Aziz over at Dean’s World is attempting to promote a dialogue on potential solutions for the problems surrounding Israel, the current Israel-Hezbollah hostilities being only the most recent instance. First, he proposed the Scowcroft framework which includes provisions for a Palestinian state, renunciation of the right of return, recognition of Israel by the KSA, what are now being called “robust, international†peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, and other measures. Then he opened the floor to other alternatives.
He’s not getting much of anywhere.
Most of the commenters rejected the idea of a negotiated settlement outright, believing that military force was the only resolution left at this point. Somewhat to my amazement many seemed to believe that military force alone could be an effective solution for Israel’s problems.
It was noted in the comments that the Scowcroft framework is not unlike the proposal that was rejected by Yasser Arafat in 2000.
In my opinion the more serious problem with the plan is that it fails to take the incentives for all parties (more than merely the Israelis and Palestinians) into account and, indeed, that those incentives are propelling events in the wrong direction. Let’s consider some of the parties, their motivations, and the incentives in place.
The Israelis want to survive as a nation and have a little more peace and security than they currently enjoy. These are goals that I respect and support. If others, including the Europeans and their Arab neighbors also respected and supported those objectives (at least more than merely verbally), there would be no problem. But the Israelis also want to preserve a certain ethnic and cultural character to their state. I think that’s an eminently understandable objective but I honestly do not believe that it’s one that the United States should support.
The approval rating of the Olmert government has risen among Israelis since the beginning of the hostilities in Lebanon. Olmert’s personal popularity has risen to the highest level ever. Despite the rockets falling on them that are reaching ever further into the heart of their territory Israelis remain convinced that these actions will result in more security in the future and, possibly more importantly, that removing their troops from Gaza and southern Lebanon was a mistake. I think they believe that they’re winning.
Given that system of incentives it’s hard to see why the Israelis would stop doing what they’re doing.
Hezbollah clearly wants to destroy the state of Israel. They undoubtedly have Islamist motivations but I also believe that they want increased power within Islam itself. In my view this shouldn’t be viewed solely as a connivance of Iran’s but more in the context of the KSA’s advancing over the years of their own version of Islam.
Hezbollah’s popularity within Lebanon even among Sunni Muslims and Christians has risen since the start of hostilities. Nasrallah’s personal popularity is at an all-time high—he is now a person of international importance. Hezbollah’s popularity among regular Arab people in the Middle East (as opposed to among their governments) has also risen. Hezbollah apparently believes that it’s winning and they have plenty of agreement on that score in the West.
Given that system of incentives it’s hard to see why Hezbollah would stop doing what they’re doing.
Non-Hezbollah Lebanese people in all probability just want to be left alone. In the present hostilities we’re being treated to the surreal spectacle of the Lebanese government declaring themselves non-belligerents in a war going on within their borders.
The prospects for the Lebanese allying themselves with Israel to de-fang Hezbollah which, in my view, actually might have stood a chance of promoting democracy and stability within Lebanon—always a long shot—become fainter with each kilometer farther north the Israelis strike.
Syria clearly does not relish the idea of a military confrontation with Israel but they’re not concerned enough about it to disinvolve themselves with Hezbollah. As I mentioned before I’ve heard outright denials from the Syrians that they’re supplying Hezbollah.
Iran is clearly quite content to let events proceed as they may. It’s hard to see how they can lose. Hezbollah is opposing Israel for them and raising Shi’ite stock in the Muslim world. They have their own missile production facilities and, no doubt from their viewpoint, unlimited resources. Direct military confrontation between Iran and Israel is IMO farfetched and might indeed be the pretext the Iranians are looking for.
I find the motivations of the Europeans extremely puzzling. They clearly have more to lose by instability in the Middle East than anyone except possibly the people who live there. I don’t see how demonizing Israel promotes greater stability in the region unless you believe that it’s possible to completely eradicate the state of Israel. That, IMO, would create more instability in the region than either the European or we could deal with.
Roughly 30% of the founding population of the present state of Israel were Ashkenazic Jews who fled persecution in Europe. They were left with few alternatives. That’s the simplest explanation for where we are right now.
Europe continues to view terrorist groups in the Middle East as fighting a war of national liberation and Israelis as being the vanguard of fascism. I don’t think that’s quite as sophisticated an understanding of affairs as the Europeans themselves do.
Presumably, the Europeans will be happy as long as oil keeps flowing. I don’t see that their present policies faciliitate that objective.
