WWRD?

Adam Schuster’s op-ed in the Chicago Tribune is yet another example of wishful thinking. In it the Rauner advisor gives advice to the man who defeated Rauner’s re-election bid:

• First, ask schools and universities to shoulder the cost of their employees’ retirement. Under the status quo, local officials negotiate salary and health benefits, which form the basis for pension payments and retiree health costs, but the state pays the bill. That creates a misalignment between responsibility and accountability, reducing pressure to keep compensation affordable for taxpayers. Gov. Bruce Rauner pushed this idea in each of his budget addresses, but the proposal started with Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan.

According to data from the Governor’s Office of Management and Budget, by phasing this shift in over a number of years, Pritzker could see savings of $825 million in the first year, with further savings each year after.

• Second, Pritzker should ask state government workers to play fair at the bargaining table. Rauner suggested savings of nearly $500 million annually, accomplished by asking workers to pay for the same percentage of their health care costs as is typical in the private sector, or about 40 percent, up from just 23 percent now. Again, this concept has received bipartisan support. Former Gov. Pat Quinn also tried to right-size government worker health insurance costs.

Was Mr. Schuster AWOL during the first week of November? Rauner lost and, as been said, elections have consequences. One of those consequences is that otherwise reasonable ideas for balancing Illinois’s budget won’t happen because they won’t pass muster with Mike Madigan.

Re-imagining J. B. Pritzker as Bruce Rauner is an exercise in futility. I have no idea what Gov. Pritzker will do. My guess is that he will try, unsuccessfully, to enact a graduated income tax in Illinois (that would require a constitutional amendment). And he may try to attract more big businesses to Illinois despite Illinois’s adverse tax and regulatory environment. What will he offer them? Tax breaks? Why not offer the tax breaks to companies that are already here to induce them to stay?

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Who Voted For You?

In a remarkable exercise in lack of self-awareness, in his New Yorker column Jonathan Chait takes exception to the new rules of decorum promulgated by the Trump Administration:

Interactions between the media and the White House are a form of democracy theater. The give-and-take is a tangible and living sign of the fact that in a republic, the president is not a monarch but is simply a citizen like everybody else. In authoritarian regimes, the palpably cowed news media treats leaders with a deference that communicates their inviolable status.

There is nothing whatever democratic about the White House Press corps. No one voted for them. No democratic process whatever was involved in their getting their seats.

The comparison he gives, Question Time in the United Kingdom, is remarkably dissimilar to White House press briefings. All of the MPs who take part in it have stood for election and the ministers of whom questions are asked are appointed and elected from within their political parties. In White House press briefings unelected and unanswerable reporters are asking questions of the president who was actually elected.

Presidents are under no obligation to give the press briefings at all. They do it when it suits their purposes. How does it serve the president’s purpose to be subjected to an inquisition by hostile camera hounds?

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Is It Time to Panic Now?

Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google have collectively lost $ 1 trillion porin value from their recent highs. CNBC reports:

The five “FAANG” stocks collectively lost more than $1 trillion in market value from recent highs as shares dropped after Tuesday’s open.

The stocks — Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google-parent Alphabet — all began Tuesday trading lower. Apple led the group’s losses, falling as much as 4 percent. The four other stocks later turned around, each going slightly positive on the day.

Combined market capitalization losses since their 52-week highs hit $1.02 trillion on Tuesday:

  • Facebook: $253 billion
  • Amazon: $280 billion
  • Apple: $253 billion
  • Netflix: $67 billion
  • Alphabet: $164 billion

$1 trillion is quite a bit of value. Is it time to panic?

My answer: absolutely not. The time to panic was when just five stocks became responsible for so much of the stock market’s growth and that was a couple of years back. Dow-Jones, Standard & Poors, and other indexing companies might want to start thinking about their indexing strategies and whether they actually mean anything any more.

As it is the FAANG stocks have just lost about 10 months worth of price increases.

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Question

How does the liberal world order result in a country that doesn’t believe in the rule of law running Interpol and countries that don’t believe in human right running the UN human rights organization?

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The Compromise

In his Washington Post column Charles Lane looks, dewy-eyed, at a compromise approach to immigration proposed by William Galston and Bill Kristol:

Its essence is a trade: legalization of roughly 11 million unauthorized immigrants already here, in exchange for tough measures against future illegal immigration.

Those brought here as minors, the “dreamers,” would receive immediate permanent residency. Others would be granted a new six-year status — “registered provisional immigrant” — that would gradually lead to citizenship, provided they meet criteria such as a clean criminal record and English training.

The federal government would build a series of physical barriers, fencing and walls, where it makes practical sense, on the U.S.-Mexico border; crack down on visa overstays with the help of advanced biometric technology; and implement a universal E-Verify system to ensure that employers hire only authorized workers.

