And at Responsible Statecraft Daniel L. Davis, who has been skeptical of Ukrainian victory all along, writes that Ukraine can’t win:
Trying to put a good face on the situation, Western officials and analysts told the Washington Post on Tuesday that “Ukraine’s military has so far embraced an attrition-based approach aimed largely at creating vulnerabilities in Russian lines.†That is not accurate. The UAF haven’t “embraced†an attrition-based approach, they have changed tactics to leading with small groups of dismounted infantry to try and penetrate Russia’s leading trench lines out of sheer necessity. Leading with armor simply won’t work, and if Ukraine had persisted in trying large armored assaults, they would have continued dying in large numbers.
The problem for Kyiv is that this “approach†is virtually certain to fail. The military geography of this entire region of Ukraine is characterized by open, flat terrain, interspersed with thin forest strips. Because Russia owns the skies and has considerable drone capacity, any time the Ukrainian soldiers move in the open, they are immediately subjected to artillery or mortar fire. If any armored vehicles move in the open, they are likewise quickly destroyed. The best the UAF can do is infiltrate small numbers of infantrymen into trenches where Russian forces are located.
It’s not that Zelensky’s forces are “going slowly†forward, it’s that they aren’t attaining any of their initial tactical objectives on the way to the Azov coast and it’s precisely because the combat fundamentals necessary to win are largely (and in some cases entirely) absent. They flatly don’t have the human resources or physical infrastructure necessary to succeed.
Now, it is always possible that Russia could suffer sudden political collapse, such as what happened in 1917, and Ukraine could still emerge successful. That, however, is extremely unlikely and Kyiv would be unwise to base their future hopes upon such an event.
I find lots of the reports puzzling. For example, although considerable glee was expressed at the Ukrainians’ latest attack on the Kerch bridge in the Western media, all of the damage reports I could find including the Ukrainian suggested considerably less damage than the first attack on that bridge.
Here is some context on what’s going on with the offensive:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html
I agree that Ukraine can’t win an attritional fight. That’s why military experts have voiced the necessity for a more mobile combined-arms offensive. The problem is this is very difficult to do and in recent decades, only the US and Israel have shown this higher-level ability. And both the US and Israel have done so during or after achieving air supremacy, which is a key force enabler. Note that the last time an enemy aircraft attacked a US ground unit was 1953. We have become so used to air dominance, that I think we don’t understand what it’s like to fight without it.
There is no way on any reasonable time-scale for Ukraine to get that kind of air supremacy. The history of successful offensives without air superiority is short and not very relevant to Ukraine’s situation.
It’s understandable Ukraine doesn’t want to throw its best units away, so it sticks with attrition, hoping for a localize breakthrough the mobile forces can then exploit. But they haven’t had one yet – Russia is very good at attrition and has defense-in-depth to prevent exploitation. Ukraine’s current strategy is ultimately a slow death that relies on western support outlasting Russian military-industrial capacity or changing domestic political fortunes.
On the other side, Russia as the same problems. They don’t have air superiority over Ukraine. They can’t interdict western supplies and support. They are functionally an attrition army focuses on artillery fires. They are already conserving ammo, so they’ve likely run through their wartime stocks. As we saw with the winter offensive in Bahkmut, their warfighting capabilities are not great on the offense against Ukraine.
Here is some context on what’s going on with the offensive:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html
I agree that Ukraine can’t win an attritional fight. That’s why military experts have voiced the necessity for a more mobile combined-arms offensive. The problem is this is very difficult to do and in recent decades, only the US and Israel have shown this higher-level ability. And both the US and Israel have done so during or after achieving air supremacy, which is a key force enabler. Note that the last time an enemy aircraft attacked a US ground unit was 1953. We have become so used to air dominance, that I think we don’t understand what it’s like to fight without it.
There is no way on any reasonable time-scale for Ukraine to get that kind of air supremacy. The history of successful offensives without air superiority is short and not very relevant to Ukraine’s situation.
