The editors of the Washington Post have noticed that Germany isn’t exactly living up to the commitments it made in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:
As Russian soldiers massed on Ukraine’s borders shortly before Vladimir Putin launched his ruinous war last year, Germany answered Kyiv’s pleas for military aid by offering to send 5,000 helmets, a gesture Ukrainian officials widely derided. “What kind of support will Germany send next?†asked Kyiv’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko. “Pillows?â€
A month later, after tens of thousands of Russian troops invaded Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told his stunned compatriots that Berlin’s decades-long thinking about national security, defense and foreign policy had to be reassessed. The country, he said, needed to support Ukraine and also to embark on a “major national undertaking†to rebuild its military. Keeping “warmongers like Putin in check,†he said, “requires strength of our own.â€
Since that speech, Germany has become a major supporter of the Ukrainian military. It recently announced a $2.9 billion arms package: Instead of helmets, it is now sending advanced air-defense systems, top-shelf battle tanks, howitzers, drones and large quantities of artillery ammunition. After the United States, it is one of Ukraine’s biggest weapons providers.
Yet Mr. Scholz has failed to deliver on the other piece of the equation — the buildup of Germany’s own defenses. As the war in Ukraine settles into a bloody stalemate, the urgency he described has evaporated.
A $109 billion special fund to rebuild Germany’s anemic armed forces over the next few years remains largely untapped. Mr. Scholz backed off his initial pledge to pump additional tens of billions of dollars into annual defense spending to meet a NATO spending target Berlin has long endorsed — and long ignored.
Actually, they’re sugar-coating the situation. According to the Kiel Center’s Ukraine Support Tracker Germany’s overall, humanitarian, and military support for Ukraine are all lagging, most of all when taken as a percent of GDP.
This raises two questions. First, why? And, second, do we really want Germany to build up its military capabilities? The answer to the first question is obvious: domestic politics. I think it’s pretty obvious that the Germans are trying to have their cake and eat it, too.
The second is more complicated. IMO it’s obvious that the longtime U. S. strategy of weak allies has failed. Having devoted the last 70 years to convincing the countries of Europe that they don’t need to spend much on defense but can rely on us, convincing them otherwise is going to take some time. And it can’t be done at all unless they’re willing to bear some pain.
It should be factored that some of our allies most inclined towards the US / “NATO” would be alarmed with a strong German military, with implications for strategic German autonomy.
As a general principle, my view is that the Europeans should be able to handle stuff in Europe and littoral areas. The US can provide enabling capabilities for that, and be the sort of “father figure” that helps them play nice with each other.
That’s basically where we are with Korea and Japan but for some reason, not Europe.
More American elites visit Europe than visit South Korea or Japan.
I don’t think US policy is much different with regards to South Korea / Japan then it is to Europe.
Japan spends 1% of GDP on its military. The South Korea combined forces command is headed by an American general. Their militaries aren’t able to operate without heavy US assistance and direction.
The biggest difference is US defense policy in Europe with respect to allies is it is structured on “collective defense” (NATO), and in Asia it is structured on “bilateral treaties” (Japan, South Korea, Philippines).
The difference is that Korea has a real army, not a pretend one, and they would very likely defeat North Korea without significant US ground forces. They’ve averaged around 2.5% of GDP for military spending.
Japan has a competent Navy and Air Force. Unlike Europe, they don’t have treaty obligations for mutual defense and, as an island nation, don’t need significant ground forces. Their military spending is only marginally less than Germany which does have such obligations.
You’re right there is a significant difference in terms of the collective vs bilateral treaty structure – but that is exactly why the policy is different, including requirements for 2% spending to support collective defense that NATO countries agree to but many largely ignore.
The collective defense arrangement should mean that NATO ought to be able to stand on its own for the most part in its region – because that’s what NATO is supposedly for – but they can’t.