Cultural Marxism or Just Raising Hell?

I recommend that you read this interesting post by Andrew Lynn at The Hedgehog Review. Here’s a snippet:

According to conservative journalist and blogger Andrew Sullivan, today’s cultural Marxists are deeply invested in toppling power structures of patriarchy and white privilege. They do so, according to this version of history, by following the Frankfurt School thinkers in transposing the oppressed-oppressor conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie into the cultural realm, assigning oppressed status to various nonprivileged identity groups. Emergence of a victimhood culture follows, as groups laying claim to various identities articulate grievances against dominant groups and the structures that serve their interests. Rational adjudication of truth then becomes subsumed under demands for the subversion of power, patriarchy, and privilege across unjust social institutions, perpetuating continual identification of conflict within the established social order.

There are many problems with this narrative, of course, and here’s one: Such a vision of an ever-in-conflict social order is only loosely “cultural” and could be constructed entirely independent of anything “Marxist.” You can find it in Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and Ayn Rand, to name just a few. Indeed, today the most popular accounts of society as groups in perpetual conflict over resources—whether material, symbolic, or political—are found in best-selling books by evolutionary psychologists and biologists eager to apply their disciplinary insights to questions far outside their field. It is more the diffusion of Darwin—not Derrida—that underlies popular conflict-grounded accounts of morality and culture today.

I think there’s broad dissatisfaction among the people in “the West” and the dissatisfied probably don’t know much more about Marx or Derrida than they do about Marlon Brando in the clip above.

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What’s the Democrats’ Policy?

I agree completely with Gregory J. Wallance’s observations in an op-ed at The Hill:

Democrats certainly should be talking about the Dreamers, ending family separation and a humane asylum policy. At the same time, they should be proposing effective immigration law enforcement measures such as better technology, more border personnel, more immigration judges, more effective tracking of visa overstays and efficient deportations of illegal immigrants convicted of crimes. In short, the Democrats’ border security policy should be to build “smart barriers” and not “dumb” walls.

Such an approach, in fact, is pro-immigration because it will build support for lawful immigration and for much-needed reforms.

Is insisting on “comprehensive immigration reform” simply using the leverage they have or is it just a way of kicking the can down the road?

What conclusions should be drawn from the Democratic leadership’s present position:

  1. They’re doing the best they can with the tools at their disposal.
  2. Their only real policy is resistance. If Trump is for it, they’re against it.
  3. They don’t believe that illegal immigration presents any security, law enforcement, budget, social, or economic problems that are worth dealing with.
  4. They think that U. S. law will enforce itself.
  5. They actually support open borders.
  6. They want to be seen to support open borders but maintain plausible deniability that’s the case.
  7. Electorally it is safer for them to do nothing than to act.

Just as a reminder you can conclude nothing from what politicians propose or vote for or against when they know it won’t pass.

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The Caravan Moves On

I don’t think that Peggy Noonan really appreciates what is happening in American politics and, indeed, in American culture more broadly. From her most recent Wall Street Journal column:

Politics is part theater, part showbiz, it’s always been emotional, but we’ve gotten too emotional, both parties. It’s too much about feelings and how moved you are. The balance is off. We have been electing magic ponies in our presidential contests, and we have done this while slighting qualities like experience, hard and concrete political accomplishment, even personal maturity. Barack Obama, whatever else he was, was a magic pony. Donald Trump too. Beto O’Rourke, who is so electrifying Democrats, also appears to be a magic pony.

Messrs. Obama and Trump represented a mood. They didn’t ask for or elicit rigorous judgment, they excited voters. Mr. Trump’s election was driven by a feeling of indignation and pushback: You elites treat me like a nobody in my own country, I’m about to show you who’s boss. His supporters didn’t consider it disqualifying that he’d never held office. They saw it as proof he wasn’t in the club and could turn things around. His ignorance was taken as authenticity. In this he was like Sarah Palin, another magic pony.

After two wars and an economic crisis, Mr. Obama gleamed with hope and differentness. This shining 47-year-old intellectual—surely he’ll turn things around. He’d been an obscure and indifferent state legislator who was only two years in the U.S. Senate when the move to make him president began. It was all—a feeling. He was The One. Mr. O’Rourke, who’s shooting up in the polls as a possible Democratic contender, is sunny, friendly, even-keeled. He reminds some Democrats of Bobby Kennedy—soulful, able to see and summon the things you like best in yourself. He even looks like a son of Bobby Kennedy. He is 46, has served only six years in the House, and before that was on the City Council of El Paso, Texas.

Our public political culture has given in too much to emotionalism. Last week at the George H.W. Bush funeral, which functioned as a two-hour portal into the old America, something was unsatisfying. Bush’s political life spanned 30 years. He had a way of seeing the world, thoughts and assumptions about it, a point of view, and these things had an impact on history. But most everyone speaking, and most in the pews, spoke not of the meaning of these things but of his personal qualities. That has its place, but we are talking history here, and the thoughts that produce it. The same was true at John McCain’s funeral.

We are highlighting emotions in our public life at the expense of meaning. And again, emotions are part of life and part of us, but only part, not the whole.

Communication through tempered speech and reason are artifacts of literacy. As we increasingly enter a post-literate world, emotion and visual imagery become ever more significant. As I have said before and will say again: turn off the sound when you watch a political speech. The words aren’t important at least not any more.

I don’t believe that our new mode of communication is compatible with liberal democracy and it certainly isn’t conducive to solving the real world problems that face us. But that’s another subject. I don’t want post-democracy but it appears that’s what we’re going to get. The caravan has moved on.

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It’s Not Insanity It’s Fanaticism

I usually don’t think much of Marc Thiessen’s Washington Post columns but his most recent is an exception:

Good news for the incoming House Democratic majority! They have something President Trump really, really wants: money to build a border wall. Trump is desperate for this money. Mexico won’t give it to him. Only congressional Democrats can. Without their consent, he can’t deliver on one of the key campaign promises he made during the 2016 election.

There’s a name for this in classic negotiating strategy. It’s called “leverage.” Good negotiators use leverage (something they have, which their adversary wants) to obtain what are called “concessions” (something their adversary has, which they want). The result is what experts call “compromise.” This is how the civilized world gets things done.

But in a fit of pique, Democrats are throwing away their leverage, insisting that they will never — under any circumstances — give Trump the wall he so desperately wants. The reason? Because he wants it and they despise him.

There is a name for this in negotiating strategy as well. It’s called “insanity.”

I would suggest a different word: fanaticism. In that I’m thinking of one of the remarks of that most quotable of 20th century philosophers, George Santayana: “Fanaticism consists in redoubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim.”

Do read the balance of Mr. Thiessen’s column. It’s a primer in negotiation.

However, assume that the Democratic leadership isn’t insane, fanatical, or mistaken. What is their aim?

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Fantasy vs. Reality

I’ve mentioned before that sometimes when I read an opinion piece there is something I just can’t get past. I was predisposed to agree with Fareed Zakharia’s most recent Washington Post column, the thesis of which is that left populists and right populists are making common cause against government-as-usual but I couldn’t get past this statement:

Thus far, the “yellow vest” protests in France have lacked a party, structure and leadership. But lists of demands have been circulating. At their heart is an unworkable fantasy, such as a constitutional cap on taxes at 25 percent , coupled with a massive increase in social spending.

Let’s do a little back-of-the-envelope calculation. Total personal income in France is around $2 trillion per year. 25% of that is around $500 billion. Present French government spending is around $136 billion. Maybe my math is rusty but it certainly appears to me that there’s a considerable amount of space between $500 billion and $136 billion. Sounds pretty workable to me.

The present personal income tax rate in France is 45%.

The fantasy is not that France can lower its taxes and increase its social spending. The fantasy is that good outcomes can be achieved solely on the basis of regressive taxes and that’s the status quo, not just in France but here in the United States as well.

Yes, the people are revolting. Who can blame them? The people who are supposed to know better have made a right hash of things. Somehow those betters always seem to make out pretty well.

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What Do We Look Like?

I liked this post at Medium from Oren Cass on the attitudes towards work and families in late 20th and early 21st century America. Here’s a snippet:

From 1992 to 2017, the Emmy went almost every year to a show about white-collar adults working in Los Angeles, Seattle, Boston, New York, or Washington, few of whom were raising children. The one exception is The Office, about paper salesmen in Scranton, but its primary vein of humor was the evidently miserable lives and meaningless jobs of its provincial subjects (none of whom seemed to have a family, either). In 2017, the seven nominations went to shows about an ad executive and his family in Los Angeles, professionals and their families in Los Angeles, an actor in New York, a young woman restarting her life as a nanny in New York, political operatives in New York and Washington, nerds in Silicon Valley, and rappers in Atlanta. Has a lineup starring characters male and female; gay and straight; black, white, and Hispanic, ever looked so little “like America”?

The reality is that most people are in “dead end jobs” and most have families. “Looking like America” apparently has its limits on television.

My wife and I frequently play a game when watching TV: spot the discrepancy. Examples: palm and eucalyptus trees in what’s supposed to be Chicago or Washington, DC. Do television programs reflect America or are they actually all about Los Angeles? Another little exercise: tally up the iconic TV programs that are about working class or non-professional white collar families. The Honeymooners, All in the Family, Roseanne, and so on. Sure, you can find exceptions. Something has changed in attitudes and its contours really suggest it involves looking down on ordinary people.

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Predictions Failed

I thought you might be interested in the findings of the Urban Institute on the effects of the Affordable Care Act:

Whether the coverage provisions under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) would lead to adverse labor market consequences in the form of reduced employment, hours worked, or earnings has been the subject of substantial debate and analysis. This brief assesses whether coverage gains from 2010 to 2016 were associated with changes in labor market outcomes across occupations. Using data from the American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey, we show how employment, hours worked per week, and weekly earnings changed, by occupation group, and how these changes differed for occupations experiencing larger and smaller coverage gains under the ACA. We also examine whether occupations experiencing increased coverage through nonemployment sources (i.e., through Medicaid or individual plans purchased on the ACA’s Marketplace exchanges) also experienced offsetting declines in ESI coverage. We find that predictions that the coverage provisions of the ACA would lead to reduced employment, work hours, and earnings did not materialize, nor did predictions that employer-based coverage rates would fall as employers dropped coverage.

or, said another way, the predictions of the ACA’s opponents have not happened.

