I was interested in the observations of John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs’s on Dick Cheney’s support for Kamala Harris, quoted in this post at RealClearPolitics By Tim Hains:
MEARSHEIMER: When we talk about the ‘Deep State,’ we’re really talking about the Administrative State. It is very important to understand that starting in the late 19th and early 20th century, given developments in the American economy, it was imperative that we develop — and this is true of all Western countries — a very powerful central state that could ‘run the country.’ And over time, that state has grown in power.
Since World War Two, the United States has been involved in every nook and cranny of the world, fighting wars here, there, and everywhere. And to do that, you need a very powerful administrative state that can help manage that foreign policy. But in the process, what happens is you get all of these high-level, middle-level, and low-level bureaucrats who become established in positions in the Pentagon, the State Department, and the intelligence community — you name it. And they end up having a vested interest in pursuing a particular foreign policy.
That particular foreign policy that they like to pursue is the one the Democrats and the Republicans are pushing. That’s why we talk about tweedle-dee and tweedle-dum with regard to the two parties. You could throw in the deep state as being on the same page as those other two institutions.
SACHS: There’s a very interesting interview of Putin in 2017 where he says, “I’ve dealt with three presidents now. They come into office with some ideas, even. But then the men in the dark suits and the blue ties,” he says, “I wear red ties but they wear blue ties. They come in and explain the way the world really is and there go the ideas.”
I think that’s Putin’s experience. That’s our experience. That’s my experience. Which is that there is a deeply entrained foreign policy that has been in place, in my interpretation, for many decades.
I do not believe that U. S. interests have much to do with the interests of that “administrative state”. They have their own goals and objectives.
One last point: doing anything about that will require much more than a single president. It will require civil service reform of a type and scale I cannot realistically envision.
Other than Ike, Biden and Bush 1 which US presidents had much background in foreign policy since after WW2? What’s your idea about how to have people working in foreign policy areas who have some expertise in the areas where they work?
Steve
Just what are “US interests”? I don’t think “US” is meaningful here. There are the interests of average Americans, which probably differ from group to group, of the political parties, which are not internally homogeneous, and the the interests of the various bureaucracies.
I think the bigger point is that the Deep or Administrative State has escaped the control of our elected officials. Trump couldn’t control his own staff, and Biden and Harris are clearly puppets.
The problem the American people have, you and me, is that the bureaucrats who control our foreign policy are actively seeking war with Russia and China and Iran and North Korea, because they think the US can win them all. The bureaucrats think Russia and its allies are weak and bluffing.
We are right now closer to nuclear than at anytime since 1945.
It’s easier to be confident in what our interests aren’t. For example, a global thermonuclear war is not in the U. S. interests. Beyond that it gets fuzzier.
For example, some would say that free trade, freedom of transit of the seas, and free exchange of data are vital U. S. interests. Others disagree with those in part or altogether.
I think it would be fair to add Nixon to that list. Having knowledgeable people with expertise in the areas in which they work is tough if only for one because there are just two reasons to work for government: money or power. We don’t want those subject matter experts to have either.
Why does anyone work for WalMart or Target? Money. Why does one become a manager at one of those places? Power. Neither WalMart nor foreign service positions actually pay that well. Low to mid level bureaucrats dont actually have much power, like the guy at Target. I think the larger problem is that Americans as a group arent actually that interested in foreign policy. Less than half even own a passport, and only about 20% are fluent in a second language and if Trump wins he wants to deport a bunch of those. So we end up with too many foreign nationals who came here and learn to speak English rather than Americans who learn to speak and learn the foreign culture helping make policy.
Once you make the Venn diagram of those who are actually interested enough in foreign policy enough to study policy, foreign language and culture you end up with a tiny group of people. The number of jobs in the US where foreign policy and related skills is germaine might be even smaller, so AFAICT you end up with a group of people who circulate from business to academia to government but its all still a pretty small group.