The current annual legal immigration level, approximately 1 million lawful permanent residents, would remain in place, but there would be a major shift away from family reunification in favor of skills-based selection of newcomers.

The arbitrary “diversity” immigration program that awards visas by lottery to countries that send relatively few immigrants would be eliminated and its 55,000 annual admissions redistributed to other categories of newcomers.

I suppose I should be heartened at this proposal; it resembles things I’ve said here from time to time although my preferred approach would be to increase the number of work visas for which Mexicans are eligible rather than creating a new class of visa.

Sadly, the proposed plan is a non-starter, unacceptable to either side in the immigration debate. With a confidence based on experience we know precisely what would happen under such a plan. The six year provisional status would be made permanent or extended again and again while the barriers, stiffening of visa enforcement, and universal E-Verify would never materialize. Following the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, only a minority of those eligible ever became citizens, the promised stiffened enforcement never happened, and illegal immigration increased greatly, encouraged by the previous granting of legal status.

I’ll repeat my proposal: greatly increase the number of work visas for which Mexican citizens are eligible, toughen workplace enforcement with serious penalties for infractions (intentional or not), produce some program for the “Dreamers” but adhere to whatever standards are established rigorously, and return H1B and L1 visas to their intended purposes which were not to provide employers with an opportunity for hiring foreign workers who will work for less.

As it stands the proposal is just another example of wishful thinking.

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The Three Stages of Good Grief

Is Walter Russell Mead assessing the evolution of the Trump foreign policy correctly or engaging in wishful thinking in his column at the Wall Street Journal?

President Trump’s foreign policy has passed through two stages—one restrained and one more turbulent. The third and most decisive is now beginning to take shape.

[…]

The liberal-internationalist vision, which holds that the world is a kind of greater European Union, moving inexorably toward its own kind of “ever closer union” via a strengthening network of international institutions, seems to be running out of steam.

As countries like Turkey, India, China, Brazil and Nigeria develop, they are striving more to strengthen their sovereignty than to pool it. By shifting America’s stance away from the losing defense of legacy liberal internationalism that characterized the John Kerry years, the Trump disruption might, might point the way toward a more sustainable U.S. diplomatic approach.

But for Mr. Trump to be remembered as something other than a diplomatic wrecking ball, his administration will have to rapidly shift gears. Destruction ceases to be creative when it doesn’t lead to the construction of something better. After the cautious first stage and the dramatic second stage, a third stage of strategy and leadership must follow.

In the Middle East, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen seem to be forcing the administration to review its strategic options. Simply outsourcing U.S. regional policy to Riyadh and Jerusalem won’t do. Washington needs a vision and a policy that both reassures our local allies and disciplines some of their wilder instincts. Walking away from the Iran deal was easy; implementing a new regional strategy will be hard. Like his predecessors, Mr. Trump will be judged not by his intentions but by his results.

The administration’s China policy has also reached an inflection point. The tariff card has been played. But what is the administration’s vision for the future of an economic relationship that, despite Chinese abuses, has benefited both countries and cannot be ripped apart without profound damage to many U.S. companies and industries? How will the administration balance its interest in building a strong global alliance to counter China and its efforts to extract more favorable trading terms from partners like Germany and Japan? Can the Trump administration develop an approach to China that is bipartisan enough to ensure Democrats don’t scrap it all when they return to power?

Unlike the Soviet Union, China has engaged successfully with the international market system and as a result has many more channels of influence around the world. How will the administration orchestrate a global response? This is a harder task than the Truman administration faced; is the Trump administration up to the job?

In Europe, President Trump has been blunt about the many shortcomings he sees in existing U.S. relationships with key allies. He hasn’t, however, put forward a compelling vision of the kind of trans-Atlantic relationship he would like to see instead.

It is the same on trade. We know Mr. Trump prefers bilateral deals to multilateral ones and that he sees reciprocity as the key to fairness. But what would a reformed World Trade Organization look like? How does Mr. Trump want trade disputes to be handled? Can Mr. Trump subject the international economy to an endless series of trade shocks without undermining the domestic prosperity on which his future and that of his party depend?

Donald Trump spent much of his pre-political career as a builder and a developer. President Trump has mostly been in the demolition industry where foreign policy is concerned. That will likely change in the next few months as the unrelenting pressure of world events forces the administration to define and communicate its objectives more clearly. As stage two gives way to stage three, it will become easier to see where this administration wants to take the world—and whether it is having any success.

There is another alternative that Dr. Mead doesn’t seem to entertain: that Trump could just back down. Will the Trump Administration enter a constructive phase in its foreign policy, continue to stir the pot, become more aggressive, or back down?

Fasten your seatbelts, we’re in for a bumpy ride.

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The Liberal World Order Was Wishful Thinking

At The National Interest Ted Galen Carpenter points out that the liberal world order which Trump is purportedly dismantling was largely wishful thinking:

The rules-based aspect is extremely selective, if not hypocritical. The United States and its Western allies frequently lecture other countries about violating proper international norms. During the Cold War, Washington repeatedly denounced the Soviet Union for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and committing outright acts of aggression. U.S. leaders excoriated Moscow’s brutal crackdowns in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Later, Washington fumed about the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and even lower-profile Kremlin meddling in such places as Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Angola.

Similar hectoring has continued into the post-Cold War era directed at a noncommunist Russia. Washington responded angrily to Russia’s war against Georgia (even though evidence indicated Georgia initiated the fighting) and reacted with utter fury when Vladimir Putin’s government annexed Crimea . China and Iran also are prominent targets of U.S. criticism for “disruptive” behavior .

Yet the United States and its Western allies have repeatedly meddled (or worse) in the internal affairs of other nations. The CIA and its British counterpart MI5 orchestrated the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran’s government, and the CIA did the same the following year in Guatemala. In both cases, the violations of the standards the West established were especially brazen and inappropriate, since the ousted governments were democratic. The United States was implicated in numerous other coups or coup attempts, including in Indonesia, South Vietnam, and Chile.

The milder forms of U.S. meddling have been even more frequent. Studies indicated that Washington has interfered in elections and other domestic political affairs in more than eighty countries, including some two dozen, full-fledged democracies since World War II. The most recent instance was the flagrant U.S. (and European Union) interference in Ukraine to encourage demonstrators to oust the elected, pro-Russian president before the end of his term.

Both the United States and its allies have committed acts of military aggression in blatant violation of supposed international norms. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and occupied some 37 percent of its territory—an illegal occupation and de facto annexation that continues to this day. The United States and its NATO partners forcibly detached Serbia’s Kosovo province from Belgrade’s jurisdiction by launching a seventy-eight-day air war. And Washington led the wars to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi’s in Libya.

The Kosovo episode is especially illustrative of U.S. and Western hypocrisy regarding a rules-based international order. Not only did the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launch an offensive war against a country that had not attacked any member of the alliance, but the war’s aftermath underscored the selective application of rules. The post-war occupation of Kosovo was under the auspices of the United Nations. When Kosovo’s leaders wanted to declare the province’s outright independence, the Western powers faced a problem. It was certain that both Russia and China would exercise their veto power on the UN Security Council to prevent that outcome. The United States and some (not even all) of its NATO allies simply bypassed the Council and approved Kosovo’s declaration of independence on an ad hoc basis. Western actions regarding Kosovo highlighted the reality that those countries follow the “rules” they officially proclaim only when it suits their interests and goals.

and wishful thinking is, sadly, the best case scenario. Too frequently the so-called liberal world order has been a melange of wishful thinking, sophistry, and guile. Even when applied only the the United States and its relationship with its European allies, our presumed allies have never hesitated to work against us when it furthered their own policy goals or was politically popular at home.

Take a single example. European opposition to genetically-modified agricultural products has largely been sophistry—a dodge around WTO trade rules that allowed them to ban or curtail the imports of U. S. agricultural products, largely in the interests of promoting the interests of their own farmers.

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Wishful Thinking Day

It is apparently Wishful Thinking Day today at The Glittering Eye. My posts today all seem to involve wishful thinking in one way or another. So, for example, the scales have finally fallen from the eyes of the editors of the Washington Post and now they wish that something could be done about Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman:

As a military partner in pushing back against Iranian aggression, Saudi Arabia has been worse than useless. It has no significant presence in Syria, where Tehran is making its strongest military push. The intervention in Yemen launched by Mohammed bin Salman produced a humanitarian catastrophe while strengthening Iran’s position. Tehran smiled when the prince rashly launched a blockade against neighboring Qatar, site of the largest U.S. air base in the Middle East; it cheered when he abducted the pro-American prime minister of Lebanon.

Mohammed bin Salman has been good at charming Westerners with talk of religious reform and economic modernization, but in practice he has done enormous damage to those causes. He has imprisoned scores of liberal Saudis who support reform, including the women who pushed for the right to drive. In overseeing the murder of Mr. Khashoggi, he silenced an influential journalist who endorsed his goals while criticizing his methods. He has backed away from several major economic reforms.

which are precisely the things I was complaining about while the editors were blissfully hailing MBS as a reformer, distracted by the bright, shiny object of letting women drive.

