You must surely know by now that President Trump has imposed tariffs on goods imported from Canada, Mexico, and China by executive order. Rather than cite external sources, I’ll just provide my reactions.

As a general principle I’m opposed to tariffs. Tariffs tend to reduce the economic growth and welfare of countries that impose them. If you don’t believe me, look it up.

I think that imposing tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada is a mistake. I presume that President Trump is doing so as a bargaining chip on issues unrelated to trade. The more quickly those issues can be resolved amicably, the less harm they will do. I suspect that more leverage could be exerted on Mexico by imposing a tax on remittances.

China is a completely different case. Dislike tariffs as I might, I’m afraid we really have little choice. China is too big and too mercantilist. My only complaint about the tariffs imposed on Chinese goods is that they’re too low.

One of the things that struck me in reading Allysia Finley’s column at the Wall Street Journal was how, er, selective it was. Here’s a snippet:

The uproar last week over the Trump administration’s short-lived pause on federal grants exposed how dependent Democratic states and cities have become on Washington handouts. Call it a welfare trap.

“Fifteen percent of our workforce are funded by those dollars,” New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy groused. A lawsuit brought by all 22 states with Democratic attorneys general plus the District of Columbia detailed a litany of programs funded by Uncle Sam. Washington state said it received $121 million last year for allergy and infectious-disease research. Illinois claimed federal Medicaid funds made up 60% of its 2023 spending on “critical health services.”

“Washington, do you realize the consequences of what you’ve done here? And do you really want us to not fund law enforcement?” New York Gov. Kathy Hochul declared. “Do you really want us to not fund roads and bridges?” What are New York state taxes for?

The title of the column is “Democratic States Are Wards of Washington”. I agree with her that some Democratic states are unduly dependent on federal spending. Some aren’t. Some Republican states are unduly dependent on federal spending. Here’s a handy map of per capita federal spending in each state:

The states with the highest per capita spending are Alaska, Rhode Island, and New Mexico. However, Wyoming, Montana, Louisiana, and Kentucky are also highly dependent on federal spending. Which states are the most dependent?

As you can see nearly a third of Montana's, Louisiana's, and Kentucky's state budgets come from the federal government. A quarter of Rhode Island's, Massachusetts's, and Maryland's budgets come from the federal government.

I don't think that Ms. Finley is telling the whole story. I can see several stories in those maps. One of them is that too many states depend too heavily on the federal government. I don't think you can tell a partisan story from them.

Here’s another fantasy. At CIMSEC Benjamin Van Horrick wants to bolster our ability to oppose China in the Western Pacific and South China Sea by increasing the number of speakers of Korean, Japanese, Thai, and Tagalog:

A dire shortage of Asian operation linguists in the First Island Chain hinders the United States’ capability to deter Chinese aggression. The joint force’s campaigns depend on strengthening regional partners and fighting as coalitions. Operational linguists act as interpreters and translators, forge trust, assist with planning, and enable the execution of coalition operations. Since language is culture, linguists also inform and educate the commands about the host nation’s cultural and social nuances, such as those that can affect operational integration. However, the present number of operational linguists in the Pacific is already insufficient for regular peacetime campaigning, let alone for crisis or war. The new administration can fix the problem and add more operational linguists in the Pacific before the operational need becomes a damaging shortfall.

To accomplish that they will need to draft Korean-Americans, Japanese-Americans, etc. into the military. Training serving personnel adequately in languages rated as difficult (which describes most of the languages he wants us to expand on) takes years.

Americans aren’t linguists. There are multiple reasons for that. The most obvious is that there are many places in the U. S. where you can travel for hundreds if not thousands of miles in any direction without hearing a language other than English spoken. Other than Spanish nowadays of course. Furthermore, the only reasons for Americans to study languages other than English or Spanish is nostalgia or personal enrichment. It opens no career possibilities. American companies hire native speakers of other languages not people who’ve learned other languages in school.