The United States is a big country and significantly more complex than most of the rest of the world likes to believe. Historically, there have been a number of different schools of thought within the United States on our dealings with the rest of the world. I’ve written pretty extensively about them—see this post for the short version with links to other resources.
These schools of thought are still active and influential today. If you’d like a good idea of the Jacksonian view, look at the comments to Aziz’s posts, cited above.
For there to be anything that resembles a durable peace in the Middle East I believe that the incentives noted above need to change. Neither a settlement that will fail from its inception because it ignores the incentives in place or a military solution that is unlikely to succeed without expanding so far that it involves us all are worth considering.
Although I have never been an advocate for it at least the plan to democratize the Middle East, sometimes referred to a “the New Middle East†or “the Neo-Con Planâ€, however fanciful it may have been, took incentives into consideration. My own objectiions to it were and have always been that it had little chance of succeeding in a timeframe that was politicallly or strategically acceptable.
So, how can the incentives be changed?
UPDATE: I don’t think I can improve on James Joyner’s comment on the truce plan that France and the U. S. have apparently agreed upon and will present to the UN Security Council:
It’s far from clear how meaningful this will be, presuming it passes the full Council. Hezbollah will certainly continue to continue firing rockets into Israel and allow Israel to continue to kill Lebanese civilians so long as it is to their operational advantage.
The incentives have to change and that’s not going to happen through UN Security Council resolutions alone.
Not a bad go, mate, but some errors or blind-spots:
(i) Re Arafat: he rejected a deal that arguably wasn’t politically sustainable given the territories retained. Leaving aside Israeli spin, the offer rejected allowed for Israelis to retain key settlements. If you don’t know the geography, you don’t get it. Percentage of total surface area isn’t they key, but what lands. Israel, to do a deal, has to accept that its big settlements on the other side of the 67 borders have to go. Palestinians aren’t going to go for anything less – not durably at least. But the Israeli government has not accepted that.
Of course, Arafat should have negotiated further, but he always was a moron, a rather Bush like short-term thinker playing to his core base w/o regard to longer-term interest.
But framing this as merely Arafat rejecting fundamentally misunderstands the incentive equation.
(ii) Second, and that ties to this: If others, including the Europeans and their Arab neighbors also respected and supported those objectives [to live in peace] (at least more than merely verbally), there would be no problem. But the Israelis also want to preserve a certain ethnic and cultural character to their state. I think that’s an eminently understandable objective but I honestly do not believe that it’s one that the United States should support.
Well, this statement is simple-minded. Europeans are certainly not against such – the most general analysis in Europe simply differs from the Americans complete imbibing of the Israeli security apparat’s view of what that means. As to the Arab neighbours, well, rewinding ten years there was a genuine window of opportunity. Unfortunately, the Israelis contributed to the failure as well as the Arab/Palestinian efforts – in no small part in my opinion from an endemic quasi-racist contempt the Israelis have for the Arabs which while understandable, blinds them to thinking of the Arab neighbours in up-to-date terms, rather conceiving their political action in the same way as in 1948. Then there was, I think, better basis for the framework. Now, much less so, as Arab society, Muslim and Arab has deeply changed from entirely communalist/tribal to rather more modern.
In short, the Israelis tend, in my experience, to view the Arabs -often unconsciously- in terms rather similar to the way 19th century Europeans and Americans viewed “the Natives” – as objects in a sense; that tends to blind them. Mind you, pointing out this is not to say the Arabs are better – Arab blindspots are, however, much discussed.
Hezbollah clearly wants to destroy the state of Israel. They undoubtedly have Islamist motivations but I also believe that they want increased power within Islam itself. In my view this shouldn’t be viewed solely as a connivance of Iran’s but more in the context of the KSA’s advancing over the years of their own version of Islam.
Eh?
This is simply silly.
Hezbullah clearly doesn’t consider Israel a legitimate state. Wants to destroy, well, in some theoretical sense. However they’ve shown a willingness to do deals, even sustained ones.
Their competition for power, however, is a Lebanese political one, not really “in Islam” as such. The Shia-Sunni tensions are not something the Saudis either created or even are the drivers behind. Contributors, certainly, of course. And backers, more importantly, in the Lebanese context, of the Sunni parties.
Given that system of incentives it’s hard to see why Hezbollah would stop doing what they’re doing.
