You Can Always Blame Inadequate Funding

In an op-ed at the Wall Street Journal naval analyst Seth Cropsey points the finger for the crop of collisions of Navy vessels at inadequate training and the shrinking fleet:

On Aug. 21, Adm. John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, told ships world-wide to pause their activity for a one-day safety stand down. He also directed the Navy to investigate how it trains and certifies the forces that deploy to Japan. This inquiry will examine the pace of naval operations—whether ships are being overused—as well as maintenance, personnel and equipment.

A no-holds-barred analysis is needed, not least because American forces face rising danger on many fronts. China is moving aggressively in the South and East China Seas. North Korea threatens war in the Pacific and beyond. The Baltic and Black Seas are as hazardous as ever. Islamic State is being pushed back by an air war conducted in part from ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Navy has its hands full simply answering requests from combatant commanders, the senior officers who lead U.S. forces around the world. The deployable battle force, at 276 ships, is far smaller than what’s needed to meet demand, and it isn’t growing. So the Navy has looked for other ways to answer the call. One has been to keep ships at sea longer. Although the gold standard for deployments once was six months, amphibious vessels recently have been sent out for close to twice that.

This helps the Navy maintain a constant presence, but at a price. Longer deployments put wear and tear on sailors, their families and the fleet. Equipment problems accumulate, but detailed maintenance must wait until ships return to port.

Adm. Richardson’s specific directive to examine Naval training is pivotal. In the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions, large merchant ships approached undetected until it was too late to avoid a mishap. The questions about seamanship are obvious, and they must be asked. Navy ships have radars, crew standing watch, officers responsible for safe navigation, and computers that calculate other vessels’ speed, direction and closest point of approach. The Navy needs to understand how the system failed twice in three months.

Is there any connection between long deployments and these fatal mistakes? Perhaps ships are being overused, leading to longer repairs once they return to port, which leaves inadequate time for training. A Government Accountability Office report last May noted this possibility: “The Navy has several options for mitigating extended maintenance availabilities and overruns, including the following: Condense training period (most common according to Navy officials) . . . ”

Has the Navy pushed practical training in seamanship and navigation too far into the realm of computers, forsaking harsher on-the-job learning? Does time spent preparing for inspections of ship systems come at the expense of training? Is the system for evaluating commanding officers functioning properly?

The problem I find in that is that it doesn’t comport with the results of the Navy’s own investigations into the collision in June as a consequence of which several officers have already been relieved of duty. That suggests to me that the Navy found a discipline problem rather than inadequate training.

I can’t help but wonder if long deployments have led to a relaxation of standards. I also wonder if civilian culture has departed so far from the Navy’s culture that the Navy now faces new problems in maintaining discipline.

Blaming inadequate funding for problems is facile. I doubt that any military commander in the history of warfare has ever found that the resources at his disposal were excessive. You can always use more. It’s right-sizing that’s hard.