A rather remarkable number of the posts I’ve seen today have looked to me like free flights of fancy. This post by Eyck Freymann and Hugo Bromley at Foreign Affairs is one of them. It opens:

As tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, U.S. efforts to deter Chinese aggression suffer from a fundamental credibility problem. The United States has conventional and strategic tools to deter Beijing, including the threat of punishing economic sanctions. But China is much too big and integrated into the global trading system to expel it from the world economy overnight. A sudden economic break between Beijing and Washington would be devastating for the United States and catastrophic for the rest of the world. Financial panic and supply chain disruptions would fracture the international economic order and undermine U.S. leadership. China might calculate that the United States would be unwilling to take such risks—or that even if it tried, the rest of the world would resist U.S. pressure to choose between the two powers.

Punishing Beijing for unprovoked aggression would be essential to maintaining U.S. credibility and leverage, but it would have to be balanced with U.S. interests. These include preserving macroeconomic and financial stability, dollar hegemony, and a functional and rules-based international trading system, as well as breaking U.S. and allied dependence on the Chinese market. Even in an extreme crisis scenario—for example, if Beijing attacked U.S. bases in East Asia during an invasion of Taiwan—attempting a total and immediate economic decoupling from China would be a costly and dangerous gamble. It would subordinate all other U.S. interests to a punishment strategy that might not even work.

The only real prospect for “decoupling” from China was abandoned more than 20 years ago when China was granted Most Favored Nation trading status and membership in the World Trade Organization. Since then the United States’s imports from China have grown enormously:

Find more statistics at Statista
and deindustrialized considerably. To decouple from China we would need billions if not trillions in additional capital investment in reindustrializing and at least a decade to do it in. The actions we have taken most recently, e.g. blocking Nippon Steel from acquiring U. S. Steel have not been targeted at reshoring our industrial capacity but at further deindustrializing.

They go on to advocate something they call “avalanche decoupling”:

If Beijing crossed one of Washington’s redlines, the United States could work with its allies to manage the resulting global financial crisis, reshore critical supply chains away from China as fast as possible, and trigger a ratcheting trade policy to unlink noncritical supply chains over the longer term. The plan would also initiate the creation of an Economic Security Cooperation Board, a new institution with membership open to all countries except rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Russia, and of course China. The ESCB would ensure that the decoupling process was rules-based, driven by market forces rather than command and control, and protective of its members’ national and economic security interests, while acknowledging that most countries would continue to trade with both the United States and China. A credible U.S. commitment to this kind of economic leadership during a crisis would not only help stabilize the international economic system but also potentially transform it in a way that benefited most of the world at China’s expense.

With what? At this point we can’t even build our own military systems without components from China. How will we “reshore supply chains away from China”?

At Axios Erin Doherty reports:

The Democratic Party is the most unpopular it’s been in polling that dates back to 2008, according to a new survey from Quinnipiac University.

Why it matters: Democrats are struggling to repair their image with voters after a bruising 2024 election that put President Trump in the White House and Republicans in control of both houses of Congress.

• Democratic lawmakers are grappling — and in some cases, experimenting — with how best to respond to Trump’s rapid, sweeping changes in the early days of his administration.

By the numbers: 57% of registered voters have an unfavorable opinion of the Democratic Party, the highest percentage since Quinnipiac started asking the question in 2008.

45% of voters have an unfavorable opinion of the Republican Party.
43% of voters have a favorable opinion of the Republican Party, the highest since 2008.

• By contrast, 31% of registered voters have a favorable opinion of the Democratic Party.
• That’s the largest favorability advantage the GOP has had over the Democratic Party since 2008, according to Quinnipiac.

In short those are the worst favorable/unfavorable ratings for the Democratic Party not simply for as long as Quinnipiac has been asking the question but for the last thirty years or more, as long as the question has been asked.

