We’re Not Fighting DAESH and Iraq Is Losing

I think I’ve mentioned before that I had seen David Kilcullen’s picture when he was an infant decades ago—long before he came to prominence as a Middle East expert. He’s the godson of a dear old friend of ours and there’s a picture of him held in his parents’ arms on her mantle. In this piece at National Journal Dr. Kilcullen gives a pretty good précis of the situation in Iraq:

Anyone reading this already knows much of the history, but to recap: ISIS exploited Iraqi government ineptitude and sectarian division after US forces left in 2011, and used the sanctuary created by the Syrian civil war to grow from an urban guerrilla group—small cells, civilian clothes and vehicles, light weapons, operating mainly by night with asymmetric (i.e. terrorist) hit-and-run tactics—into something more like a conventional light armored cavalry.

By late 2013, when ISIS fighters mounted a major push against the Iraqi cities of Tikrit and Fallujah, their tactical style had settled into a pattern. A main force, often comprising dozens of trucks and troop-carrying technicals, would move in compact formation on highways and secondary roads. Ahead of it, and to the flanks, a swarm of gun trucks—technicals with anti-armor weapons, heavy machine guns, radios and a few dismounts—ranged widely across the landscape, scouting routes, securing chokepoints, and looking for targets of opportunity or soft spots. When they spotted one, they would either “bounce” and overwhelm it with their own resources, or pull the main column onto it using radio and cellphone messages. Teams of two to three technicals, each carrying six or eight fighters ready to dismount, would swarm onto a target, coordinating their fire to overwhelm it. This is classic maneuver warfare—in the business, it’s known as “recon pull”—and it looked a lot like Soviet-style mission tactics, which was unsurprising given the number of Ba’athist officers now on the ISIS payroll.

Read the whole thing. I have one substantial problem with his exposition and it’s with the title: we’re not fighting DAESH and Iraq was never ours to lose. We were never willing to occupy Iraq indefinitely which is what repelling DAESH would have required. How anyone could ever have believed the American people were prepared for such an occupation baffles me.

10 comments… add one
  • TastyBits Link

    Holy shit!

    I have not been paying attention to them, but they are not terrorists. If I were the Saudis, I would have a good supply of adult diapers because they should be shitting themselves.

    Moving a mechanized column with lead and flanking elements and keeping everybody synchronized is not a trivial task. The body has to keep moving, and the lead and flanks need to keep up, provide security, investigate threats, and keep a proper distance.

    They are practicing for when they are going through the burning oil fields in Saudi Arabia. The Jordanians would probably do well to start worrying. The Israelis would rip them apart, but they are not headed that way.

  • ... Link

    TB, one of ISIS’s best field commanders was apparently trained by the US – he’s Georgian of Chechen ethnicity, and we trained him as part of the Georgian military to fight the Russians. I forget the guy’s name, but he was a standout for Georgia during the war with Russia in 2008.

    So once more our pigeons are coming home to roost.

  • TastyBits Link

    The one big problem for ISIS is using US armaments instead of Soviet or Russian ones, and this is because of spare parts. US equipment is more sophisticated, and therefore, it is more complicated. There are more things that can go wrong, and it takes more knowledge to keep them working.

    If the delusional hawks keep equipping their unicorns, ISIS will just resupply from them.

  • steve Link

    These are mostly Saddam’s old military. Before they joined up IS was just a bunch of head choppers. Now they have real military expertise.

    This losing Iraq meme persists. We broke the country when we invaded. We didn’t, and we still don’t, know how to put it back together. We did as much as the Iraqis were going to allow us to do, but they just weren’t going to become Sweden, or even Chile, through our efforts. As soon as we left, whenever we left, the Maliki government or any successor was going to exclude the Sunni minority and end where we are.

    Steve

  • they are not headed that way.

    Yet.

    You know, one of the great ironies is that while our evangelical social conservatives support Israel because they want to hasten Armageddon the purported foreign policy realists in Washington may actually accomplish it.

  • Andy Link

    Steve,

    Iraq is broken and can’t be put back together – it’s something I’ve been saying for many years now. Syria too.

    I think it goes back to before 2003, however, and it’s a legacy of the Gulf War and the aftermath where we set-up zones in the north and south that were free from central government control – it was a de facto partition of Iraq. When we destroyed the central government in 2003 it’s not surprising that the power structures that evolved over the previous decade were conducive to the establishment of another central government.

  • TastyBits Link

    Over at Col. Lang’s site, the second of a three part series was posted. It was not written by him. It was written by Patrick BAHZAD. I do not know his background, and I have not vetted him. I agree with the narrative, and being a contrarian, I have a problem falling in love with a narrative by a source whose background and expertise I have not researched.

    The comments do not have any disagreements, but they could have fallen in love with it, also. The link to part 1 is below. I will put Part 2 in a separate comment to avoid the spam filter (hopefully). I think that there is a lot of truth in them, but each individual will need to decide for him/herself.

    RECIPE FOR DISASTER: How supporting Syrian rebels put US foreign policy into disarray – Part 1: A Quick Overview (2011-2014)

  • TastyBits Link
  • Andy Link

    TB,

    He’s a retired French soldier with 25+ years of operational experience in the Mid-East and Africa.

  • Algerian?

Leave a Comment