Steve
I think you’re underestimating the degree and number of individuals who have axes to grind that are in our foreign service. And scholarship may not be as relevant as you think. After all Arabs speak Arabic, Mexicans speak Spanish (Mexican Spanish anyway), Ukrainians speak Ukrainian, etc. and if the foreign service is anything like our private sector native speakers (people who learned a language as their first language) are sought after more than people with book learnin’.
I actually said this.
“So we end up with too many foreign nationals who came here and learn to speak English rather than Americans who learn to speak and learn the foreign culture helping make policy.”
I agree that we have too many of these but a lot of that is because we dont have native Americans who can speak the languages. One thing that clearly contributed towards our failures in Iraq was that we had almost no one who could speak the language. We were dependent upon Iraqis, who had their own agendas.
Steve
Dave Schuler: I do not believe that U. S. interests have much to do with the interests of that “administrative state”. They have their own goals and objectives.
We have a different take. The foreign policy establishment provides consistency and stability, which are essential to U.S. interests. When dealing with other countries, it’s important they know where America stands today, and where it will stand tomorrow.
Will America honor its alliances? Will American stand up to aggression? Or does American honor depend upon American whims? American power has always (since WWII) depended on being first among equals; the ability to marshal other countries to help guard international stability and democratic values.
The problem comes when consistency and stability mean being unable to adapt to changing conditions. But, like with most political change, evolution is almost always preferable to revolution.
Consistency is a contingent good not an absolute good. We have consistently:
Demanded military primacy in every theater
Spent more on our military than necessary for national security
Made war on countries that had not attacked us
Encouraged our allies to underspend on their own militaries
Promoted the “Washington Consensus”
Those were not policies demanded by the American people. They were policies promoted by the Departments of State and Defense. That’s not the whole list—just a small sample.
Dave Schuler: Consistency is a contingent good not an absolute good.
We addressed that in our comment. Adapting to changing conditions is essential. Throwing everything out and starting over would be self-defeating.
Do you think a whimsical foreign policy would be beneficial to the United States? Do American promises have meaning?
As an aside, I may have to reconsider voting for Trump. He is now promising to cap credit card rates at 10%, cut auto insurance costs in half and no more taxes on social security. Most importantly my cats will be able to stop worrying about being eaten!
Steve
No one, especially not Trump, is planning on throwing everything out and starting over. You’re showing your fear.
Administrative state is too powerful.
Not answering to the people or the borders would not be wide open. That’s not democracy, importing domestic workers for the 10%.
When you disparage the working class because they only speak English, your arrogance is on full display and you have to consider that deplorables have value and valid interests too, or else you need to let the mask slip and endorse full class rule and negate popular vote.
And the left will have to stop saying “Democracy “ is their cause.
“When you disparage the working class because they only speak English”
No where did I specify working class, or any class. Have no idea what percentage of Americans speak a second language by class. Cant say I really care much either.
Steve
The behaviors of bureaucracies have been well-documented for the last century. They have little to do with the nominal mission of the bureaucracy and everything to do with perpetuating and expanding the bureaucracy. A bureaucracy unresponsive to either the president or Congress is not remotely democratic. Like other autocracies it IS consistent, however.
There have been multiple instances of heads of federal departments perjuring themselves in testimony to Congress lately. That is definitionally “unresponsive”.
Dave Schuler: The behaviors of bureaucracies have been well-documented for the last century. They have little to do with the nominal mission of the bureaucracy and everything to do with perpetuating and expanding the bureaucracy.
Sure. Nothing new about that. However, bureaucracies, like modern democracies, while resistant to change, do bend to political pressure and can adapt to evolving conditions. It’s not an absolute. But it does require some political consensus and some leadership. Partisan division can render the bureaucracy, like modern democracy, adrift.
Even a single link seems to be sending posts to moderation.
Examples, please, focusing on State and Defense.
Dave Schuler: Examples, please, focusing on State and Defense.
Military doctrines have changed to include nuclear deterrence, the change from a draft army to a much higher quality volunteer force, the use of precision munitions and now drones. NATO is still the most important military alliance, but international terrorism has become a central focus of security.
