The Unknown Unknowns

Recently, I was asked to provide a concrete example of how Iran has not been forthcoming about its nuclear development program. This passage is from the site Nuclear Threat Initiative, which I recommend:

On 21 September 2009, ahead of the public revelation by the leaders of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, Iran disclosed to the IAEA that it was building a second pilot enrichment facility. According to IAEA Spokesperson Marc Vidricaire, Iran’s letter “stated that the enrichment level would be up to 5%,” and the Agency was assured that additional information would be provided in due time. The facility was located in an underground tunnel complex on the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base near the city of Qom. Managed by Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) was slated to hold 2,784 centrifuges, and began operations using 696 centrifuges in late 2011. Moreover, Iran contradicted its declaration to the IAEA concerning planned enrichment levels by moving 19.75% enrichment activities from Natanz to Fordow. A May 2012 report from the IAEA raised concerns over the activity at Fordow, citing uranium enriched past the stated target of 19.75%, and the “difference between the original stated purpose of the facility, and the purpose for which it is now used.” The plant’s size, secrecy, and location on an IRGC military base led some analysts in the U.S. government to argue that Iran constructed it in order to produce HEU for nuclear weapons.

The original is copiously annotated. I have taken the liberty of removing the footnote references for legibility.

That example is not isolated. It is typical of our experience with Iran. The process goes something like this:

1. We learn via intelligence of an Iranian nuclear development facility. The intelligence might be electronic but is more likely human intelligence.
2. We convey what we have discovered to the Iranians, informing them that we are preparing to disclose our findings.
3. The Iranians declare our findings.

I would add that the IAEA has not been given access to all of the nuclear development facilities in Iran of which we are aware and that there is evidence that the Iranians have “sanitized” areas to which they have been given access prior to being allowed to enter. BTW I suspect British intelligence has been more successful than we. Americans are notoriously loose-lipped.

Consequently, the question those in favor of negotiating with Iran need to answer is how do they know what they don’t know? In the light of Iran’s bad faith my view is that we shouldn’t negotiate at all with the present generation of Iranian officials. The pattern with revolutions has been that after a while the revolutionaries get old and die and are succeeded by bureaucrats who are a lot more tractable (think Gorbachev).

But I also think we shouldn’t fret. What will happen will happen.