Fareed Zakaria on the way forward in Iraq

In Newsweek this morning Fareed Zakaria displays a keen understanding of the situation as it exists in Iraq today:

Something like the close of the Korean War is, frankly, the best we can hope for in Iraq now. One could easily imagine worse outcomes—a bloodbath, political fragmentation, a tumultuous flood of refugees and a surge in global terrorist attacks. But with planning, intelligence, execution and luck, it is possible that the American intervention in Iraq could have a gray ending—one that is unsatisfying to all, but that prevents the worst scenarios from unfolding, secures some real achievements and allows the United States to regain its energies and strategic compass for its broader leadership role in the world.

and I’m gratified to see that he gives more than a nod to U. S. interests in Iraq and in the region:

The core national-security interests of the United States in Iraq are now threefold: first, to prevent Anbar province from being taken over by Qaeda-style jihadist groups that would use it as a base for global terrorism; second, to ensure that the Kurdish region retains its autonomy; third, to prevent or at least contain massive sectarian violence in Iraq, as both a humanitarian and a security issue. Large-scale bloodletting could easily spill over Iraq’s borders as traumatized and vengeful refugees flee to countries like Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Historically, such population movements have caused trouble for decades to come.

He proposes a number of measures designed to protect U. S. interests while recognizing the situation on the ground in Iraq:

  • reduction of the present force to roughly half of its present numbers
  • American forces should be re-deployed out of Iraqi cities and towns
  • devote the attentions of American forces to Al-Qaeda in Iraq
  • give a security guarantee to Iraqi Kurdistan
  • inform Iraqi leaders that continued U. S. presence is contingent on their performance both to give political strength to a continued U. S. presence and to motivate them to forge a sectarian agreement.  Specifically, he calls for an immediate up or down vote in the Iraqi Parliament:  should the U. S. stay or go?

    Iraq’s Parliament should thus publicly ask American troops to stay. Its leaders should explain to their constituents why the country needs U.S. forces. Without such a public affirmation, the American presence will become politically untenable in both Iraq and the United States.

  • engage with Iraq’s neighbors on the promoting Iraqi security

He sees the outcome as a Korea-like solution:

Something like the close of the Korean War is, frankly, the best we can hope for in Iraq now. One could easily imagine worse outcomes—a bloodbath, political fragmentation, a tumultuous flood of refugees and a surge in global terrorist attacks. But with planning, intelligence, execution and luck, it is possible that the American intervention in Iraq could have a gray ending—one that is unsatisfying to all, but that prevents the worst scenarios from unfolding, secures some real achievements and allows the United States to regain its energies and strategic compass for its broader leadership role in the world.

With a fine touch of realism he acknowledges that his proposal might not work:

This plan might not work. And if it does not, the United States will confront the more painful question of what to do in the midst of even greater violence and chaos. The Brookings Institution’s Kenneth Pollack is already working on a plan to address just such a worst-case scenario, in which U.S. forces establish “catchment basins” along the borders of Iraq to stop massive refugee flows.

While I think that there’s much to recommend in what Mr. Zakaria proposes, I think he’s overly optimistic about the political situation in Iraq, in the United States, and, probably, in the Middle East.

The present Iraqi leaders are creatures of the militias.  It’s hard for me to see what would motivate them to work against those who brought them to power.  While I think a sectarian compact of the sort that Mr. Zakaria suggests would be a fine solution to the problems in Iraq, I can’t for the life of me see why such a compact would actually be adhered to.  Each of the parties would need to believe that they get more by conforming to the terms of the compact than they could realize by violating it and I don’t see that’s the case.

We have now have had a major troop commitment in South Korea for 50 years.  As far as most of the people in the United States are concerned our troops have always been there—that (along with the fact that very few casualties are being taken there—not too different from any military base) IMO is the reason there’s no particular move to get them out.  What in recent history makes Mr. Zakaria think that the American people would be content to leave a force of whatever size in Iraq for a long-term commitment?  And then there’s always the “peanut” argument:  once we’ve begun withdrawing from Iraq the American people’s appetite for withdrawal will be insatiable.
I’ll update my table of pundit opinions with Mr. Zakaria’s observations.