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What’s Wrong With the World

In an op-ed in the Boston Globe Niall Ferguson gives us his version of what’s wrong with the world, not just here in the United States but in most of the developed world:

1. You can’t do anything about demographics, and for most democracies the demographics are terrible.

2. You have inherited welfare systems that transfer resources from younger to older voters, but the latter tend to be more numerous and turn out more in elections, so you can’t reform them and survive.

3. Your safety valve is that you can borrow from the bond market and interest rates are very low, but that’s now changing, and you can’t do anything about it, because central banks are independent.

4. Your aging population means that there’s an economic demand for foreign labor and foreign students, but immigration is politically unpopular, even when the immigrants come from northern Europe (e.g., Poland) and genuinely relieve skill shortages.

5. You might just be able to overcome these problems if there were a real external threat, but the truth is that ordinary people just aren’t that scared of Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, much less Kim Jong Un.

6. As for climate change, ask President Macron how his proposed fuel tax is going.

7. Finally, social media have made it almost impossible for you to control the narrative. You can tweet to your heart’s content, but you are firing a water pistol into an ocean of extreme views and fake news.

That’s an interesting take but it doesn’t quite describe what’s happening because it doesn’t address Japan. Japan is facing a demographic bottleneck much worse than the U. S. and worse than Germany, France, or the UK. It’s GDP growth rate is extremely low. It’s debt to GDP is extremely high—more than twice that of the United States. It has a much more expansive welfare system than the U. S.

Despite all of these Japan isn’t experiencing the political upheaval that the U. S., Germany, France, or the UK are? What’s different about Japan?

Although its GDP growth rate is practically flat, its per capita GDP continues to rise, it is very equal compared to the U. S. or European countries, and, related to this, its immigration rate is extremely low. Its social welfare spending is very low. There’s a lesson in here somewhere.

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La Foule

I wanted to share with you some observations from Claire Berlinski at City Journal about the Gilets jaunes protesters in Paris:

I spent Saturday speaking to the Gilets Jaunes near the Bastille, where I figured I’d have a good vantage point on a traditional protest site. I walked with them as they slowly made their way to the city hall, or Hôtel de Ville. It was obvious from a single glance that these weren’t Parisians, but rural people who couldn’t afford to buy expensive Parisian clothes or get chic haircuts. I instantly understood why Macron rubs them the wrong way. They looked worn out; their hands and faces were lined; they were mainly in late middle-age. They seemed to be decent, respectable, weary people who had worked hard all their lives, paid their taxes, and played by the rules.

They couldn’t have seemed less disposed to violence, nor more apolitical. They were respectful of the police, and vice-versa. As cops drove by, relaxed, the Gilets Jaunes smiled at them, like kids excited about their first trip to the big city, waved at the officers, and gave them the thumbs-up. The cops reciprocated. The sentiment was fraternal. “We’re all weary, overtaxed working men,” they were saying to each other. “We’re on the same side.”

I concluded they were just what they were advertised to be: family men and women who couldn’t make ends meet and who were tired of Macron’s attitude. Why this protest, why now, I asked? The fuel tax was just the straw that broke the camel’s back, they said; it made the difference between “able to make ends meet, barely,” and “not able to make ends meet.” It had just been getting steadily worse every year since the economic crisis began. They had run out of hope.

Recall my observations about how demographically different these protesters are from the students or banlieusardes of previous demonstrations. When ordinary working class Frenchmen in their 30s and 40s think they have nothing left to lose, that seems like a rather serious development to me.

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Half Empty or Half Full

Why is the U. S. unemployment rate 3.7%? The Economist has their explanation:

Joblessness in America has fallen steadily thanks to the longevity and the sturdiness of the American recovery. America’s stretch of unbroken growth, which began in June of 2009, will become the longest on record in 2019 (assuming it continues).

while I think an explanation that comports better with the facts is that the wages for the jobs that are on offer are inadequate to attract people back into the job market, something explained by two-job families, non-portability of support systems, and a variety of other factors.

I guess it’s a question of whether you see the glass as half empty or half full.

I am left with a host of questions. Why do economists cling to the Phillips Curve when its predictive ability is now in question? What would the U. S. economy look like if we were calculating its size based on number of workers times the average productivity per worker rather than the way we are now? (or even better based on marginal productivity) In that case how would we calculate productivity? Is the calculation of the unemployment rate broken because the birth/death ratio (the fudge factor that has been accounting for more change in the estimated unemployment rate than actual measurements for years) is broken and the whole thing is made up? What happens to the unemployment rate when you take illegal immigrants into account?

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