
In his column in the Washington Post Robert Samuelson muses about whether high asset prices are signalling an incipient recession:
To test his theory, Steuerle compared U.S. household net worth (what people own minus all they owe) to the economy’s annual output, gross domestic product (GDP). Since 1950, the ratio has mostly remained 4-to-1 or less. Americans’ assets, from homes to stocks, grew roughly in tandem with the overall economy.
But there were two glaring exceptions. In early 2000, the ratio jumped to 4.5-to-1, and at the beginning of 2007, it rose to 4.9-to-1. There are two possible explanations for these leaps: Americans had become permanently richer — their accumulated wealth was rising faster than their annual incomes (GDP); or for some reason, the value of their assets had temporarily increased.
With hindsight, we know that the second answer is correct, because in each case, the economy soon entered a recession that reduced the ratios. What worries Steuerle is that the same pattern is now unfolding. Toward the end of 2018, the ratio hit an all-time high of 5.3-to-1.
The implication is that asset prices — particularly for stocks and real estate — are artificially high and that, when the bubble inevitably pops, a serious recession will occur, Steuerle writes in the journal Business Economics. People will feel poorer; joblessness will rise; confidence will slacken; business investment will weaken.
It would be about damned time. Make no mistake: artificially inflating asset prices was the explicit objective of quantitative easing. Said another way, the academics at the Federal Reserve’s response to the Great Recession was to exacerbate income inequality in the hope that the newly-endowed ultra-rich would start investing in the United States. The strategy did make the ultra-rich even ultra-richer. It did not spur business investment in the United States.
I agree that Stephen Moore should not be appointed to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and, if appointed, should not be confirmed. I also agree with the editors of the Washington Post that we need experts there.
However, the experts I’m interested in lean more towards practicum than prowess as a researcher or teacher. Only theoreticians would have given us an abomination like quantitative easing.