State doctrines have changed from a largely neutral stance before WWII to military alliances and international deployments to guarantee stability, joining the United Nations, detente with the Soviet Union, opening up to China, then integration of China into the global economic system, international relations centered on human rights, and now adaptation (albeit haltingly) to a multipolar world.
So, you have no examples within the last 30 years.
At the state level many DMVs are markedly improved. Ours in PA is much better. At the federal level it’s now very easy to apply for Medicare and Social Security. Payments for care under Medicare are pretty easy now. Electronic filing of taxes has made that easier. Voting is now easier as you can vote when you actually have time off instead of having to take time off to do so or you can mail in if you know you are working late that day. It’s now pretty easy to sign up for the ACA, unlike it was for the first year.
Clearly they change, As to State and Defense I have no idea how you would measure that unless you are talking about stuff like improving the pay system.
https://www.army.mil/article/256364/game_changing_smartvoucher_pays_pcsing_soldiers_faster
Steve
Dave Schuler: The behaviors of bureaucracies have been well-documented for the last century.
Dave Schuler: So, you have no examples within the last 30 years.
Of course, evolutionary changes will tend be less pronounced over shorter time spans. But certainly the changes due to the 9/11 attack affected both defense and state doctrines. On a more granular level, we have a new multidomain military doctrine, and diplomatic changes are beginning to occur related to the U.S. no longer being a sole hegemon.
The administrative state tends to resist change. But that doesn’t mean change can’t happen. To effect change requires consensus and time. A shock can accelerate the process because it can force consensus and shorten the time required, such as what happened after 9/11.
Consider Trump’s “America First” doctrine, which meant disengaging from the world and turning inward. This was resisted by the administrative state. But there was never a consensus among the American people. Indeed, many Americans saw it as folly. So, the change was slowed, but not stopped.
You seem to believe that the system should not just bend but bow to the current president. But the president isn’t an absolute monarch. He’s just one player in a complex* of power centers. The president’s might is checked by the courts and by statutes, including by administrative regulatory laws.
If Trump had had a consensus of the American people, then he would have been able to effect more substantial change. The administrative state would resist, but ultimately bend towards the new reality. Instead, Biden moved towards more engagement internationally. The advantage in terms of statecraft is that new ideas are filtered by time and practice, and that America is a more predictable diplomatic partner.
You can argue that the administrative state is too inflexible to adapt to modern times. Sure. But the real fault is with the American people who continue to hold on to old ways of thinking about the world. They too will bend to the new reality, even if haltingly. When that happens, the political system and administrative state will bend with them. Meanwhile, the American people are caught between the past and the future, the problem exacerbated by the dichotomous U.S. political system which causes the political system to lurch from one side to the other.
*On Complex Systems
Complex system are characterized by multiple connections or interactions, not just between components of the system, but at many different levels within the system.
In a modern democracy, power is distributed at many levels; national and local; executive, legislative, judicial; political parties and civic organizations, churches, clubs, families, neighborhoods, elections, property rights, and commercial interests; with many lines of communication between all levels.
All this forms a complex system that is robust yet flexible. It’s not immune to problems; however, especially when cooperation begins to fail between the various power centers.
This can be distinguished from, for instance, an absolute monarchy where the monarch must decide everything, and courtiers may wait for years in the anteroom to petition the monarch.
Complex scale-free network: Note one aspect of this network is that when knocking out any node, even a highly connected node, the other nodes will still be connected by other routes. Even completely disconnected areas still form a remnant network and can be reattached to the overall network. It’s also flexible for the same reason. It can take a lot of pressure, but the network will tend to bend and adapt rather than break. It takes a lot to bring this type of network down completely.
“Examples, please, focusing on State and Defense.”
Exactly my point. Adaptation? In no material way. Pure fiction.
I have avoided this silly debate. For just this reason. The “deep state” is so entrenched that the notion that the state or pentagon are good actors vs self serving actors is absurd on its face.
Why insult people’s intelligence?