The individual who, armed with a machete, has been robbing people in neighborhoods on the Northwest Side of Chicago has been apprehended according to multiple media reports. From David Struett in thne Sun-Times:

A man with half a dozen robbery convictions on his record armed himself with a machete last week and went on a “crime spree, wreaking havoc” across the Northwest Side, Cook County prosecutors said in court Wednesday.

“To say that these are violent offenses is actually an understatement —a machete is a vicious, dangerous weapon,” Judge Mary Marubio told Andre Gonzalez, who is charged with robbing four people since last Friday and suspected in seven other attacks.

Three of the victims identified Gonzalez, 35, in photo arrays, prosecutors said.

Pro tip: if you’re going to engage in a crime spree don’t tattoo your name on your face. The perpetrator’s image was captured on a surveillance camera and he was prominently tattooed, including a tattoo of his name on his face. If you must tattoo a name on your face, I suggest someone else’s name. Possibilities: “Lori”, “Toni”, “Kim”.

At ABC 7 Chicago by Karen Jordan and Stephanie Wade:

Police said he was taken into custody during a traffic stop near his home in the 10000-block of South Avenue C, Brown said, adding that he would allegedly drive to the other side of the city to commit these crimes.

He appeared in court Wednesday and ordered held without bond. Investigators say Gonzalez would approach victims and threaten them with a machete before taking their belongings. The assistant state’s attorney said in the bond hearing that in one case Gonzalez robbed a woman of her purse and later dumped it after taking cash and credit cards.

“Records show that some of the victim’s credit cards were utilized four times after this incident,” Cook County ASA Sean Kelly said.

A father of four, Gonzalez has five previous felony convictions and possibly faces more armed robbery charges.

Some of his previous crimes were committed with firearms.

The map at the top of this post pinpoints where the robberies took place.

The perpetrator is rather obviously a violent habitual criminal. In earlier less enlightened times if he hadn’t been executed he would be permanently in prison. After his long list of crimes I honestly have no idea how he was out on his own at the tender age of 35.

At the federal level the rate of recidivism is quite high—around 60%. I see no mention of substance abuse in any of the published reports but I wouldn’t be surprised if it were not involved. I’m honestly not sure what should become of individuals like this. I certainly don’t see how light sentences for violent repeat offenders deters anybody from anything.

In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal Wayne Stoltenberg and Merrill Matthews point out something that should be obvious but apparently isn’t about energy production:

Devon Energy recently issued guidance for 2022 that refers to capital spending in the range of $1.9 billion to $2.2 billion on new-well drilling and completing activity, and a production target of 570,000 to 600,000 barrels of oil equivalent a day. That’s a modest increase in capital spending, from $1.85 billion in 2021, and a modest decrease in production, from 611,000 in the fourth quarter of 2021. Devon also anticipates increased cash returns to shareholders for 2022.

Like many in the industry, Devon obviously believes it’s better to return capital to its shareholders than to reinvest in the business. The reason is the left’s incessant demonizing of the fossil-fuel industry, leading to near pariah status, which has succeeded in driving capital away from the industry. Small and midsize producers rely more on outside capital than larger companies such as Exxon to increase their production.

Consistency and stability foster investment. Uncertainty and wild oscillations in policy discourage it.

Germany is already learning to its chagrin the costs of its short-sighted strategy for reducing carbon emissions—it has closed its nuclear reactors and started burning coal again. That would seem to be a counter-productive strategy if your objective is to reduce carbon emissions. India is reopening coal mines at a prodigious rate. Here in the U. S. we are anticipating rolling blackouts in various places around the country.

Good policy doesn’t produce situations like this. Political pandering does.

It is not my practice to comment on local elections in states other than my own and I don’t plan to change that. However, I do see a lot of what I think is wishful thinking regarding the recall of San Francisco district attorney Chesa Boudin. They forget that the attempted recall of Kim Foxx as Cook County States Attorney failed. IMO if Boudin had been black he would not have been recalled.

I did look up Mr. Boudin’s biography. All I can say is with that pedigree how could the voters of San Francisco have elected him in the first place? How could they?

I’ve listened to portions of the House’s hearing this morning and thought I’d put my two cents in. IMO there’s a classic case of “the politician’s dilemma” in progrss. For those of you not familiar with it the dilemma goes something like this:

• Something must be done!
• X is something.
• Do X

The single most important thing we should do is enforce existing law. There are already laws regulating the sales or gifting of firearms across state lines. They are barely if ever enforced. About a quarter of the states have laws that require gunowners to report the loss or theft of firearms. Illinois is one of them. That law is hardly ever enforced.

I don’t object to laws requiring background checks of the recipient when individuals give or sell a firearm.

