The Two-Pronged Formula

Here’s the formula for ending the war in Ukraine proposed by Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan at Foreign Affairs:

The best path forward is a sequenced two-pronged strategy aimed at first bolstering Ukraine’s military capability and then, when the fighting season winds down late this year, ushering Moscow and Kyiv from the battlefield to the negotiating table. The West should start by immediately expediting the flow of weapons to Ukraine and increasing their quantity and quality. The goal should be to bolster Ukraine’s defenses while making its coming offensive as successful as possible, imposing heavy losses on Russia, foreclosing Moscow’s military options, and increasing its willingness to contemplate a diplomatic settlement. By the time Ukraine’s anticipated offensive is over, Kyiv may also warm up to the idea of a negotiated settlement, having given its best shot on the battlefield and facing growing constraints on both its own manpower and help from abroad.

The second prong of the West’s strategy should be to roll out later this year a plan for brokering a cease-fire and a follow-on peace process aimed at permanently ending the conflict. This diplomatic gambit may well fail. Even if Russia and Ukraine continue to take significant losses, one or both of them may prefer to keep fighting. But as the war’s costs mount and the prospect of a military stalemate looms, it is worth pressing for a durable truce, one that could prevent renewed conflict and, even better, set the stage for a lasting peace.

I see all sorts of things wrong with that formula. First, it isn’t “the West” that is providing more weapons for Ukraine but the United States. Germany in particular has largely been issuing press releases and otherwise doing relatively little. In fairness Germany’s imports of crude oil and natural gas from Russia have declined substantially but they are still not non-existent.

The second thing I see wrong with it is that weapons are not enough. Ukraine’s greater problem is the possibility of running out of people to carry the weapons. The reports of UK and U. S. special forces operating in Ukraine is disturbing. If true, it’s an error.

Third, the costs in manpower to Russia are being exaggerated. Most of those lost are in militias. Their deaths have next to no political cost to Putin or Moscow.

Fourth, I see no indications that either Ukraine or Russia is stepping back from its maximalist goals. I would think that would be a pre-requisite for any talks.

I do agree with this observation:

For over a year, the West has allowed Ukraine to define success and set the war aims of the West. This policy, regardless of whether it made sense at the outset of the war, has now run its course. It is unwise, because Ukraine’s goals are coming into conflict with other Western interests. And it is unsustainable, because the war’s costs are mounting, and Western publics and their governments are growing weary of providing ongoing support. As a global power, the United States must acknowledge that a maximal definition of the interests at stake in the war has produced a policy that increasingly conflicts with other U.S. priorities.

I have less confidence in their notion of a “feasible path” out of the impasse:

The West should do more now to help Ukraine defend itself and advance on the battlefield, putting it in the best position possible at the negotiating table later this year. In the meantime, Washington should set a diplomatic course that ensures the security and viability of Ukraine within its de facto borders—while working to restore the country’s territorial integrity over the long term.

or, in other words, acknowledge defeat. Isn’t that what it would be if Ukraine backs away from restoring its pre-2014 borders?