The Song Is the Same

but the circumstances have changed. In his Wall Street Journal column, James Freeman argues that the U. S. economy can grow faster if only we cut taxes:

Real GDP growth in 1983 turned out to be 4.6%, followed by a remarkable growth surge of 7.3% in 1984 and another strong year after that with 4.2% growth in 1985. The U.S. economy wouldn’t slow back down to the level of Times realism until 1990.

Speaking of the 1990s, toward the end of that decade some observers once again discovered reasons that purportedly showed why America’s best days of economic growth were behind her. In the July-August 1997 issue of Harvard Business Review, an economist named Paul Krugman skillfully argued why a group of “new paradigm” economists were wrong to think that Americans could expect faster economic growth.

[…]

Mr. Krugman insisted that “it is time to get serious: an economic doctrine, no matter how appealing, must be rejected if it cannot stand up to well-informed criticism. We would like to believe that the U.S. economy can grow much faster if only the Fed would let it. But all the evidence suggests that it cannot.”

By an amazing coincidence, Mr. Krugman published his piece right around the time that President Bill Clinton was signing the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which included, among other benefits, a cut in the federal tax on capital gains.

In hindsight we know that even as Mr. Krugman was drafting his explanation of the limits to U.S. growth, the U.S. economy was shifting into a higher gear. 1997 would turn out to be the first of four straight years in which real GDP growth averaged more than 4%.

Tax reform was not all that happened in the early 1980s. Paul Volcker had thrown the economy into a tailspin to bring double digit inflation under control. And the Reagan Administration launched an enormous program of deficit spending.

The Trump Administration would like to do the same things—reduce tax rates and borrow from future economic growth. There are some good reasons to believe that won’t be as effective now as it was 35 years ago.

For one thing the federal debt was about 40% of GDP when President Reagan took office. Now it’s about 100% and there’s good reason to believe that higher debt levels suppress economic growth.

Secondly, people in the top 10% of income earners pay most of the income tax and, consequently, they will get most of any foreseeable tax cut. Will whatever they do with the additional money result in more domestic economic growth? IMO there’s good reason to doubt it, rooted in their present behavior. Why aren’t the top 10% of Americans spending more on goods produced domestically, why aren’t they starting new businesses, and why are so much of their savings in financial instruments?

Third, the best prospect for stimulating domestic economic growth is by cutting the payroll tax, the federal tax actually paid by most Americans. That isn’t on the table and, due to structural changes in the American economy, even that won’t result in as much domestic economic growth as might otherwise have been the case.

That isn’t to say that I don’t believe the greater economic growth isn’t possible in the U. S. I think it is but won’t be accomplished by cutting taxes or spending beyond our means. Reduce the burden of regulation to what is actually needed. Stop picking winners and losers in the economy. Roll back subsidies. Limit the growth in the wages of public employees and those who depend on tax dollars for their incomes to a level the communities they serve can bear. Let businesses import the workers they actually need but don’t let them use imported workers to push wages down.

That’s much harder lifting than cutting tax rates. Which is why it won’t be done.

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The Past Is Never Dead

It’s not even past. In a sort of counter-point in the Washington Post, Lan Cao present five myths about the Vietnam War:

  1. The Viet Cong was a scrappy guerrilla force.
  2. The refugees who came to the U.S. were Vietnam’s elite.
  3. American soldiers were mostly draftees.
  4. Enemy forces breached the U.S. Embassy in the Tet Offensive.
  5. South Vietnamese soldiers were unwilling and unable to fight.

to which I’d add one more: the Vietnam War was unpopular. It had majority support until at least 1968.

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Twisted History

If Ken Burns actually believes that Americans lost their ordinary trust of the federal government as a consequence of the Vietnam War, as suggested in this interview of him at the Washington Post, his vision of American history is seriously twisted, skewed. As anyone who’s actually looked at the history with an open mind can tell you, not trusting the federal government has been the default position for Americans for most of its history. 1940-1970 was an aberration, the consequence of the one-two punch of the Great Depression and World War II.