I don’t object to raising the legal age for purchase of a firearm or ammunition.

Laws banning the sales of scary-looking firearms don’t bother me, either.

I also think we need to revise how we think of mental illness and its treatment but I doubt that will emerge from this or related hearings.

Finally, I think that many of those advocating laws limiting the possession of handguns are greatly overestimating the effectiveness of those laws. I also think the notion that laws are deterrents to crime whether they are enforced or not is a fantasy. That may have been true 30 years ago but the evidence it’s true now is pretty slim. Most of the firearms used in the commission of crimes are possessed illegally.

I don’t post breathlessly at every rise or fall of a president’s approval rating but I do take not of significant developments and I think we’re in the midst of one right now. I believe that the spread (approval minus disapproval) in President Biden’s RCP Average is the worst of his presidency to date.

There are a number of reasons that is not a good sign but at least to my eye the very worst part is that President Biden’s approval rating and disapproval ratings both get better when he maintins a low profile. In other words not only is there not much he can do about it but doing something about it actually makes it worse.

The president appears to have a floor of support of around 40% and a floor of disapproval at around 52%.

Democrats had better hope that the November midterms are not a referendum on President Biden (as has been the case in practically every midterm election in my memory).

In his latest Wall Street Journal column Walter Russell Mead muses about the relationship between India and the United States:

Americans and Indians often see the same problem in very different ways. India, for example, does not see Russia’s attack on Ukraine as a threat to world order. While Americans have been disturbed by India’s continued willingness to buy oil from Russia, Indians resent the West’s attempt to rally global support for what many here see as a largely Western problem in Ukraine. Pointing out that Europeans scarcely noticed China’s attacks on Indian frontier posts in 2020, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar told a conference in Bratislava, Slovakia, last week that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems.”

More generally, Indians bristle when they sense Americans and Europeans getting together to write global rules. The more that American Wilsonians talk about a values-based international order, the more that Indians worry about Western arrogance. Many Indians want a strong Russia and, within limits, a strong China precisely to help guard against the kind of world order President Biden and many of his advisers want to build.

This is more than the postcolonial suspicion of Western intentions that India has long shared with many other non-Western countries. The Hindu nationalist movement that has replaced the long-ruling Congress Party with a new political system built around the Bharatiya Janata Party and its charismatic leader, Narendra Modi, has brought a new dynamism to Indian foreign policy. This new nationalist India wants to increase and develop Indian power, not submerge Indian sovereignty in Western-designed international institutions.

There are a couple of things I wanted to point out about that. First, note how his observation about the rise of Hindu nationalism aligns with my observation about the rise of nationalism more generally. The form that nationalism is taking in India is as religious nationalism.

Dr. Mead concludes:

These conflicts aren’t going away and will likely get worse over time. Hindu nationalism is here to stay. So are India’s communal tensions, and so too for that matter is the belief of many Americans that they have a solemn duty to tell people in other countries and cultures how to live—and to impose sanctions on those unhappy occasions when they fail to take our advice. If bilateral relations are to prosper, Indians and Americans need to find better ways to manage these chronic issues.

India and the U.S. are raucously democratic societies, and their foreign policies cannot ignore public opinion. Managing this critical relationship is never going to be easy. Building deeper ties between the two societies will help; so too will quiet, low-key conversations aimed at preventing blowups before they occur. Both sides need this relationship; we both need to focus on making it work.

I’m skeptical whether a relationship between the United States and any religiously nationalistic country can “work”. That includes not just Israel but also Saudi Arabia, other Gulf Arab states, and, possibly, Turkey. The most we can hope for is some sort of modus vivendi and they cannot be our allies and certainly not our friends. That modus vivendi will vary from country to country.

There are other issues about which we need to be more sensitive. What is broadly viewed here as “promoting our values” including promoting women’s rights and gender preference and identification rights, may not be seen that way in other countries, particularly countries in Asia and Africa. They are seen as colonialism and even considered assaults on the fabric of other societies and, indeed, religious in nature.

My rather heterodox views are:

1. The United States is and always has been an outlier in the area of fundamental rights.
2. We have lots of clients and vendors but no friends in the world.
3. Our values are not universal. Most other countries reject them.
4. Modern communications and economies require us to maintain relations with other countries including countries that are very unsavory.
5. We should do so with our eyes open. He who sups with the devil should have a long spoon.

One last point and it’s one I’ve posted on before at length. Immigrants to the United States leave a lot behind them in the former countries but they bring with them their social, cultural, political, and religious views. We need to keep our eyes opened about that as well.

