What Happens With Ukraine?

This post by James Joyner at Outside the Beltway is largely a round-up of articles sounding a similar theme: Ukraine is losing in its war with Russia. He observes:

On the one hand, depending on unlimited and indefinite external support for one’s war effort is a pretty good indication that you’re destined to fail. On the other, most of the countries that have pledged such support are pretty wealthy and have a strong interest in seeing Russia weakened, if not defeated—to say nothing of the moral and humanitarian interests at stake.

I was wrong in predicting back in 2022 that Putin would not invade Ukraine. I misjudged the intensity of his views if not his motives. However, since the beginning I have questioned the achievability of Ukrainian victory, defined as a return to the pre-2014 borders, NATO membership, and the attendant security guarantees against Russia. It’s not that I wouldn’t like to imagine that happening. It’s a matter of understanding Russian objectives and arithmetic.

The pieces to which James links are either 1) facesaving measures or 2) beating up on the United States or 3) beating up on the Republicans or some combination of all of the above.

Let’s approach this more positively. What would it take to achieve victory for Ukraine? I support aid for Ukraine because our aid keeps the Ukrainian government afloat and prevents outright Russian victory on terms decreasingly favorable to Ukraine (or us for that matter). That’s why I always accompany my support on an insistence on oversight which we have never really provided. What good to support the Ukrainian government if the money goes to line the pockets of some corrupt official?

I don’t believe we are capable of producing munitions at the pace at which Ukraine requires them, by the time we could build up our capacity the war will be long over, there just aren’t enough Ukrainians, and the risks of direct confrontation between NATO countries and Russia are just too great.