At RealClearWorld Ken Pollack remarks on President Trump’s Iran policy:
In May 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo laid out a dozen far-reaching steps that Iran will have to take to get the administration to reverse course. While nothing short of regime change in Tehran would realistically fulfill those conditions, these were probably part of a maximalist bargaining position — an opening bid. Trump never expected to get all or even most of them. So, what does the president want?
It seems increasingly clear that all Trump really wants is a new nuclear deal with Tehran. He wants it to be better than the one his predecessor Barack Obama sealed — the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Trump believes that by placing enormous economic pressure on Iran, he will force the Iranians back to the negotiating table. Once there, Trump believes he will have the leverage he needs to extract bigger concessions from Tehran than what Obama got, possibly in return for fewer benefits than Obama gave.
I think that’s a remarkably optimistic view. I’m not sure how well it comports with reality.
I’ve always found the JCPOA puzzling because I thought it was only useful if it was unnecessary, an inherently contradictory situation. I wish more people were observing that Iran’s rapid restocking of its inventory of refined uranium demonstrated just how limited the JCPOA’s utility was.
Recently, someone made a case to me that I found intriguing and persuasive. The purpose of the JCPOA from our point of view was not to change Iran’s behavior, reduce its stockpile or refined uranium, or to halt its nuclear development program. It was a confidence-building move. IMO that would have been a worthwhile goal.
Unfortunately, that seems to have failed as well.
When looking at the Iran deal, it is not so puzzling if one accounts for personal interests vs national interests.
The JCPOA, the Paris Climate Accord, and TPP had similar characteristics — the Obama administration treated them as legacy projects.
As to what Trump wants — I think the observation made here that Trump sees everything as a negotiation but the decision process on whats “a great deal” vs a “a bad deal” is a complete mystery to everyone is astute as they come.
It is interesting the different reactions the Chinese, North Koreans, Iranians have given the circumstances.
“The JCPOA, the Paris Climate Accord, and TPP had similar characteristics — the Obama administration treated them as legacy projects.”
I think that’s certainly true. I have no idea what a confidence building move means, especially in that part of the world and with the Iranian characters.
Trump’s gamble is that the Ayatollahs will choose to surrender rather than go to war. The Japanese made the opposite choice. That their defeat was inevitable did not deter them, and we paid a huge price in men and treasure.
I don’t think that Trump has a list of hard objectives. Iran is an enemy. The State Department, well before Trump came on the scene, listed it as the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world by a large margin. He’s going to tighten the screws until they quit causing trouble.
The JPCOA allowed much more intrusive monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities than was previously the case. That is why it was a confidence-building measure. Actually building nukes while subject to the JPCOA terms would be extremely difficult for Iran to pull-off without being discovered.
I’m not confident. Notice provisions and off limits facilities didn’t inspire that. Iran, like other nations, haven’t been compliant in fact or spirit since I’ve been watching.
The Iran agreement was more intusive than other agreements made in the past. We know that the inspections worked in Iraq, and these were more aggressive. I dont see the basis for lack of confidence in this case, other than political.
Steve
Sometimes all you can do is play the long game. Trump isn’t seeing other options with Iran, so, tighten sanctions.
I’m more curious about his hopes for North Korea. The carrots he offers are loosening of sanctions, food aid, and economic development. If Kim quits nukes, and loosens control. When has an absolute dictator ever done that?
An interesting analysis on Iran in the WSJ.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/squeezed-by-u-s-sanctions-iran-shifts-from-patience-to-confrontation-11562270731
The most intriguing quote is at the end – that Iran’s goal is to avoid becoming geopolitically irrelevant like Cuba where the US has no incentives to change policy.
From Darius I, Iran has been relevant, so why anyone in or outside Iran think that would change?