At Carnegie Europe there is a round table considering the question “is Europe serious about defense?” The answers of the participants range from “yes”, to “they’re getting there”, to “some countries are; some aren’t”, to “no”. The answer that most closely approximates my view is from Brit Julian Lindley-French:

No. Europeans are defense DIMBYs—defend me but not in my back yard—that is, they are very serious about being defended, just not by themselves. Of course, the nearer one is to danger the more one is prepared to invest in defense. And for all the nonsense about modest defense increases since 2014, the €200 billion ($214 billion) or so Europeans spend on defense is mainly spent badly, largely by Britain, France, and Germany and is being eaten up by inflation.

As for leadership? The“Big Three”—France, Germany, and Italy—really do not like each other very much and none of them feel threatened. In spite of the war in Ukraine, indebted Europeans routinely confuse politics with strategy and defense value with defense cost.

or, to say it another way, the Europeans are completely serious that the U. S. should defend them. That is what is meant when the panel members indicate that they want NATO to provide defense for them. The only two militaries at the highest level of readiness are those of the French and U. S. and both our forces and those of the French are stretched pretty thin.

I notice that the panelists do not define what the mean by “serious”. The analogy I would make is with lighting a reading room. You’re serious about lighting a reading room if there is enough light in it to read by. You can’t measure how serious the countries of Europe are about collective defense by how much is spent or by the levels of effort they’re willing to expend to defend their own borders.

A shorter but more difficult question is whether Germany is serious about defending Europe? I don’t believe the Germans know at this point.

The editors of Bloomberg have noticed that the rich developed countries are united in their opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The rest of the world? Not so much. And they’re worried about it:

One aspect of the war in Ukraine demands much closer attention — the failure of the US and its rich-country friends to build strong partnerships with the developing world. Many governments in Africa, Latin America and Asia have distanced themselves from the allies’ response to Russia’s aggression. This is helping Moscow and does nothing to discourage other regimes with expansionist ambitions. The neglect that allowed it to happen was a serious error, and putting it right should be a high priority.

concluding:

To win better support from developing countries, on Russia and other matters as well, Western governments should, for a start, be less quick to admonish. Appeals to liberal values tend to fall flat with people who remember less principled Western interventions. Also, many see the war in Ukraine as a proxy fight between Moscow and Washington — one where they have little at stake. The remedy is to frame the conflict not as punishing Russia and its autocratic leader, but as aiding Ukraine’s fight for self-determination. A powerful nation started this war by scorning sovereign borders: That’s a threat all can recognize.

Here’s another. A prolonged war will keep food, energy and fertilizer prices elevated, and this puts poor countries, with fewer resources to buffer the impact, in particular danger. It makes sense for the allies to say so, but their warning will get a better response if combined with prompt and generous support for the countries worst affected and most in need. Looking farther ahead, new efforts to address deeper economic vulnerabilities — for instance, by supporting African agriculture and logistics — would serve the diplomatic purpose and help deliver longer-term prosperity.

I don’t think the problem is “American inattention” as the editors aver. I think that most of the world prefers American inattention over the interventionist America that has been front and center for the last 30 years. Most of the world thinks that America is more of a threat to them than Russia is and they’re right.

At the present moment the Republican Party appears likely to have majorities in both houses of Congress in 2023. In a column in the Washington Post Matt Bai tells Democrats, smile! The news isn’t all bad:

No one at the White House will say this out loud, certainly, but the fact is that losing control of the House (and possibly the Senate) in November would instantly make the presidency a more manageable job. It would curb the power of the Sanders-Warren wing, freeing Biden to pursue the kind of mainstream liberal agenda — his landmark infrastructure law being a good example — that the voters thought they were getting in the first place.

Meanwhile, a newly emboldened Republican majority — like space junk orbiting its Trumpian star — will gravitate even more strongly toward antidemocratic themes of election fraud and intolerance. Like Clinton and Obama before him, Biden will have the chance to rebrand himself as the grown-up standing firm against bullies and extremists.

I’m not as sure as Mr. Bai is that the parallels between Bill Clinton in 1994 and Barack Obama in 2010 and Joe Biden in 2022 are that strong. For one thing both President Clinton’s and President Obama’s presidential approval ratings were higher going into the midterms than Joe Biden’s. Clinton’s approval rating was over 50% and Obama’s was around 45%. Joe Biden will be very lucky if his approval rating cracks 40% on Election Day 2022.

For another thing, the U. S. domestic and the world situations were a lot rosier going into the midterms in 1994 and 2010 than they are now.

For yet another Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were a lot younger then than Joe Biden is now—just about 30 years younger in both cases. That makes a difference in how much energy they could bring to the party.

My only advice is do unto others as you would have others do unto you.