It’s hard to see why they would concede defeat: not hard to see how reaching a cease-fire could be done. Disarming is a fantasy that is not going to happen under the present circumstances. Israel handed Hezbullah a brilliant gift to justify itself.
Non-Hezbollah Lebanese people in all probability just want to be left alone. In the present hostilities we’re being treated to the surreal spectacle of the Lebanese government declaring themselves non-belligerents in a war going on within their borders.
Not quite, the Lebanese government has declared itself unable to effectively intervene, but in Arabic comm to its own population, the government has taken to celebrating / thanking Hezbullah for defending the nation.
Brilliant that, rather the exact opposite of what the US and the Israelis intended.
Own-goal as the phrase goes.
The prospects for the Lebanese allying themselves with Israel to de-fang Hezbollah which, in my view, actually might have stood a chance of promoting democracy and stability within Lebanon—always a long shot—become fainter with each kilometer farther north the Israelis strike.
Long shot?
Bloody magical thinking even before the conflict started. Alliance with the Israelis was always a kiss-of-death since the wind-up of the occupation and the fine example of the SLA.
Integrating Hezbullah and disarming was a long-shot but possible w a Chebaa Farms resolution.
Now, not even that is likely.
Iran is clearly quite content to let events proceed as they may. It’s hard to see how they can lose. Hezbollah is opposing Israel for them and raising Shi’ite stock in the Muslim world. They have their own missile production facilities and, no doubt from their viewpoint, unlimited resources. Direct military confrontation between Iran and Israel is IMO farfetched and might indeed be the pretext the Iranians are looking for.
Fair enough, although I do not believe anyone outside the magical world of blog-land actually believes either can whack the other directly in any effective manner – although those innocent of geography certainly love to use the Iraqi example.
I find the motivations of the Europeans extremely puzzling. They clearly have more to lose by instability in the Middle East than anyone except possibly the people who live there. I don’t see how demonizing Israel promotes greater stability in the region unless you believe that it’s possible to completely eradicate the state of Israel. That, IMO, would create more instability in the region than either the European or we could deal with.
There is nothing puzzling about EU ex-UK policy (and what would be UK policy ex-Blair and his dog-like devotion to Bush).
All that is required to understand is to not adopt an uncritical acceptance of the Israeli POV and look at a largeer picture.
First, writing blank checks to ‘allies’ is rarely if ever a wise idea. As the Bush Administration is rapidly learning.
As the Israelis have a penchant for believing that they can impose solutions on the natives that do not take into account in any way the other side (see supra), the European point of view largely revolves around the position that this has to be restrained and some attention paid to the other guys’ perceptions. (Of course this oversimplifies, as in many ways speaking of European position is rather facile).
A final deal is not going to be 100 percent pleasing to either. The give-ups on the Palestinian side are well-discussed among Americans. However, rarely are those of the Israelis.
Europe continues to view terrorist groups in the Middle East as fighting a war of national liberation and Israelis as being the vanguard of fascism. I don’t think that’s quite as sophisticated an understanding of affairs as the Europeans themselves do.
The above is a cartoonish fun-house mirror distortion that seems to afflict American commentary.
Of course, some ‘terror groups’ are indeed ‘national liberation’ groups at the same time, and as such face (as they have in Europe itself) different incentives than say, messianic apocalyptic type groups as in al-Qaeda (which while not precisely apocalyptic is certainly messianic in a wide sense of the term).
That is the point of difference. Americans tend to have all the understanding of such different incentives of a bull in a China shop.
The scare words ‘terror group’ having a different meaning to Americans than Europeans.
In any case, it is more than slightly rich for you to write about the complexity of American position, society etc while so fundamentally and comically reducing the Europeans to a fun-house mirror usually seen in Bolshy Right circles commentary. I presume you may know better.
As for the final question, the incentives have to be changed incrementally.
First, Israel and its neighbours are not going to be chums.
However, even neighbours who literally despise each other can get along in a cold peace if certain basic compromises are made to get the ball rolling. The core compromise is something Scrowcroft highlights but Americans don’t quite seem to get in re 67 borders. Perhaps one has to know the climate and geography of the territories to appreciate the importance of what looks on abstract maps like smallish pieces of land. If one looks at the hydrology, and rainfall, then it becomes far clearer where the real incentives are behind the posturing. I’d add the same remains true for Golan and Chebaa. It’s not just square meters, it’s key hydrological facts.
