At RealClearDefense Adam Cabot remarks on the outcome of a wargame:
When wargaming a Russian attack on the Baltic states, the Rand Corporation, demonstrated that current NATO forces in Europe are an insufficient deterrent. Findings indicated that if Russia was to attack the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, the longest length of time it would take their forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga is 60 hours. RAND found that a NATO force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades supported by air power and adequate land-based fire support would be necessary to prevent a rapid defeat until more forces can arrive in Europe. This, they argued would be the necessary conventional force required to deter a Russian attack.
The problem with fielding such a force is politics based on cost and will. Deploying seven brigades with heavy armored fire support and logistics would cost billions of dollars, and it would most likely be the United States that is required to provide the bulk of these forces. In the current climate where the Trump administration is at odds with most NATO members for failing to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense, the chances of the U.S. being willing to supply the forces required to defend Europe is highly unlikely.
Of the members of NATO only France and United States have military forces at the highest level of readiness. As we saw in Libya, neither the Brits nor the French have the ability to sustain activity for more than a few hours.
Trump has been much ridiculed for harping on the failure of NATO members to ante up their 2% of GDP on military spending. They say he “doesn’t understand”. I think it’s the NATO members and the critics who don’t understand.
NATO is nothing if not a military alliance. The issue isn’t the percentage of GDP but the degree of military readiness. We can clearly see that France’s 1.82% of GDP isn’t enough. I don’t know whether the amount they’ll need to start spending is 2% of GDP, 3.5% of GDP (what we spend), or 7% of GDP, a consequence of years of inattention.
They will pay one way or another. For decades they’ve been living in a fool’s paradise and that is coming to an end. They can be co-equal members of the NATO alliance, they can depend on the kindness of strangers, or they can be dependent on the goodwill of the U. S. Each one of those will have consequences.
Is there any reliable source for the claim that Putin wants the Baltics? I hear a lot of “well Stalin did it” commentary, but nothing else.
I can only offer my opinion. Like the Russian people, Putin doesn’t think much of countries that are openly hostile to Russia on its borders. IMO it’s part of the Washington dichotomy school of thought. If you’re not explicitly supportive to the U. S., the only other alternative is hostile.
I wonder how they’re going to rationalize India.
Would we, or any of the EU Countries, want to spend that much over Estonia or Latvia? If they don’t want to be invaded they should get nukes.
Steve
A succinct explanation of why expanding NATO, one of George W. Bush’s several blunders, was such a bad idea. But it’s water under the bridge now. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are all NATO members and are extended the same guarantees as any other NATO member. If France won’t prepare to defend Lithuania, will it prepare to defend Poland? Italy? The question brings the entire alliance into question.
I think Dave’s last comment has it correct. The Baltic states and Poland do not trust the rest of Europe which is why they want a US presence. They also realize that the rest of Europe does not have the capacity to defend them conventionally.
The fundamental issue is that the US continues to provide the bulk of military capability to the alliance and without the US, the alliance would not be much of an alliance at all in terms of military capability. They do not have much ability to project power, even to their own littoral. Even in the wake of the Cold War when European forces were larger, they could not deal with the various Balkan crises without the US carrying most of the weight. Their forces are smaller now.
Russia, however, is not the USSR. The Russians don’t have several tank armies poised to roll across the northern European plain. But they are sufficiently powerful to be a real threat to states on their border, such as the Baltics and Poland. But without the US, the rest of Europe is unlikely and unable to defend them. Absent the US, the Germans would probably use the time it would take for Russia to conquer the Baltics and Poland to mobilize to defend its own borders.
Ben,
It’s hard to say what Putin wants, but Russia does have a strong interest in the many Russians who continue to live in the Baltics and there is a sense among many Russians that the Baltics should not be independent. The conventional wisdom here in the US is the Baltics are under threat because of what happened in the Crimea, but I think that was a special case.
What’s clear is that Russia will vigorously defend what it sees as it’s core strategic interests. When Russian access to the Black Sea and Sevastopol was only threatened by the prospect of a pro-western Ukraine, they took immediate action. The Russians don’t do many out-of-area operations, but support for the Syrian government is vital for Russia’s ability to project power into the Med, so they’ve resourced there heavily.
Right now, I don’t see a similarly big strategic interest that would precipitate a desire to retake the Baltics. Given the Baltics are already part of NATO, Russia is more likely to use its arsenal of less direct capabilities to apply pressure – and they’ve done that to some extent already with a robust cyber campaign against various Baltic entities. There’s a lot more Russia could do there along a spectrum of activities to include fomenting civil unrest and violence.
But at this point, I don’t think Russia wants to take the big bite out of that apple.
As I’ve tried to explain before, Russia has a hierarchy of interests that include
ethnic Russians
Slavs
the Orthodox
In addition they have geopolitical interests that include access to ports, access to the Mediterranean, and so on.
For the last 25 years we’ve been pushing their buttons, for no particular reason.
Also, keep in mind that the Baltic countries, Georgia, and Ukraine have been part of Russia longer than the U. S. has been a country. The Lithuanians, Georgians, and Ukrainians see things differently than the Russians do.
Dave, your comment on there is no free lunch is the best summary of all the commentary on NATO defense spending.