Iran has responded

Iran has sent its reply:

TEHRAN, Iran – Iran’s top nuclear negotiator said Tuesday that Tehran was ready to enter “serious negotiations” over its disputed nuclear program but did not say whether it was willing to suspend uranium enrichment — the West’s key demand.

The negotiator, Ali Larijani, hand-delivered Iran’s response to a six-nation package of nuclear incentives aimed at persuading it to suspend enrichment. He gave the reply to ambassadors from Britain, China, Russia, France, Germany and Switzerland, state-run television said, without disclosing details.

“Iran is prepared as of Aug. 23 to enter serious negotiations” with the countries that proposed the package, state-run television quoted Larijani as telling the envoys.

Iranian officials close to the meeting said Iran offered a “new formula” to resolve the dispute as part of its formal response to the incentive package. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information.

“Iran has provided a comprehensive response to everything said in the Western package. In addition, Iran, in its formal response, has asked some questions to be answered,” one official said, without elaborating.

European Union officials declined to comment, saying they needed to study the Iranian offer.

Their response was likely to depend on how far Tehran was ready to go in suspending uranium enrichment — the cornerstone demand of the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany, the six powers that agreed to the package of incentives if Iran compromises and punishments if it does not.

At U.N. headquarters in New York, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton said the United States is prepared to quickly submit elements of a new Security Council resolution that would impose economic sanctions on Iran if it does not accept “the very, very generous offer” from the five permanent council members and Germany.

“We will obviously study the Iranian response carefully, but we are also prepared if it does not meet the terms set by the permanent five foreign ministers to proceed here in the Security Council, as ministers have agreed, with economic sanctions,” he said.

“If, on the other hand, the Iranians have chosen the path of cooperation, as we’ve said repeatedly, then a different relationship with the United States and the rest of the world is now possible,” he said.

We don’t know what that response is as yet although I suspect that there would be at least a little crowing if the response had been positive. Lack of such a reaction suggests to me that my prediction of yesterday was correct. Which would surprise no one.

My own view is that the preponderance of the evidence does, indeed, suggest that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. I’m not going to repeat that evidence here—just search my posts for “Iran”. It’s rather clear that ordinary Iranians believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons regardless of what their government says.

I think that perfectly reasonable intelligent well-informed people can believe otherwise. Here, for example. My view is that they’re using the wrong standard (“beyond reasonable doubt” rather than “a preponderance of the evidence”).

Over the last couple of months I’ve seen the following positions taken by various and sundry:

  • Iran is developing nuclear weapons and already has some it’s obtained from North Korea or Pakistan. I doubt the latter.
  • Iran is developing nuclear weapons and is months or a few years from having them (my view).
  • Iran is developing nuclear weapons and is five or more years from having them
  • Iran isn’t developing nuclear weapons

I have thought and continue to think that some sanctions regime other than outright invasion or bombing ought to have been in place a long time ago. Tempus is fugiting. We’ll see.

8 comments… add one
  • ME Link

    My only question is this: What makes a nuclear-armed Iran so dangerous compared to other regimes? In other words…why would the principle of mutually assured destruction somehow not apply to the Iranians? I understand that many in Iran might be willing to strap on a bomb and blow themselves up. But accepting your own death as a necessary consequence is a far cry from accepting the nuclear destruction of your country as a necessary consequence.

    I think it’s much more likely that Iran will use the bomb just like everyone else…as a defensive threat. They aren’t stupid. They know that nuking Israel would result in a war that would destroy them, and they know that having a nuke will protect them from invasion by the US. From this perspective…even if Iran is actively and agressively pursuing nukes, they aren’t doing it for ‘evil’.

    It almost seems the US doesn’t want Iran to get the bomb just in case we want to invade them for other reasons. It may actually be the case that Iran getting a nuke would be of great help in avoiding another disastrous war for the US.

    (I’m not that sure about all of this…but I’d like to see a cogent explaination to my first question above)

  • The usual answer to the question is that the regime isn’t deterrable. While I do believe that Ahmadinejad is a religious fanatic, I don’t think he’s the whole story (Khameini is far more important) and I’ve written before that I do think that the present mullahocracy is deterrable so my opinion is somewhat divergent.

    My problem with the present regime getting nuclear weapons is that I think that the regime is unstable. When it collapses there will be a period of chaos and I’m concerned that whatever nuclear arsenal Iran has will fall into the wrong hands i.e. into the hands of those who aren’t deterrable, during the chaos.

    Therefore, in my view, the problem with Iran having nuclear weapons is the present regime. I wouldn’t have any more problem with a durable, liberal democratic regime in Iran having nuclear weapons than I do with France having them.

    That isn’t the case however.

  • ME Link

    That’s something I thought about after posting… the stability question is the scariest. Pakistan definitely falls into that category too.

  • Exactly. Consider our predicament with respect to Pakistan. The current regime there is, essentially, a military dictatorship—scarcely the sort we’d like to see. However, they’re the only game in town and we’re placed in the uncomfortable situation of supporting the regime lest their nuclear weapons fall into the hands of nogoodniks.

    Was A. Q. Khan carrying on a rogue operation under the nose of the Pakistani government or was the Pakistani government behind it? They haven’t let the IAEA question him which implies the latter.

  • There is another aspect to this as well. Iran currently considers itself to be ascendent in regional power, and to have successfully tied the US down in Iraq and Afganistan by funding and equipping the Shi’a militas and the Taliban. Iran considers itself to be in a strong position vis-a-vis Israel because of the (again, Iranian-funded) Hizb’allah and Hamas terror groups which are fighting Israel in such a way that Israel will not respond effectively. In sum, Iran thinks that it is in the catbird seat, and will regain its traditional regional power status, which it lost after the Shah fell and Iraq fought the much larger and richer Iran to a standstill for 8 years.

    If Iran is exercising its will through terror to this degree now, how far will Iran be prepared to go when it knows that no one will respond against it for fear of triggering a nuclear response? Iran can create and lose proxies essentially forever, backed by an essentially infinite money stream and an invulnerable heartland. Even if Iran never attacks Israel directly, or the US directly, it can create so many problems for the US and Israel in the Middle East that our choice becomes massive (and possibly nuclear) war or ceding the majority of the world’s oil supply to declared enemies of the US and Israel.

    Even if we successfully deter them from using nuclear weapons, Iran can use their nuclear weapons to deter us from forceful action to defend ourselves against terrorism by fighting it in its home bases. Iran can force us onto permanent defense against terrorism, and that is how you lose to terrorism.

  • Good point, Jeff. I wish people mentioned the internal Iranian, regional, and intra-Islamic political issues more frequently when discussing this subject. Not everything is about us.

  • Fletcher Christian Link

    Seems to me the problem is not whether Iran will use nukes or not (i.e. whether they really believe all the millennialist BS they spout) but whether they are likely to supply some of their proxies with them, and if so whether they will get used.

    Anyone fancy the chances of Tel Aviv if Hezbollah gets a nuke?

    MAD theory relies on both (or all) parties being rational actors. If one party is certifiably insane, then all bets are off.

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