I certainly agree with the overwhelming preponderance of what you’ve written above, Lounsbury. And, yes, I was oversimplifying and glossing over lots and lots of details. I wasn’t attempting to be encyclopedic—I was trying to suggest a different way of thinking about the situation, particularly to American Jacksonians who are increasingly looking for purely military solutions which IMO are, basically, doomed to failure.
Arafat? My take was that he thought the agreement was a death sentence. A non-starter. But my impression was that the problem wasn’t merely what land but somewhat more central. I certainly could be wrong about that.
I’ve lived and worked in Europe. I’m aware that there’s a diversity of opinion. Perhaps my own experience (mostly in northern Germany) was warped but I found significantly less diversity in opinion in my experiences in France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Germnay than in the U. S. Again, just my own experience. As I noted, I’m genuinely puzzled by the reaction of the European countries and the EU. I was grasping at straws and am all ears for an explanation that really makes sense.
I’m also aware of the water issues surrounding the Golan and Chebaa. I wish that was mentioned more frequently in the American news media. While I think that Israel’s withdrawing to the pre-1967 borders is necessary I don’t think it’s sufficient.
I always appreciate corrections and amplifications—that’s how I refine and expand my views.
Again my main purpose in this post was to suggest a different way of thinking about things than I see in either the media here or in the blogosphere, i.e. considering the Israelis, Hezbollah, and other players as real people with real motivations rather than the comic book version so often seen. That’s why I appreciate folks like yourself and John Burgess.
Well, very good.
Arafat? My take was that he thought the agreement was a death sentence. A non-starter. But my impression was that the problem wasn’t merely what land but somewhat more central. I certainly could be wrong about that.
Well, he lacked the vision and courage to do a deal. Death sentance?
Maybe, I don’t think that was the problem. I think he was more worried about short-termist power concerns and had no vision or understanding of the situ he found himself in.
Very Bush like actually.
In the end it’s almost axiomatic in Anglophone circles to say Arafaat didn’t want the deal or was afraid of death.
I rather think that it was worse, that he simply lacked the vision to know how to move forward.
So, w/o that, and given Israeli-American blind-spots, it failed.
Sad really. Arafaat in the end was a contemptible incompetent.
As I noted, I’m genuinely puzzled by the reaction of the European countries and the EU. I was grasping at straws and am all ears for an explanation that really makes sense.
It’s not that hard, mate.
Simply a different analysis of what’s needed to make things happen.
In the US it is considered axiomatic that the Israeli negotiating points are the deal.
That’s not the case elsewhere.
Further, the understanding of groups like Hezbullah is rather different.
I’m also aware of the water issues surrounding the Golan and Chebaa. I wish that was mentioned more frequently in the American news media. While I think that Israel’s withdrawing to the pre-1967 borders is necessary I don’t think it’s sufficient.
And the West Bank, look at the hydrology. Then those small bits of land emerge as more important.
That aside, of course not. Unilateral withdrawal ain’t going to work.
Israel can’t impose a solution – it has to do some horse trading.
In a way the Israeli hard-line security people are right, unilateral withdrawal from Leb Land was an error.
Had they had the vision to stop treating the Arabs like incoherent savages and formally negotiate a peace or cease-fire, they might have learned some things and pulled the various parties into a framework to build on.
That’s the mistake they, Israelis, keep making over and over again.
That is the essence of things in a single sentence. It’s also one of the reasons I think that the uncritical support Israel’s receiving from the US is so destructive: it gives Israelis (or at least Israeli leaders) an unrealistic view of what options are available to them.
I have to side mostly with Lounsbury here–minus the misreading of Bush’s intellectual capacity.
I was at both the Wye River and Camp David negotiations. Arafat did say something, around the time of the Camp David collapse, about how that “deal” would have been a death sentence, but it was more rhetorical than substantive. The point very much was just exactly which pieces of land were to be swapped around. What was on offer was not acceptable to the Palestinians, Arafat or no Arafat.
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are fighting multi-level/multi-value wars simultaneously. Issues of religion, geography, politics, history, and “moral righteousness” are all in play. Making gains on one level can lead to losses on another, utterly confounding “good intentions”. More is needed, as with the war with Hezbollah.
Actual creative thinking, outside the box with a bold gesture on the part of both parties, is the only thing that’s going to solve it.
BTW, the “let’s watch Israel and Iran duke it out” group are only hoping they can get a thermonuclear exchange in their own lifetimes; they missed 1945’s productions.
