Rahm Emanuel’s critique of President Trump’s trade policy in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal leaves a few questions unanswered. Here’s his alternative to what he describes as a policy of “losing friends and alienating allies”:
First, trade Mr. Trump’s tariff wall for an “economic bloc of common interest.” The U.S., the European Union, Latin America and Indo-Pacific allies should set one common external tariff on subsidized overcapacity: steel, aluminum, autos, batteries, solar equipment and so on. Then drop tariffs inside the bloc. Nobody beats overcapacity unilaterally.
Second, compete where the game is decided: markets. As ambassador to Japan, I watched Beijing ban every scallop and fish Japan exported. Mr. Xi’s move wasn’t about food safety. The Chinese wanted to damage a key Japanese industry. Tokyo was able to withstand China’s coercion because Washington helped it find alternative markets.
Third, treat each ally’s industrial base as part of America’s portfolio of security assets. In April 2025, Britain’s Parliament was recalled on a Saturday to stop the Chinese owner of its last two blast furnaces from letting them go cold. This was the first time since the 1982 Falklands War that legislators were asked to convene on a Saturday, reflecting the depth of Downing Street’s concern. British steel—like Korean semiconductors and Japanese shipyards—buttresses America’s security in the event of a conflict with China. Economic statecraft should support national-security interests.
I think he’s leaving at least two questions unanswered. First, how do you reconcile the Democratic complaints about “affordability” with raising prices with tariffs whether we do it in a bloc or not?
There is no reason to believe that steel, batteries, solar equipment, or automobiles produced in the United States or other members of Emanuel’s bloc will cost as little as subsidized Chinese production. Indeed, preventing Chinese subsidies from driving competitors out of business is the point of the tariff. Economic security has a price. How much are we prepared to pay for it?
Second, what if the European Union, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific fear and dislike the United States more than they do China? There is ample evidence going back 200 years that is the case. Do we have friends and allies? I don’t think we do. I think we have trading partners, clients and competitors.
An ally is someone with whom you cooperate. A client is someone whose security you guarantee. The two categories can overlap. The mistake is assuming that because a country is an ally, dependence on that country’s industrial capacity is equivalent to domestic capacity.
If Japan withdrew from its security relationship with the United States tomorrow, would the United States remain a viable independent great power? Obviously yes. If the United States withdrew from Japan tomorrow, could Japan confidently guarantee its security against China and North Korea? Much less obviously.
My view is that President Trump is right and wrong at the same time. He’s right that we cannot depend on China for strategic goods which includes steel, autos, batteries, solar equipment and so on. He was wrong to impose tariffs on Canada, the European Union, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific.
Mounting a tiger provides three alternatives. By far the best, least risky, and cheapest is not mounting the tiger in the first place. Unfortunately, we mounted the tiger more than 30 years ago. Alternatively, you can be prepared to endure the pain and damage you will absorb when you dismount or you can just keep riding. Choose carefully.
