At the European Center for Foreign Relations Célia Belin, Majda Ruge, Jeremy Shapiro present “six scary policy scenarios” if Donald Trump is re-elected in November. They posit three strains of foreign policy opinion among Republicans:
- Donald Trump remains erratic and inconsistent when it comes to foreign policy. But the broader Republican foreign policy ecosystem forming around his administration is increasingly clear and organised.
- This ecosystem comprises three main “tribes” – restrainers who want US foreign policy to focus on America; prioritisers who want it to focus on Asia; and primacists who want it to continue to focus globally.
and the scenarios they present include a return to the Minsk Accords and a foreign policy crisis in the Indo-Pacific. I found the piece thought-provoking.
I have found Donald Trump’s thought processes puzzling since well prior to 2017. However, I think the authors overestimate how much can be determined about what a hypothetical second Trump term would bring based on prevailing strains of Republican foreign policy thought. Might they consider the first Trump term as a sign of what a second would bring? Maybe that, in fact, is what they’re considering and Trump’s previous European policies are what worry them.
My own observation is that Mr. Trump’s approach to foreign policy is completely transactional—he assesses what’s the best “deal” he can get from any particular situation, “deal” measured variably. I can well see how that would be disconcerting to European leaders.
While I cannot tell you what a second Trump term would do in any given situation, I can give you my impressions of European leadership. I think that the Europeans, particularly the Germans, are very accustomed to pursuing their own national interests, having America pick up the tab, and any change in that is very concerning to them. I also think they’re putting far too much weight on the “2% of GDP” NATO guideline for defense spending when they should be focusing more on readiness. When you’ve spent far less than you needed to for any reasonable level of readiness for over a generation, how much do you need to spend to achieve a satisfactory level of readiness? It could be 2%, 10%, or more? It could be 1%. I’m no expert on European militaries but even the French military, probably that at the highest level of readiness at this point, could probably use some sprucing up, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
Furthermore, what do the recent EU elections portend for future European defense spending? My take on the EU elections was that the Europeans were voting their pocketbooks and they’re tired of leadership policies that raise prices and taxes which would include increased defense spending.