It’s not a coincidence that Americans elected Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency four times and Americans had an unprecedented trust of the federal government.

The federal government took that trust and did exactly what you’d expect from it: overreached. That the second-longest war in American history coincided with that period of trust isn’t a coincidence, either.

I have lived through the longest war in American history and the second longest, the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. We have been at war for much of my adult life. Enough.

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Gerrymandering Is Wrong

I agree with the editors of the New York Times that gerrymandering is wrong. I disagree with their implication that only Republicans gerrymander districts. The reality is that political parties who control state legislatures gerrymander districts.

I’ve posted the picture at the top of this post at least a half dozen times. That’s the Illinois Fourth Congressional District. It’s vaguely horseshoe shaped, in some places just one block wide. It was constructed explicitly to ensure the re-election of Luis Gutiérrez. The Democratic Party has had control of the Illinois legislature for decades.

The Illinois Fifth Congressional District in which I reside is likewise gerrymandered to ensure that a Democrat is elected from it. My ward is gerrymandered to protected Marge Laurino. And so on.

The editors’ partisan implication reflects either their own partisan biases or a misunderstanding of gerrymandering. Gerrymandering concentrates minorities whether racial, ethnic, economic, or political to protect incumbents. Simple as that. When in power either party does it unless actively prevented.

I wish that the editors had explored ways and means a little more. While I’m sure that the justices of the Supreme Court can disallow certain district maps, I’m not sure I see any way for them to ban gerrymandering.

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Those Were the Days

Return with us now to those thrilling days of yesteryear. If FT Alphaville is right, you were probably better off financially in 1998 than you are now:

The median American family was richer in 1998 than it is now, and it also has about 30 per cent less wealth than at its peak in 2007. That measurement was obviously inflated by the housing price bubble, but even so the decline can nonetheless be understood as a massive shock to the value, real and perceived, of the typical household’s collateral. Other methodological approaches, perhaps using a different deflator, might yield a more hopeful trend, but the devastation wrought by the crisis remains hard to overstate.

but it was the graph at the top of this post that caught my eye. Note how nicely it explains a point I’ve made here repeatedly, that if you’re worried about income inequality you should be as worried as much about the top 2-9% of income earners as about the top 1%. The subsidies received by that group are enormous and their lobbying is commensurate with their subsidies.

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What, Me Worry?


If you’re worried the Brookings Institution has a good tool for deciding where you’ll fit right in:

Our geographic analysis yields many patterns that are consistent with those reported in other kinds of data—and in our earlier work. For example, the best places in terms of optimism for poor minorities are the Southern cluster of states: Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. The worst places for this same group are California, Washington-state, Oregon, Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico. The patterns are almost the inverse for poor non-Hispanic whites, meanwhile. The most optimistic states for this group are Maryland, California, Florida, Nevada, Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia. The most desperate states are the Dakotas, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Wisconsin, Missouri, West Virginia, and Kentucky (which correspond, roughly, to the opioid and suicide belts in the heartland).

The best places for worry (i.e., the lowest levels of worry) for minorities are, again, the Southern cluster of states, while the worst are Washington state, Kansas, Utah, New Mexico, Florida, and Massachusetts. Again, non-Hispanic whites have an inverse pattern, with worry the lowest in Arizona, New Mexico, Minnesota, Wyoming, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, and Georgia. The worst places for poor white worry are Nevada, Utah, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. While some of the classic rural areas again show up, so do some coastal regions with more vibrant economies, as in the case of the latter three states.

I note that unmentioned is Illinois, the Cognitive Dissonance State. We’re thinking of changing the license plates.

The analysis that I think would be even more interesting and revealing would be an analysis by county. I’m confident that you’d find that people were most worried in counties that a) aren’t part of large metropolitan areas and b) aren’t adjacent to state capitols. Also, note the high prevalence of worry among non-whites in the California and the Pacific Northwest.

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Equality, Homogeneity, and American Constitutionalism

When I was reading this article at the Library of Law and Liberty on the challenges that income inequality poses for our constitutional system, this passage leapt out at me:

Early in The Federalist, for example, John Jay argued that the then existing homogeneity of the US suggested “one connected country” fitted to “one united people”: “[A] people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs . . . To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people . . .”