The kneejerk reaction of apologists to that has emphasized messaging. The Democratic Party’s problem is not merely a messaging problem. As Ruy Teixeira has been saying for some time the party is adopting positions on a variety of issues that are wildly unpopular among historic constituencies. That’s not just a messaging problem. The party needs to change what it’s doing or risk becoming a fringe party.

My advice: execute. Crime should be lower, education results better, and economic performance better with less political corruption where the party is the strongest like Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York City than in places where the party is the weakest. The Democrats need for people to be flocking to these places rather than leaving them in droves.

The trial of former Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan, the longest-serving speaker in U. S. history, on charges of corruption and racketeering has gone to the jury. Michelle Gallardo reports at ABC 7 Chicago:

CHICAGO (WLS) — 14-and-a-half weeks after the jury was first seated in former Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan’s federal bribery and racketeering trial, his fate, and that of his co-defendant Mike McClain is now in their hands.

While the case is now in the hands of the jury, any actual deliberations are unlikely to take place before Thursday. The delay is due to the countless recordings and documents that must be set up in the jury room for them and a foreman must be selected.

Including the more than 100 pages of instructions they have to go through.

The jury is made up by eight women and four men, including a nurse, a woman who works at a Goodwill donation center and a manager for Aramark food company.
Former Federal Prosecutor Chris Hotaling said they may start by taking an initial poll.

Today is the first full day of deliberations and I honestly have no idea of how long they will deliberate or what their verdict will be. Considering that Speaker Madigan made the unusual move of testifying on his own behalf, the verdict may depend primarily on whether the jury believes him or not.

The TL;DR version of this article by Hannah Ritchie at Sustainability by numbers is there is no upward trend in either the number or percentage of people dying in disasters.

There’s an interesting piece from the Mayo Clinic Press editors on artificial intelligence in a healthcare setting. Here’s a snippet:

A report from the National Academy of Medicine identified three potential benefits of AI in healthcare: improving outcomes for both patients and clinical teams, lowering healthcare costs, and benefitting population health.

From preventive screenings to diagnosis and treatment, AI is being used throughout the continuum of care today.

I think they’re just scratching the surface. I saw artificial intelligence (mostly pattern recognition rather than generative AI) being used in remarkable ways in radiology several years back. One of the factors I don’t believe they’ve come to terms with yet is that GAI has implications for how good physicians will be selected and trained.

Carl Thayer’s assessment at The Diplomat of the situation in the South China Sea is somewhat disquieting. After detailing the situation with respect to China and the Philippines and China and Vietnam, he concludes:

Major developments in the South China Sea in 2024 do not augur well for 2025. China will remain committed to asserting its sovereignty over land features and adjacent waters that lie within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone, and the PLAN and CCG continue to expand in numbers. China will continue to pressure the Philippines to convince it that resistance is futile because the Trump administration will be a fickle ally and the Philippines lacks the capacity to stand alone against China.

The Philippines will have to weather the uncertainty of the U.S. commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty now that President Donald Trump has taken office. Pete Hegseth, Trump’s secretary of defense, admitted he didn’t know which countries were members of ASEAN when questioned at his confirmation hearing. When Hegseth tried to make up for this lapse by noting he knew the U.S. had alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia, he failed to mention the Philippines. Also, Marcos was not invited to Trump’s inauguration (while Xi Jinping was, although he sent China’s vice president in his stead).

Vietnam will continue to build infrastructure on its land features in the Spratly islands. It is unclear, however, if Vietnam will construct more air strips and militarize these features. This could provoke China into ending its “softly, softly” approach.

Malaysia has replaced Laos as ASEAN chair and this has given rise to guarded optimism that progress can be made on the South China Sea Code of Conduct in 2025. China can be expected to press for a quick conclusion to negotiations on the Code of Conduct with ASEAN members as one means of undermining a U.S. security role in maritime affairs.

I think this is a situation to which the United States needs to accustom itself. It is not a hegemon. It does not possess overwhelming force. Other countries including China do, in fact, have interests and will pursue them.