“The World” Has Rejected the Rules-Based Order

In his Wall Street Journal column Walter Russell Mead laments that the world has rejected the “rules-base order”:

Liberal internationalists around the world believe that global institutions (like Wilson’s ill-fated League of Nations) can replace the anarchic, often deadly, power struggles between nations with a system of orderly management that brings the rule of law to a weary world. Institutions like the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, as well as agreements like the Paris climate accords, reflect efforts by diplomats and politicians in the U.S. and abroad to create the kind of world that Wilson sought.

For Wilson’s modern heirs, technocratic governance through rules-based international institutions represents humanity’s last, best hope to avoid cataclysmic disruptions ranging from world wars to climate change. From this perspective, Mr. Putin’s defiant international rule-breaking threatens the foundations of Wilsonian order. If a great power gets away with breaking the rules this egregiously, humanity falls back into a nuclear jungle.

Mr. Putin’s challenge to Wilsonian order is why so many liberals, especially in the U.S. and Europe, have become uber-interventionist on Ukraine. Many expected traditional national-security hawks would rally to oppose Mr. Putin’s assault on his neighbor. What was more surprising and, given the politics of the Democratic Party and the Biden administration, more consequential for American foreign policy, was the response of Wilsonian liberals to the war. Normally dovish columnists and members of Congress now cry “praise the Lord and pass the ammunition!” as they urge Western governments to step up shipments of advanced weaponry and supplies to Ukraine.

Within the Biden administration, the struggle is among three groups: liberal internationalists, who want America and the West to do what it takes to ensure that Russia loses the war; pragmatists who want to check Russia but fear Russian escalation and believe that the war will inevitably end in a compromise peace that falls short of Wilsonian hopes; and Asia-firsters who worry that U.S. support for Ukraine reduces America’s ability to face the more consequential and long-term threat from China. President Biden has tried to stay in the middle, giving Ukraine more support than the pragmatists and Asia hands prefer, but dribbling it out more slowly than the Wilsonians would like.

For Wilsonians, world politics today is less about great-power rivalries between the U.S. and rivals like China and Russia and more about the struggle between principles and selfishness, order and chaos, democracy and authoritarianism. Wilsonians hailed the recent wins of a pro-Western candidate in the Czech election and of Lula da Silva over Trump ally Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil as victories in the global struggle for liberal order.

Last week German chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Lula to celebrate his victory over Mr. Bolsonaro—and to ask Brazil to send ammunition to Ukraine. Lula accepted the congratulations but turned down the request. Brazil, like India, South Africa and much of the rest of the world, wants nothing to do with Wilsonian crusades.

While I think it brave of Dr. Mead to acknowledge the obvious, that rather than the entire world rallying to oppose V. Putin’s attack on Ukraine, only a handful of American and European countries have done so but I think he’s wrong. It’s not the “rules-based order” that the world is rejecting but a “rules-based order” that does not bind the United States as well. I would put the major nails in the coffin of the rules-based order over the last 30 years as:

  • U. S. invasion of Grenada
  • China pegs the yuan to the dollar
  • U. S. bombing of Serbia
  • China granted most favored nation trading status and admitted to the WTO
  • U. S. invasion of Iraq
  • U. S. use of armed drones in multiple countries without Security Council authorization
  • U. S. campaign against Qaddafi government in Libya
  • U. S. support for the rebels in Syria
  • China’s “One Belt, One Road” program
  • U. S. withdrawal from Afghanistan
  • Russian invasion of Ukraine

just to hit the high spots. There was never a global consensus in support of a rules-based order. Dr. Mead mistakes U. S. hegemony for a rules-based order and most countries in the world have chafed under that hegemony.

My list may seem like a hodge-podge but it’s actually coherent. U. S. military dominance is downstream from U. S. economic dominance and it is that dominance that made us the “policeman on the beat”. Whatever the illusions of some Americans, we cannot preserve economic dominance on the basis of banking, retail, and services, relying on other countries to manufacture what our retailers sell. Without economic dominance we cannot preserve military dominance and without U. S. military dominance there is no rules-based order.

8 comments… add one
  • bob sykes Link

    The Rules based order (from comments in Reminiscence of the Future):

    Overthrowing other people’s governments: The Master List
By William Blum (1933 – 2018). Instances of the United States overthrowing, or attempting to overthrow, a foreign government since the Second World War. (* indicates successful ouster of a government)

    China 1949 to early 1960s
, Albania 1949-53
, East Germany 1950s
, Iran 1953, *
Guatemala 1954, *
Costa Rica mid-1950s
, Syria 1956-7
, Egypt 1957
, Indonesia 1957-8
, British Guiana 1953-64 , *
Iraq 1963, *
North Vietnam 1945-73
, Cambodia 1955-70, *
Laos 1958 *, 1959 *, 1960, *
Ecuador 1960-63, *
Congo 1960, *
France 1965, 
Brazil 1962-64, *
Dominican Republic 1963, *
Cuba 1959 to present, 
Bolivia 1964, *
Indonesia 1965, *
Ghana 1966, *
Chile 1964-73, *
Greece 1967, *
Costa Rica 1970-71, 
Bolivia 1971, *
Australia 1973-75, *
Angola 1975, 1980s
, Zaire 1975
, Portugal 1974-76, *
Jamaica 1976-80, *
Seychelles 1979-81, 
Chad 1981-82, *
Grenada 1983, *
South Yemen 1982-84, 
Suriname 1982-84
, Fiji 1987, *
Libya 1980s
Nicaragua 1981-90, *
Panama 1989, *
Bulgaria 1990, *
Albania 1991, *
Iraq 1991,
Afghanistan 1980s, *
Somalia 1993, 
Yugoslavia 1999-2000, *
Ecuador 2000, *
Afghanistan 2001, *
Venezuela 2002, *
Iraq 2003, *
Haiti 2004, *
Somalia 2007 to present
, Honduras 2009, *
Libya 2011, *
Syria 2012, 
Ukraine 2014.