Thanks, John. Great amplification. I’ll have to re-think my understanding of Arafat’s actions from Camp David forwards.
My own view is that Israel’s problems with its neighbors are a “wicked problem”, i.e. there is no solution and the best that can be hoped for is “good enough”, the mark for which will be ever-changing over time. I also wish that all the parties which includes Israel and its neighbors, the EU, and the US would be a little more creative and stop looking for a “solution” and start looking for a process. I think that’s the best that any of us will do.
I have no idea of what the motives of the “let’s you and him fight” group are but I think the view is both deluded and illusory: you just can’t get where anybody (except, perhaps, the truly psychotic) wants to go that way.
Re: Your point that:
Loss of its basic cultural character would be a death sentence for Israel and the non-Muslims who live there. While you are undoubtedly correct that today’s Arabs are somewhat more modern-thinking than they were in 1948, I see little evidence that they have, culturally, accepted what should be universal values such as equality of genders, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the separation of church and state, and democracy and the rule of law in general. To be sure, there are elements within Islamic and Arabic culture calling for such changes, but they are hardly the majority at this point. No matter how much extremists and dictators and demagogues in the region keep saying so, the Israel-Palestine conflict is not the cause of all the ills of the Arab world. The cultures in almost every Arab nation amply demonstrate that they are not yet ready for prime time.
David Bernstein at Volokh Conspiracy thoroughly debunks the concept that Israel’s efforts to maintain a certain ethnic or cultural character is somehow inappropriate or unique in the world.
I don’t and wouldn’t claim that it’s inappropriate or unique. I just think that fact has little to do with U. S. interests.
Keeping the culture of Israel western/christian/judaic has a lot to do with US interests . As one of many possible examples Israel stopped a Fatah insurection from succceeding in Jordan in 1980 at U.S. request by overflying syrian tank columns. If Israel became culturally islamic such a request would most probably nor be acted upon and not just because they wouldn’t be able to maintain modern aircaraft.
Interesting, but I think you’re missing the incentives of the primary player here: Iran.
Iran wants conflict, because conflict serves Iran in several ways. Most importantly, it distracts the Iranian people from the fact they’re ruled by repressive, autocratic nutjobs who should be overthrown; religious conflict is manna to a regime that rules on the basis of false piety. Mideast violence also creates higher oil prices, which obviously benefist them. And killing some Israelis warms their murderous hearts, with the long-term goal, of course, to destroy Israel completely.
And what is the disincentive for Iran to foment war? THERE ISN’T ANY. That is why we have war today: Iran’s leaders do not believe the West will take any serious military action to remove them from power, and scoffs at anything less.
As always, weakness in the face of the unscrupulous has led to war. This is not a new phenomenon.
Good point, TallDave. There was no way that I could make this post encyclopedic—this just isn’t an appropriate medium for that.
I was rather beating around the bush about Iran when I spoke about European incentives. There need to be both positive and negative incentives for Iran’s behavior. Bad behavior needs to have consequences and, as you’ve noted, right now there just aren’t any for Iran and, of course, we’re getting plenty of bad behavior.
Not to cut them any slack but I think that Iran’s behavior needs to be considered in the context of longstanding behavior by Sunnis, the Brits, us, etc.
Israel only exists because of its cultural identity. Overrun by Arabs, it would no longer be Israel. It’s just not possible for Israel to survive in relative peace and stability without maintaining its cultural character. If you believe a maintaining a peaceful and stable Israel is in the U.S. interests, then maintaining Israel’s cultural character is also in the U.S. interest.
I think the counterpoint to the description of the US as a bull in the china shop is Europe as the eunuch in the whorehouse.
I don’t dispute the idea that the US rushes in with too much steel and too little gray matter — we are an impatient, action-oriented people. American voters have no patience for the drawn-out, subtle games of diplomacy. The average American wants the middle east to “Go away. Stop bothering us. We’re trying to make money.” And because we are politically polarized, and because we are pathologically distrustful of our own government, the voters exercise an intermittent, unfocused, but often decisive control of foreign policy.
But Europe for its part sophisticates itself into irrelevance. Occasionally, no matter how well the diplomatic game is played, a credible threat of force or at least determined action is required. The Europeans have no capacity to threaten any country larger than Sierra Leone. Powerless they rely for “threat” on the US. “You may wish to sit back down and negotiate further, or I’ll let my crazy Yankee cousin go postal on you.” If Europe wishes to play a positive role in managing serious conflicts it needs to start paying the cost of maintaining a meaningful military force.