I guess my own wishful thinking is that both the editors and the Trump Administration would recognize that the Saudis are not our allies; they are our enemies. They financed Osama Bin Laden; they financed Al Qaeda’s attack against us; the Saudis have continued to support Al Qaeda in Syria.

There is an old proverb that covers our relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pretty well: he who sups with the devil should use a long spoon. Ultimately, U. S. and Saudi interests cannot be reconciled. The best we can do is manage them and so far we have refused to do that.

More wishful thinking? That any alternative to MBS would be better than he.

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The Full Implications of China’s Slowdown

I’m not sure that Josh Rudolph appreciates the full implications of a major slowdown of China’s economy, discussed here in his piece at the New Atlanticist/i>. He lists the challenges as

1. Slow deleveraging: While credit growth has moderated to come in line with economic growth, debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios remain high and steady.

2. Persistent financial risk: Financial regulatory overhaul continues, but new shadowy corners pop up as soon as old ones get regulated, while property prices remain elevated.

3. Monetary/external imbalance: The strategy of using monetary liquidity to support the financial system amid regulatory tightening is running headlong into Federal Reserve tightening, weakening the renminbi and retesting capital controls.

4. Geopolitics: Even before the Trump presidency, China and the United States were poised to become competitors as China climbs the value chain and offers an alternative model. For a country as large as China, the middle-income trap is harder because it also leads to a Thucydides Trap (the pattern of established powers fearing rising powers, historically leading to conflict three-quarters of the time and likely to strain China’s integration with Western economies).

5. Social contract: Convincing people to accept lower growth and higher default risk will be difficult.

6. Attracting foreign investors: Convincing international investors to use the renminbi and invest in China requires a credible commitment to avoid capital controls.

7. Sectoral restructuring: It will take decades to rebalance the economy toward domestic consumption, services, and advanced manufacturing, reform state-owned enterprises, and deepen capital markets.

I want to focus on just one of them—what he rather blandly refers to as “social contract”. Over the period of the last 25 years, earned or unearned China’s leadership has gotten something of a reputation for competence, particularly among the members of the Western process, cf. Tom Friedman. That has not always been the case. China had several runs of inflation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, indeed until the yuan was pegged to the dollar.

But a very large proportion of China’s working age population has never experienced anything else from the Chinese leadership than carefully managed growth. IMO if that growth does not continue there is a risk of a loss of confidence in the leadership, something that could snowball.

What could happen with a critical loss of confidence? Just about anything.

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Consolidation

This article at the Economist was music to my ears. Many American sectors have been consolidating at a rapid pace:

Since 1997 market concentration has risen in two-thirds of American industries. A tenth of the economy is made up of industries in which four firms control more than two-thirds of the market. In a healthy economy you would expect profits to be competed down, but the free cashflow of companies is 76% above its 50-year average, relative to gdp. In Europe the trend is similar, if less extreme. The average market share of the biggest four firms in each industry has risen by three percentage points since 2000. On both continents, dominant firms have become harder to dislodge.

Incumbents scoff at the idea that they have it easy. However consolidated markets become domestically, they argue, globalisation keeps heating the furnace of competition. But in industries that are less exposed to trade, firms are making huge returns. We calculate the global pool of abnormal profits to be $660bn, more than two-thirds of which is made in America, one-third of that in technology firms (see Special report).

and this consolidation has costs:

Not all these rents are obvious. Google and Facebook provide popular services at no cost to consumers. But through their grip on advertising, they subtly push up the costs of other firms. Several old-economy industries with high prices and fat profits lurk beneath the surface of commerce: credit cards, pharmaceutical distribution and credit-checking.

During the California Gold Rush relatively few great fortunes were made panning for gold but several were made in selling tools and other supplies to prospectors. The same is true in the retail gold rush. Jeff Bezos isn’t making money in retail. He’s making it selling retailers the tools to help them go online.

I like the Economist’s prescriptions, too:

Market power should be attacked in three ways. First, data and intellectual-property regimes should be used to fuel innovation, not protect incumbents. That means liberating individual users of tech services to take their information elsewhere. It also entails requiring big platforms to license anonymised bulk data to rivals. Patents should be rarer, shorter and easier to challenge in court.

Second, governments should tear down barriers to entry, such as non-compete clauses, occupational licensing requirements and complex regulations written by industry lobbyists. More than 20% of American workers must hold licences in order to do their jobs, up from just 5% in 1950.

Third, antitrust laws must be made fit for the 21st century. There is nothing wrong with trustbusters’ remit to promote consumer welfare. But regulators need to pay more attention to the overall competitive health of markets and to returns on capital. America’s regulators should have more powers, as Britain’s do, to investigate markets that are becoming dysfunctional. Big tech firms should find it much harder to neutralise potential long-term rivals, as Facebook did when it acquired Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014.

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