    That list should be updated with Egypt, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

    The Chinese Embassy has published a list of states that were bombed by the United States of America after World War II:

    • Korea and China 1950-53 (Korean War), 
• Guatemala 1954, 
• Indonesia (1958)
, • Cuba (1959-1961)
, • Guatemala (1960)
, • Congo (1964)
, • Laos (1964-1973), 
• Vietnam (1961-1973)
, • Cambodia (1969-1970)
, • Guatemala (1967-1969), 
• Grenada (1983)
, • Lebanon (1983, 1984) (hitting targets in the territories of Lebanon and Syria)
, • Libya (1986)
, • Salvador (1980)
, • Nicaragua (1980)
, • Iran (1987), 
• Panama (1989)
, • Iraq (1991) (Gulf War)
, • Kuwait (1991)
, • Somalia (1993)
, • Bosnia (1994, 1995)
, • Sudan (1998)
, • Afghanistan (1998)
, • Yugoslavia (1999)
, • Yemen (2002), 
• Iraq (1991-2003) (joint US and British troops)
, • Iraq (2003-2015), 
• Afghanistan (2001-2015)
, • Pakistan (2007-2015)
, • Somalia (2007-2008, 2011)
, • Yemen (2009, 2011), 
• Libya (2011, 2015)
, • Syria (2014-2015)

    The war in Somalia is still going on, reaching some 30 years this winter, and being our longest war.

    Some one has estimated that since the adoption of the Constitution the US has participated in some 451 wars, not counting the Indian Wars, which ran from 1607 to 1918.

    “But look at the number of them.” (Sam Spade)

  • As I have written before the U. S. role in the removal of Mossadegh in Iran is greatly exaggerated both by the Iranians and by us, starting with Kermit Roosevelt. For the Iranian government is is part of their founding mythology. IMO it was mostly a homegrown affair, a putsch, which explains why the revolutionary government took the actions it did in 1980, executing thousands of military officers, probably including some classmates of mine. The U. S. role was mostly limited to providing some “walking around money” for violent demonstrators. We had no agents in-country at the time of the overthrow.

    The involvement of the British was probably greater but the question that should be asked is did the Iranian military need help? Furthermore if a little walking around money was all that was needed to provide the impetus to overthrow Mossadegh his government was already teetering and Kremlin records have revealed that the Tudeh was poised for an overthrow of their own.

  • steve Link

    Leaving Afghanistan? Our staying was not accomplishing anything. We were never going to fix the place. Just a steady financial drain and some American lives. You can make the case we mismanaged the occupation and maybe, I doubt it, the withdrawal could have been better but we needed to leave.

    Steve

  • Andy Link

    It’s interesting how Chomsky-ist ideas have transferred from the left to the right.

    Anyway, I have no problem with the US as a hegemon – and I was mostly happy to be a cog in that machine for a long time. I wish we had made smarter choices, however.

    But people need to not drink the kool-aid and pretend that what we are doing is based on neutral “rules-based order” principles. We are happy to throw out the rules when we want to and have done so many times. And that may or may not have been wise, but people shouldn’t be shocked when other countries push back against our hypocrisy and hegemony or think they should also be able to throw out the rules for their strategic reasons.

    In short, I prefer a power-politics where the US dominates, but it’s silly to expect that dominance will last forever or won’t be challenged because of moralistic appeals to a “rules-based order.”

  • I agree that we needed to leave Afghanistan—IMO we should never have been there to begin with. I didn’t make the argument at the time because it didn’t occur to me but a significant reason not to invade was that our ultimate departure would inevitably be messy.

    The question is whether the departure enhanced or detracted from an image of power, justice, and benignity. I think it detracted. What do you think?

  • Andy Link

    I don’t think our withdrawal from Afghanistan affects much in terms of global perception or strategy since Afghanistan is a backwater of little strategic importance.

  • steve Link

    You know I said here many times that no one wanted to be the president who left Afghanistan for a couple of reasons. First, it wasn’t likely to go off without some catastrophe(s). Moving people around in buses, piling up at airports means targets. Second, no matter when you left shortly thereafter the place would be a chaotic mess. The people who wanted us to stay forever, the neocons mostly, would say it was our fault for running out.

    I dont think this affects our global reputation. Anyone paying attention to Afghanistan knew it was going to be ugly when we left. If anything, staying 20 years and not accomplishing much might affect our reputation.

    Steve

  • Forbes Link

    WRM’s thesis–“Mr. Putin’s defiant international rule-breaking threatens the foundations of Wilsonian order”–is a bit off. The Wilsonian order of the League of Nations was never joined by the US.
    Though however one imagines the now-characterized “rules-based order,” it strikes me that diplomacy should count as the critical component. And if you believe the US to be the indispensable nation in upholding that order, then the US has failed in its entreaties for diplomacy. The US training up Ukraine’s military on Russia’s border is a provocation no different than a foreign power doing much the same in Mexico or Canada. The US likes to proclaim the Monroe Doctrine in the Westen Hemisphere–yet violates the very same spirit in Eurasia.
    Russia’s intervention in Ukraine occurred under auspices of R2P–responsibility to protect–after Ukraine had (most recently) shelled the Donbass with artillery fire for a week prior to 2/24/22. R2P is recognized by the UN, unanimously adopted at its 2005 World Summit.
    The Wilsonian order or Wilsonian liberalism is a relic of a century long past–to claim its relevance is an irrelevance.

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