It’s understandable Ukraine doesn’t want to throw its best units away, so it sticks with attrition, hoping for a localize breakthrough the mobile forces can then exploit. But they haven’t had one yet – Russia is very good at attrition and has defense-in-depth to prevent exploitation. Ukraine’s current strategy is ultimately a slow death that relies on western support outlasting Russian military-industrial capacity or changing domestic political fortunes.
On the other side, Russia has the same problems. They don’t have air superiority over Ukraine. They can’t interdict Western supplies and support. They are functionally an attrition army focusing on artillery fires. They are already conserving arty ammo, so they’ve likely run through their wartime stocks. As we saw with the winter offensive in Bahkmut, their warfighting capabilities are not great on the offense against Ukraine.
There are other issues. We have been training the Ukrainians in “combined arms warfare”. The Ukrainians have all but abandoned that, returning to the ways used by the Russians.
A key issue, as Andy notes, is that combined arms warfare very much assumes air supremacy.
Ukraine cannot fight a combined arms war, because they do not have the necessary air power, air defense, mobile artillery, tanks, APC’s. They also lack the training.
Russia invented combined arms warfare, along with Germany, in the 1930’s. Right now it is the US and NATO that are incapable of doing it because of lack of equipment and, most importantly, training. The US Army has not trained for large-scale combined arms since the second Iraq war, some 30 plus years. Russia conducts large-scale (army corps level) combined arms operations every year, usually nowadays with China. Last year 30,000 troops were involve, along with air and naval maneuvers.
Russia is also superb at defensive maneuvers. The fight at Kursk is a good example. The German army destroyed itself in the defensive maze put up by the Soviets.
Moreover, Russia does have air superiority over much of Ukraine, and they definitely have rocket and artillery superiority. They are also holding back a substantial fraction of their army, partially in anticipation of a NATO intervention.
The Patriot system has once again proven to be faulty. Even the Houthis defeated it in Saudi Arabia. The US simply does not have air defenses. The Army and Marines depend on the Air Force achieving air supremacy so that they can maneuver without considering enemy aircraft.
Ukraine’s recent failed counter offensive is an objective lesson in how not to do war. Russian troops hunkered down in prepared defenses in depth, and allowed the Ukrainians to assault across open, flat country into mine fields, artillery, rockets, and helicopter and CAS aircraft fires. The Ukrainians never once breached the first defensive line, and only reached it a few times. Most of the killing was in the Russian mine fields. The result was at least 26,000 dead Ukrainians and about 300 dead Russians. That’s a 100:1 kill ratio. That kill ratio worse than the British assault in the Somme in 1916. At least the Brits had fire support, and did kill some Germans.
This war, if it does not go nuclear and world wide, will likely mark the end of American dominance in the world, and may well collapse its alliance system.
Whomever the Russian leaders are, they’re in a much stronger position to maintain public support than whomever the American leaders are.
Indefinitely.
We’re going to need an exit strategy and, AFAICS, that means
President Trumps return to restore common sense to our foreign policy.
A couple more clicks on the WW III ratchet. The grain deal ended without renewal, and Russia announced that ships traveling to Ukrainian ports will be regarded as carrying military contraband. What this means in practice is not stated, but stopping and inspecting ships is a possibility. Ukraine immediately reciprocated.
So a naval war on the Black Sea is now on the table.
What will Turkey do?
OT- I know who is losing. Rudy! Every lawsuit reveals that the Trump campaign was lying about stolen votes.
“The lawsuit says Giuliani repeatedly pushed debunked claims that Freeman and Moss — mother and daughter — pulled out suitcases of illegal ballots and committed other acts of fraud to try to alter the outcome of the race.
Though Giuliani acknowledges in the filing that the statements were false, he does not concede that they caused any damage to Freeman or Moss. That distinction is important because plaintiffs in a defamation case must prove not only that a statement made about them was false but that it also resulted in actual damage.”
https://www.fox5ny.com/news/rudy-giuliani-admits-he-made-false-statements-about-georgia-election-workers
Steve