The Truth About Afghanistan

Obama Administration national security advisor Susan Rice takes to the pages of the New York Times with an op-ed outlining the alternatives for U. S. policy in Afghanistan. After acknowledging that the Obama Administration erred in its “Afghan surge”:

The fact is the Taliban remain strong, controlling or contesting over a third of the country. Their share continues to grow slowly, despite persistent Afghan and American efforts to weaken them. The early Obama-era surge to 100,000 United States troops, plus the infusion of an additional 40,000 troops from NATO nations, did not defeat or even permanently debilitate the Taliban.

during which period most of the U. S. casualties were incurred, she goes on to outline three potential courses of action for the United States:

First, the Trump administration could refocus its objectives, returning to the previous administration’s more limited goal of fighting foreign terrorists and providing training, equipment and advice, but not direct combat support, to help the Afghan government control Kabul and other cities. This would enable a reduction in United States forces, while protecting the American diplomatic presence in Kabul and preventing Afghanistan from re-emerging as a major terrorist safe haven. This approach would probably slow, but not halt, the progress of the Taliban.

Second, the United States could withdraw its forces, on the premise that it cannot “win” in Afghanistan. This would leave Afghanistan and the United States vulnerable to a reinvigorated terrorist presence and, perhaps, the replacement of the American-led presence by Russia, Iran, China or India.

In this scenario, the Kabul government would most likely lose more territory to the Taliban and eventually fall. Arguably, the deaths of more than 2,400 American servicemen and women would have been in vain. This choice conjures haunting images of the United States retreat from Saigon in 1975, and no American president has yet been willing to accept this scenario.

Finally, the United States could acknowledge and resolve that its presence in Afghanistan is essentially permanent — but in doing so, it should understand the cost. The United States will stay at whatever troop level our commanders deem necessary to combat terrorists and prop up the Kabul government. Mr. Trump has, in effect, chosen this option at an annual cost of at least $45 billion and about 15,000 American troops. But this approach will not result in the military defeat of the Taliban.

We have had three consecutive administrations that have lied to the American people about the real prospects for Afghanistan. Afghanistan has never been a viable state and in all likelihood will never become one. It doesn’t have and cannot support a military capable of defending its borders against incursions either by the Taliban or “terrorists”.

The alternatives we have for Afghanistan are actually two. We can leave or we can stay. In either case the president must summon up the moral and political courage to tell the truth about Afghanistan. If we leave, we must be prepared to engage in punitive bombing raids with the potential of killing many, many civilians, raids which might need to be repeated over and over with increasing levels of ferocity. If we stay, we must be prepared for the expenses in lives, money, and time that will entail.