able to reach major Israeli cities and the UN resolution does little to change that. The very least that will occur is another round of expensive civil defense measures.
Potentially worst of all there’s no obvious way forward from this point. Further withdrawals from the West Bank would appear to be not on.
The United States
Like it or not we’ve bound US fortunes to those of Israel in this and the loss of Israeli reputation will result in a loss of US reputation (if such a thing be possible). The US also appeared uninterested or impotent at the early stages which later activity with the UNSC will do nothing to salvage.
The United Nations Security Council
Who was it who said that a committee is a group of people, none of whom can do anything individually, who meet to agree that nothing can be done? Fits the UNSC to a “Tâ€. The notion that a Hezbollah, flush with victory, will be moved to disarm and make nice by a piece of paper and a strengthened UN force whose primary mission is force protection beggars understanding.
The Westphalian system
The UNSC’s willingness to treat Hezbollah with any regard whatever raises the stock of non-state actors generally and places civilians worldwide at greater risk. The minimum action that should have been undertaken is a Chapter VII peacemaking force and a demand for the return of hostages.
The Head Heeb concludes his preliminary analysis on a hopeful note:
If all these hurdles are overcome, then the Israel-Hizbullah war will end on terms that allow everyone to gain something. Israel will have weakened Hizbullah and will get a stable northern border for the first time in more than 30 years, Hizbullah will be able to claim that it fought the IDF to the end, and the Lebanese government will obtain sovereignty over the entire country as well as a chance to resolve its outstanding disputes with Israel. France, as Lebanon’s once and future patron, will increase its regional influence, and even the United States will (against all odds) have played a critical role in brokering the settlement.
This means that the proposed resolution is, at this point, about the best possible end that can be imagined for the whole sorry mess. A war in which all parties can claim achievements is one that is less likely to fester and more likely to provide a foundation upon which the underlying issues can be settled. As Israel has learned from bitter experience, a draw that leads to a resolution of the root conflict is preferable to a victory that doesn’t – the Yom Kippur War ultimately resulted in peace with Egypt while the Six Day War led to nothing but an endless nightmare of occupation. If this war, like the war of 1973, leaves all parties proud but chastened, the not-defeat may have better results in the long term than an unequivocal battlefield victory.
I agree that the entire affair has been a sorry mess; I agree that this is a face-saving measure; I agree that it’s the best that can be expected under the circumstances. I’m still not heartened by it.
This is a case in which the only way to win was not to play.  A minor slip by Israeli soldiers exploited by Hezbollah in a border incident has been allowed to grow into a major incident in which, perhaps, a thousand people have died. There’s no obvious process for moving forward in Israel’s problems with its neighbors and the new agreement is unlikely to result in more than an extremely temporary intermission in hostilities.
I came to about the same conclusion you do. I suspect Olmert will suffer, but I doubt Bibi is coming back.
But I would add a loser: Don Rumsfeld. This was a Rumsfeld style war which the Israelis are now belatedly turning into a Powell Doctrine war. Next time we have to deploy for war US generals will look at Iraq, and look at this mess, and demand overwhelming force.
Note by the way that it only took the Israelis a month to conclude they needed the big guns on the ground.
We don’t have a new doctrine for this war yet. Rumsfeld and Powell were both reacting against what this war represents. The Powell Doctrine’s fatal flaw is that it requires a clear exit strategy before committing forces; it ignored the fundamental rule that no plan survives contact with the enemy.
The lessons in this botched cease-fire are that stopping a war requires someone to be defeated, and that such defeats are going to require more casualties than any Western country seems willing to tolerate. These are not new lessons, and we’ve been slow to learn them. Bush, maybe, understands this, and I keep wondering if Bush and Bolton designed this cease-fire so that it would fail in a way that discredits the possibility of any further cease-fires in this war. We’ll see.
Nice analysis Dave – I’m on the fence on Olmert though -his future depends on what follows and how robust the cease fire appears to the Israeli public.
Impressive analysis indeed. The whole thing will likely become a moot point though, as Nasrallah certainly doesn’t relish the idea of disarming. The question is more whether fresh hostilities will break out before or after international forces arrive. If Hezbollah is smart, they’ll hold back till the foreign troops are in place. They are unlikely to do anything effective to stop Hezbollah and they would sure get in the way of any effective action on the part of Israel.
On the other hand, sitting quiet and waiting would look a lot like capitulation, so Nasrallah could be strongly tempted to move too quickly, inviting Israeli retaliation before foreign or even Lebanese troops are there to complicate things.
But then again, what do I know? Tell me why I’m wrong and I might possibly learn something that will help me understand better.
It might be helpful to consider the incentives that are in place. I don’t see that Hezbollah has much in the way of incentives to stop fighting at this point.
Putting the Lebanese army amidst Hezbollah simply adds another human shield layer. I’m still struggling with the notion of changing incentives to alter Hezbollah’s behavior. After all, terrorism works. In the context of a weak state, renegade militias work (Iraq, Lebanon). I agree that Hezbollah seeks regional legitimacy- but it derives it by seeking to destroy Israel; that’s what gets the Arab world excited, not hospitals, schools, roads and bridges. I’m going to assume that I’m missing your point entirely because I haven’t carefully read your incentive post, so it’s back to the link.
Essentially, my point is that the incentives in place for Hezbollah favor continuing to fight. The incentives for Olmert have changed recently: his popularity has started to trend downwards and, at least temporarily, he has an incentive to at least pause.
I think that kreiz is correct viz the expansion of the human shield feature. There is , for me, little hope that whatever force (if any) shows up in South Lebanon will have any incentive to curb hostilities.
This hasn’t been much of a war, has it? The parallels with the Iraq campaign are maybe a bit strained, but this looks like another fruitful effort to expend arms and lives, effectively draining resources (both in materiel and manpower) of conventional armies and states.
I think that Dave is spot on about the losers. This stalemate has weakened Israel and the US and the next aggression will be met by reluctant and exhausted forces.
Also, Hizb’allah is certainly a big winner in that it seems that they have baited the Israelis into doing what Nasrallah wanted to achieve in Lebanon; that is, the destruction of an emerging liberal, modern and egalitarian country at peace with Israel.