Taking the obvious example, Kosovo, it was absurd that American airmen had to fly jets from North Dakota to apply force in a situation where the locus of conflict was practically a taxi ride from the border of the EU.
A Note and a Prediction:
I agree that: President Bush is a simple man, and he has the courage of the convictions. I do not agree he is dumb but I may agree his actions have been mistaken. However, we are still early in this fight, and democracies usually stumble and bumble about in the early phase of great conflicts.
I predict that after the U.S. elections in 2006 November – in fact, sometime in mid or late summer 2007, the U.S. will attack Iran. The U.S. will break the current theocratic mullah-led government in Iran, but will not stick around to try to fix what has been broken – instead the U.S. will simply supply arms to any groups that opposes the power base of the mullahs. President Bush will not leave the problem of Iran to his successor to have to handle. Now, what the effects of bringing down the theocracy in Iran will be, I doubt anyone has a clear idea.
by all means, good luck with that.
it worked so well in Somalia.
Dave,
You may find these previous pieces I”ve written helpful as you recalibrate your assessment about Camp David and the Taba accords.
Myth 1 – Barak was generous
Myth 2 – Arafat began the intifada after Sharon’s visit
Since that time I’ve changed some of my own views – I now support the Israeli Wall, and I accept that reunification is a pipe dream, and that a two state solution is a neccessary first step. But the above articles were my shot at the issue at that time and i think the reasoning was sound. I link to my sources so you can draw your own conclusions, though some older articles may have expired.
in a thread of exceptionally brilliant commentary, that statement is perhaps the most brilliant. 😉
Thanks, Aziz. Your posts are interesting but, since I’ve never particularly believed either that Barak was generous (generous would have been volunteering to move all the Israelis to Poughkeepsie, for example) nor that Arafat began the intifada (I think the dynamics fits those of a craze), it doesn’t influence my view too much.
After relinquishing my prior view (that Arafat’s actions at Camp David stemmed from political calculus), and accepting Lounsbury and John Burgess’s estimation, I’m largely just left with sorrow that the Palestinians have been so poorly led over such a great length of time. IIRC they’ve backed losing sides with some consistency.
To be fair to Arafat, while he lacked the vision necessary to take the Palestinians beyond Oslo (as well as being corrupt and autocratic), his theatrical terrorism and political maneuverings in earlier years (especially the 70s) were essential to getting, and keeping, the Palestinian cause on the world stage. Which in a way makes it more tragic that he ultimately became a hindrance to that cause.
Dave, my point was to point you towards the Taba proposal, which I think fit teh bill of theh present debate regarding a process towards peace. I urge you to use my posts only as a starting point with respecct to Taba.
Taba was derailed primarily by Sharon, not Arafat, and the present mess is really driven by Olmert, for domestic political concerns as much as the prior incursion to Lebanon was in 1996. So I would say that the Israelis also have been just as poorly led as their Palestinian cousins.
Thank you, Aziz. And I will.
So many comments.
I have to side mostly with Lounsbury here–minus the misreading of Bush’s intellectual capacity.
I go with the available evidence, and since I don’t give a bloody fuck about US domestic party political whanking on, I’ll stick with my conclusion that the man is dim. He may have unused intellectual fortitude, but it remains unused. Mediocrity.
Now there a good number of highly conclusory declarations by people who I rather suspect know fuck-all about the subject beyond blog-reading:
Iran wants conflict, because conflict serves Iran in several ways. Most importantly, it distracts the Iranian people from the fact they’re ruled by repressive, autocratic nutjobs who should be overthrown; religious conflict is manna to a regime that rules on the basis of false piety. Mideast violence also creates higher oil prices, which obviously benefist them. And killing some Israelis warms their murderous hearts, with the long-term goal, of course, to destroy Israel completely.
Such is the sensation of foreigners.
‘Should be overthrown’ is of course your judgement, it is best not to confuse that with popular sentiment (one way or the other) in Iran. Nor confuse your party political sentiments dressed up as analysis (nut-jobs, e.g.) with actual analysis.
Certainly a degree of confrontation serves some parties in Iran interests in terms of holding power, and further to that matches their ideological goals.
The assertion this distracts from a supposed revolt – made implicity in the comment – well that is certainly convergent with American Bolshy Right wishful thinking. Hard to point to substantive non-Amer Taheri evidence.
