In a Wall Street Journal op-ed Ray Tayekh recaps the 1953 Iranian putsch that overthrew Mossadeq:
After seven decades it’s time to set the record straight. Mossadeq was a Persian aristocrat who objected to Britain’s control of Iran’s oil. He led the nationalization charge and was instrumental in Iran’s reclaiming its national asset. He wasn’t democratically elected to his post but appointed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. He was stubborn and uncompromising, and he relished defying the great powers.
America became involved with Iran at Mossadeq’s instigation. Once negotiations over oil with Britain deadlocked, Mossadeq implored President Harry S. Truman to mediate the dispute. From 1951 until the eventual coup, a succession of American diplomats came up with numerous plans, all of which Mossadeq rejected. The U.S.-crafted compromise called for Britain to accept the principle of nationalization and for Iran to compensate Britain for the loss of its assets, which included the world’s largest refinery. Although London resented Washington’s evenhandedness, as a junior partner it had no choice but to agree. Diplomacy failed only because of Mossadeq’s obduracy.
To pressure him, Britain imposed an embargo on Iranian oil. Deprived of revenue, Iran’s economy cratered. The less money Mossadeq got, the more despotic he became. He rigged elections, disbanded Parliament, usurped the powers of the monarch, and showed little respect for the constitution.
His ruinous policies and dictatorial tendencies alarmed Persian power brokers. The shah was still too young and hesitant to take charge, but merchants, mullahs and military officers all began plotting against the prime minister. The clerical estate was critical to Mossadeq’s overthrow—something the Islamic Republic denies and Western professors whitewash.
By 1953 Iranians were asking the U.S. Embassy for support. Eisenhower seemed sympathetic because of Mossadeq’s increasing reliance on the Tudeh Communist Party. Eventually the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched Kermit Roosevelt to Iran to work with the horde of scheming Persians.
But the CIA didn’t create the opposition to Mossadeq. Lt. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, one of Iran’s most distinguished officers, had already organized the military to overthrow the prime minister, mullahs were using their street muscle to organize demonstrations against Mossadeq, and merchants were closing their bazaars in protest.
All the while the monarchy as an institution still commanded popular support. America’s most essential contribution to Mossadeq’s removal was to get the shah to dismiss his prime minister. The monarch had the constitutional authority to do so but lacked the courage. Finally, on Aug. 15, after much American arm-twisting, Pahlavi fired Mossadeq. All the talk of a coup should note that once the shah issued his decree Mossadeq’s premiership was rendered illegal.
Tipped off by communist cells in the Iranian army, Mossadeq was waiting for the officer who delivered his dismissal orders. The officer was quickly arrested, and the shah fled the country. For Washington, the coup had ended. The State Department acknowledged that the “operation has been tried and failed and we should not participate in any operation against Mossadegh.†The CIA concurred: “Operations against Mossadegh should be discontinued.†Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s aide, told the president that the plan had failed and that “we now have to take a whole new look at the Iranian situation and probably have to snuggle up to Mossadeq if we are going to save anything there.â€
In Tehran, the Iranians took command of the situation. The mullahs inflamed the streets with their sermons while the military gained control of the capital. Mossadeq went into hiding, only to turn himself in after a few days on the run. A stunned shah planning for a life in exile was summoned back to Iran. No one was more surprised by this turn of events than the spy masters at the CIA.
That basically comports with what one of the Iranian officers who participated in the coup wrote in his memoir. And it also is completely consistent with what I’ve been saying around here for the last 20 years.
It also explains why the revolutionaries of the 1989 revolution purged the military when they took over. They knew the threat was from the military not external forces.
This has been my understanding as well. Most “bad takes” start with Roosevelt landing in Iran and credit him with what appears to be single-handedly taking out Mossadeq in a matter of a few weeks or days.
I watched Cromwell (1970) last night and it did the same thing. Cromwell is depicted as having a key, if not the key, role in starting the English Civil War, when he only emerged and rose up the military ranks during the war. Biographical films have to simplify stories; popular historians have to depict Americans as having the key role in everything, for good or for bad. I mainly complain that giving people the impression that the CIA can arrange a coup with such ease contributes to a lot of conspiracy nonsense.
Hmm. The accounts i am familiar with claimed that the Brits took a major role and the Americans a minor but significant role, mostly working with the shah but probably providing a bit of money and a little propaganda. I think the counter narrative has been that the US had nothing to do with it. This account seems to align with what I have read, I guess depending upon what he means by “America’s most essential contribution to Mossadeq’s removal “. That certainly seems to allow for other CIA actions. Hard not to see convincing the shah to fire the guy as making a contribution. What is clear and I think this piece helps make clear is that there was already widespread unhappiness with the guy.
Cant help but notice that this is much better documented than what has happened in Ukraine. The claim is that Nuland singlehandedly instigated and caused the overthrowing of the pro-Russian government universally loved by all of Ukraine.
Steve