3 comments… add one
  • LaurenceB Link

    Among rational folks, I believe there is now general agreement that Iraq was a mistake. That having been said, we are now in Iraq and we have to make the best of it. We have to find a way out. To that end, we need more creative thinking like Zakaria’s, and less sloganeering of the kind we are getting from the politicos.

    I wish there were five or six sets of scenarios similar to Zakaria’s that our leaders could lay out in front of us to choose from. Instead, we get ten million “cut and runs”, “stay the courses”, and “Bush lied”s.

  • I have a lot of respect for Mr. Zakaria, but his prescription is folly. Something like the “close of the Korean war” is particularly obtuse as the two conflicts share few similarities either strategically or tactically. How can Iraq, a nation deeply divided along ethnic, tribal and religious lines, be so casually equated to a stalemated conflict of cold-war ideologies? Even if this were a bipolar conflict the analogy is still suspect at best. Who represents China in the case of Iraq? No one. Mr. Zakaria also assumes an armistice can be reached – an impossibility given the multi-polar nature of the conflict and the absence of a larger global superpower competitive environment where the US is inextricably allied to one party in the conflict. As Mr. Zakaria admits, “There is no Sunni with whom to make a deal.” So how is an armistice to be achieved if there is no Sunni to negotiate with?

    Iraq is largely an urban population, so what purpose is served by redeploying troops away from population centers? Surely that would reduce American casualties, but what operations would they perform? How is one supposed to “devote the attentions of American forces to Al-Qaeda in Iraq” when our forces are deployed in unpopulated areas away from AQI strongholds? AQI does not operate in the nomadic lands outside towns and cities.

    Giving a security guarantee to “Kurdistan” will essentially say that the US no longer recognizes Iraq as a nation. Recognizing the legitimacy of one ethnic group over all others will only ensure that any “national” government will fail.

    I like the idea of an up or down vote in the Iraqi parliament, but how does Mr. Zakaria think the parliament will vote when we announce that we will militarily defend Kurdistan and not any other portion of the country? Mr. Zakaria should be careful what he asks for as I think the vote will turn out far different than he predicts. Does he really think that giving the Kurds security guarantees will give Iraqis “political strength” in non-Kurd areas to reach consensus? The act of guaranteeing Kurdish independence will weaken the central government, if not destroy it, and only ensure the government will not meet our expectations.

    There are so many fundamental points of ignorance in Mr. Zakaria’s piece that I can’t tackle them all. Statements like:
    “They do not have heavy weapons—tanks, armored vehicles—and cannot hold territory for long” belies a fundamental unawareness of insurgent warfare.
    “Were a deal between the Shia and the Sunni to be signed, Al Qaeda would be marginalized within months.” Well, duh!
    “In the meantime, U.S. Special Forces could harass and chase Qaeda terrorists just as they do in Afghanistan today” except that Afghanistan is not urbanized like Iraq and is, well, completely different from Iraq in many significant ways. This view also incorrectly portrays SF personnel as Hollywood-style gung-ho door-kickers instead of the force they actually are.
    “The Iraqi Kurdish region is the one unambiguous success story of the Iraq war.” Actually, it’s the most unambiguous success story of Operation Northern Watch, and even then Mr. Zakaria overlooks Sunni’s that were “cleansed” from Kurd areas.

    Anyway, my comment is already too long, but suffice it to say that I’m quite disappointed that Mr. Zakaria (whom I respect) would postulate such a conflicted, shallow and ignorant solution to Iraq based on such flawed assumptions and logic.

  • I think your criticism is to the point, Andy. I’m reminded of the old crack “If I had some ham I could make a ham and cheese sandwich if I had some cheese”.

    What I liked about Mr. Zakaria’s column is that he acknowledges that the U. S. has interests in the region other than the lives of our soldiers in Iraq and the expense of maintaining them. Very few are mentioning this these days. I may post on the subject later.

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