And what is the disincentive for Iran to foment war? THERE ISN’T ANY. Stupid comments in ALL CAPS are not any more convincing.
There are plenty of disincentives, including self-interest of parts of the politico-religious hierarchy; having their factories potentially blown up is not what the Bazaari class looks forward to.
The remainder of that comment is merely ideological whanking.
Finally, it seems to be axiomatic among the whanker portion of the US right commentariat that terribly stupid mis-estimations of Europe based on rather simplistic stereotypes (and yes the opposite also exists, the whole US as idiot simpleton cowboys) are actually somehow enlightening:
I think the counterpoint to the description of the US as a bull in the china shop is Europe as the eunuch in the whorehouse.
Really. Well, I guess you should replace the Euro troops in Afghanistan with some US bulls then, eh what?
I don’t dispute the idea that the US rushes in with too much steel and too little gray matter — we are an impatient, action-oriented people.
“You” – meaning the current political leadership, as making generalisations like ‘we are an impatient action-oriented people’ is trivial – have recently rushed in without bothering to understand the situ. However, “your” own governmental staff had warnings against such.
Being impatient and action oriented is not an excuse, again not an excuse for being incompetent and bumbling. The traits do not, ipso facto go together.
American voters have no patience for the drawn-out, subtle games of diplomacy.
Utter bollocks and excuse making mythologising: American voters like any other will follow a story if its well-sold and convincing.
Although perhaps the penchant for seeing things in Action Movie terms is a real one.
The real weakness is leadership.
Occasionally, no matter how well the diplomatic game is played, a credible threat of force or at least determined action is required. The Europeans have no capacity to threaten any country larger than Sierra Leone.
Amusing.
Stupid as well. And utterly untrue. But amusing.
Obviously the European troops in Afghanistan and the UK troops in Iraq have not been sufficiently mediatised for Americans to actually know they exist. Pity, it reinforces the unfortunate stereotype of loud-mothed navel-gazing dim-wits.
In fact the UK and France have relatively decent ability to project force. Even the Germans would if they so decided, in collaboration with someone with transport.
I am sure your exagerated and self-serving vision of only American is strong is comforting, however, in the context of Lebanon a European force would have numbers. If, of course, they were so stupid as to play the American game of sticking their hand in the bear trap and playing whack-the-mole with the trigger.
Capacity and desire: not synonymous.
But lurking behind the buffoonishly stereotypical overstatement is an element of truth, yes, indeed behind talk one does need an alternative.
I believe it was Teddy Roosevelt that said “Speak softly and carry a big stick” – apparently modern American administrations have restated that as Speak Loudly and Threaten Alot.
Taking the obvious example, Kosovo, it was absurd that American airmen had to fly jets from North Dakota to apply force in a situation where the locus of conflict was practically a taxi ride from the border of the EU.
What’s absurd is Americans mistaking their bombing campaigns as something others wanted to do but were unable to.
Again, capacity and desire are not the same. European forces could have bombed Kosovo…..
Now, that does not mean the lack of desire is the correct position, although certainly had you had two world wars fought on your home soil with millions dead, your enthusiasm for bombing would likely be noticably cooled.
‘Should be overthrown’ is of course your judgement,
No, it is an absolute moral fact, not an opinion. They have no legitimate right to power. They do not rule by consent of the governed.
And what is the disincentive for Iran to foment war? THERE ISN’T ANY. Stupid comments in ALL CAPS are not any more convincing. There are plenty of disincentives, including self-interest of parts of the politico-religious hierarchy; having their factories potentially blown up is not what the Bazaari class looks forward to.
Calling my comment stupid and complaining that I used caps for emphasis doesn’t prove anything but the weakness of your argument. You’ve totally missed the point: the problem is precisely that no one is talking about bombing their factories. They may not want war in Tehran, but they have no disincentive to promote war in Lebanon.
Ideological whanking? Please, try to have some substance beyond mere insults. You’re only proving you’re a lightweight with such silliness.
Now, that does not mean the lack of desire is the correct position, although certainly had you had two world wars fought on your home soil with millions dead, your enthusiasm for bombing would likely be noticably cooled.
And again, you totally miss the point and completely misread history to boot. You didn’t have two world wars because democracies were too facile about fighting their enemies; indeed, precisely the opposite. You had two world wars (which America had to be dragged into to protect the freedom you would not, and then could not) because democracies foolishly insisted war could be avoided and refused to confront fascism while it could have been contained with miminal bloodshed.