My ancestors—mostly Irish, Swiss, and Germans Catholics—certainly didn’t fit into that “one united people”. Different religions denominations, different languages, different customs, manners, and expectations. How was “one people” preserved?

The answer is that my ancestors adopted English, changed the way they dressed, ate, and behaved, and abandoned traditional religious practices in favor of those of the people who had preceded them here. My ancestors arrived here mostly from 1820 to 1840 with the latest immigrating in 1865.

Their children spoke only English, were largely irreligious, and were as American as the WASPs they lived among if not more so.

Can we have income equality with millions of low-skilled immigrants with very different “manners and customs” from the bulk of the population, who speak little English and don’t feel as much pressure to adopt it as my ancestors did? Can our constitutional order be preserved in the absence of a high degree of social cohesion? We’re conducting a vast real world experiment to find out.

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American Non-Exceptionalism

I couldn’t get past the caption of this Washington Post op-ed, “Most countries have given up their colonies. Why hasn’t America?” for the simple reason that it isn’t true. The following countries all continue to have colonies:

  • Australia
  • China
  • Denmark
  • France
  • The Netherlands
  • New Zealand
  • Norway
  • Portugal
  • Spain
  • United Kingdom
  • United States

That’s not an inclusive list. There are probably more. They may call them “territories”, “commonwealths”, or a variety of other terms but they’re colonies. Mostly, these colonies are a dotting of islands in the Pacific and Caribbean.

We’re just not unusual in this regard.

Here’s the question. This stuff isn’t that hard to check. Why did the WP run the op-ed?

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Resistance from the Washington Post

The editors of the Washington Post don’t like the outline of tax reform as construed by the Trump Administration one bit:

TAX REFORM was supposed to attract wide, bipartisan support. Lower rates would be fully offset by cutting unneeded deductions and loopholes. The benefit would be a simpler, more efficient tax code. But the idea has moved steadily toward just another irresponsible GOP tax cut, paid for with magical thinking, that would erode the nation’s fiscal health and burden future generations. Republicans who know better must resist this path.

President Trump released a tax reform framework Wednesday, promising that “historic tax relief” would result in higher wages and a “middle-class miracle.” That’s about as likely as it sounds. In fact, the plan is packed with giveaways to the wealthy and threatens to add even more to the debt.

One of the many problems with the tax code as it stands is that as long as you’re only considering the income tax just about any lowering of the marginal rates will be a “tax cut for the rich” because 45% of people pay no income taxes and most of those aren’t rich. That’s by definition. “The rich” are the top 1% or .1% of income earners, depending on whom you ask.

The non-rich pay substantial federal taxes, too, but it’s mostly in the form of payroll taxes.

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The Real and the Unreal

Now that President Trump has told us his ideas on tax reform we’re being inundated with a heated discussion in various states of dissociative fugue of what constitutes real tax reform. I won’t try to tell you what real tax reform is or is not but I can offer some thoughts on what prudent tax reform would look like.

Prudent tax reform would

  • Be more efficient than the present system
  • Be simpler than the present system
  • Make the U. S. tax system more like those of other OECD countries
  • Be no more regressive than the present system

The corporate income tax is the least efficient of our taxes. It should be eliminated or reduced. At the very least our corporate income tax marginal rates should be brought into line with those of other OECD countires.

Politics being what it is over time the tax system becomes increasingly complicated. We’re between ten and twenty years overdue for a major rewrite of the tax code.

The truly prudent thing to do, incorporating efficiency, simplicity, and making our tax system more competitive with other OECD countries would be to eliminate the income tax entirely and impose a VAT, preferably one that includes a prebate to reduce its regressivity.

When they controlled the Congress, the Democrats inexplicably chose to make our overall tax system more regressive. It’s time to reverse that but we can’t accomplish that without bringing payroll taxes and substantial Social Security and Medicare reform into the discussion.

And that’s why tax reform is hard.

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