Robert D. Kaplan, the neocon’s neocon, admits that it’s time to throw in the towel on Afghanistan in an op-ed in the New York Times:
No other country in the world symbolizes the decline of the American empire as much as Afghanistan. There is virtually no possibility of a military victory over the Taliban and little chance of leaving behind a self-sustaining democracy — facts that Washington’s policy community has mostly been unable to accept.
While many American troops stay behind steel-reinforced concrete walls to protect themselves from the very population they are supposed to help, it is striking how little discussion Afghanistan has generated in government and media circles in Washington. When it comes to Afghanistan, Washington has been a city hiding behind its own walls of shame and frustration.
I won’t analyze the op-ed in detail but I would like to highlight a few passages.
The total cost of the war could reach as high as $2 trillion when long-term costs are factored in, according to Brown University’s Cost of War Project. All that to prop up an unstable government that would most likely disintegrate if aid were to end.
which is exactly what anyone who actually knew anything about Afghanistan was saying in 2002. Afghanistan cannot support the sort of military structure we are building for it and they will never be capable of defending their own borders. Since those borders were drawn by the English, why not leave it to the English to defend them? There is a barely defensible argument for retaining a small, lethal force in Afghanistan with a mission of counter-terrorism but none whatever for a mission of counter-insurgency.
It did not have to be like this. Had the United States not become diverted from rebuilding the country by its invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which I mistakenly supported), or had different military and development policies been tried, these forces of division might have been overcome.
or, in other words, blame it on Bush. Sorry, Mr. Kaplan. The blame belongs solidly on those who wanted the U. S. to occupy Afghanistan in the first place, e.g. you. Afghanistan would not have been less warlike or less divided. The last conqueror to successfully pacify Afghanistan was Alexander and he did so by settling a population there. Which brings up another important fact: the people who actually fight America’s wars have no interest in the sort of American Empire you have espoused.
According to the Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, there was simply too much emphasis on the electoral process in Kabul and not nearly enough on bread-and-butter nation building — in particular, bringing basic infrastructure and agriculture up to the standards that Afghans enjoyed from the 1950s until the Soviet invasion of 1979.
because Pakistan is such a good example of a country in the region that has become a peaceful liberal democracy. This is a free flight of fancy. I wonder if it’s occurred to him that Pakistan was one of the reasons for our failure in Afghanistan? Advice from Pakistanis about Afghanistan is questionable at best. And dare I mention that the ongoing acts of terrorism in Afghanistan made the sorts of programs he envisions futile? For every school or road built there were 100 terrorists ready to blow them up or burn them down.
Can anyone cite an example of that strategy having been effective anywhere but in Germany, Japan, and South Korea? Those societies are much more cohesive than Afghanistan ever was. The real past in Afghanistan was one in which only Kabul and its immediate environs experienced “the standards that Afghans enjoyed” prior to the Soviet invasion.
Do we owe it to the Afghan people to stay? Not if the ideals that we claim to represent appear unachievable. Spending billions and stationing thousands of troops there with no end in sight to stem a deepening chaos is simply not sustainable policy.
But that policy hasn’t just been invented in the last few years. It was the policy from the outset and a foreseeable outcome as soon as we put “boots on the ground”.
I think that those who say that some show of force was necessary in the aftermath of the attacks in 2001 are, sadly, correct. However, the political leadership simply did not have the stomach for the level of airpower that would have been necessary to accomplish the objective of rooting the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan.