The Fog of War

The editors of the Washington Post declaim that a Ukrainian victory is imminent in Ukraine:

In the face of stiff Ukrainian resistance — bolstered by timely and massive shipments of Western arms — Russia has retreated from Kharkiv, the second-largest city in Ukraine, reportedly, in some areas, all the way back to the international border Mr. Putin sought to erase. Russia has “likely abandoned the objective of completing a large-scale encirclement of Ukrainian units” in eastern Ukraine, the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War reported Sunday. It now appears to be aiming to take, at most, the entirety of a single Ukrainian region, Luhansk.

And even that might be beyond the capability of Russia’s depleted, poorly led forces. Quite the contrary: The more likely next game changer in this war would be a widening Ukrainian counteroffensive that brought still more of the Russian-held south and east of Ukraine back under the control of its legitimate government. Certainly that is the result that would do the most to compound the strategic defeat of Mr. Putin, and that Ukraine’s supporters in the United States, Europe and elsewhere should therefore be pursuing in unison.

Now is not the time, therefore, to go for a negotiated cease-fire between Ukraine and Russia, as France, Germany and Italy have proposed in recent days. Their desire to shorten this destructive war — and thus limit the damage both to Ukraine and to their own hard-pressed economies — is understandable. Their promises not to impose terms on Kyiv are undoubtedly well intentioned. Still, the risks of relaxing the pressure on Mr. Putin before he is thoroughly beaten, and maybe not even then, are too high.

Meanwhile at 1945 Daniel Davis provides a more sobering assessment:

If Kyiv has hopes of eventually winning the war, it will need to make some significant changes in its approach to the fighting in the near term. It will also need to develop a new plan for the longer term. Kyiv must continue to hold in the Donbas while simultaneously starting the process of building an offensive force with the capacity to push Russian troops from its soil.

As I have written many times in these pages – both before the war started and since it began – I assess the most logical course of action for Kyiv is to make the best deal it can with Moscow and end the war through negotiations. That is the best way to stop the fighting, end the killing of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, and halt the destruction of still more Ukrainian cities.

Yes, that would result in the likely loss of the Donbas, but it would prevent tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands more Ukrainians from being killed, allowing the rebuilding of the country to begin. Negotiations would prevent Putin from escalating the war, thus precluding an even worse outcome for Kyiv later.

But as both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, said following the May 9 Victory Day commemorations, many Ukrainians would rather continue fighting. No matter how long it takes or how much risk they incur, Ukraine would like to win back all of the territory Russia has occupied.

Attempting to retake all lost territory by force of arms will certainly impose a high cost on Ukraine, and there is no guarantee of eventual success. If the people of Ukraine decide they are willing to take on this burden, however, there is a path to ultimate victory.

which he follows with a rather detailed prescription of the steps that the Ukrainian forces should take.

11 comments… add one
  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    Compare and contrast two headlines about the same event in Mariupol.

    “Ukraine ends bloody battle for Mariupol, evacuates fighters in steel plant” — Washington Post

    “Fate of hundreds of Ukrainian fighters uncertain after surrender” — Al Jazeera

    If the Washington Post existed on July 4, 1863, would they have printed the headline; “Confederacy ends bloody battle for Vicksburg, evacuate fighters in city”?

    This comment is not to place Mariupol with Vicksburg in terms of importance to the war; although the amount of blood / material expended on both sides to win it indicates both viewed it as strategic.

    The point is the pre-requisite to Ukraine / NATO plans to “win” the war is an honest, realistic, sober assessment of the situation. When the Washington Post and other Western media will not fulfill that role, how does that impact decision makers in Congress, the administration, and NATO capitals?

    To quote Sun Tzu; “If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle”.

  • As I have been whinging about for some time the amount of disinformation regarding the Russian-Ukraine War is prodigious, not only from Russia and Ukraine but from the U. S. I honestly don’t know how anyone can predict victory confidently.

  • steve Link

    What would be the plan of Davis the next time Russia invades? Give them another piece of the country? For sure, If the primary goal of Ukraine is to minimize deaths they should just give Russia what it wants. If Russia invades us we could do the same.

    Say Ukraine gives Donbas to Russia. As I understand it the pro-Russian faction is actually a minority. What’s the minimum percentage of “Russians” in an area needed to justify a Russian invasion?

    “Negotiations would prevent Putin from escalating the war”

    Hmmm. I thought Russia agreed to Ukraine’s safety when Ukraine gave up its nukes. Exactly why should Ukraine trust Russia?

    I agree there is too much misinformation. Both sides should stop it. I vote Russia goes first.

    Steve

  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    “What would be the plan of Davis the next time Russia invades?”

    I’d ask what’s your plan. Any plan needs to start with deal with these facts.

    1) Economic production is acknowledged to be the basis of military strength. Ukraine already had a pre-war GDP 1/10th of Russia’s, GDP per capita of 1/3 of Russia. The war has caused Ukraine’s GDP to decline by 50% and Ukraine’s government says it requires $600 billion to rebuild.

    2) The military-industrial complex Ukraine is in ruins (that’s why it is asking for NATO arms).

    3) Roughly 10-20% of its pre-war population has left, Ukraine isn’t Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria, where birth rates were above replacement levels. It has been drained of its human capital to a much worse degree then Russia.

    I can’t come up with an easy answer.

    My honest assessment of the war is the longer it drags on, the more everybody that’s involved in it (directly or by proxy) will lose.

  • Grey Shambler Link
  • steve Link

    “I’d ask what’s your plan.”

    Sure. Step 1- We start by reducing the incentives for Russia to invade again. Make sure the costs for this attack are as high as we can reasonably make them. Ukraine needs to decide how much and how long it wants to fight but we go ahead and make sure the EU doesnt need Russian oil and gas. That still leaves China and Russia for sales but Russia wont get as much out of that. Cut other trade as much as possible also. Russia can survive but it wont prosper with the 20-30 years behind technology it has in so many areas.

    Looks like Davis and maybe you want to bypass this step?

    “My honest assessment of the war is the longer it drags on, the more everybody that’s involved in it (directly or by proxy) will lose.”

    That’s pretty much every war.

    Steve

    Steve

  • I don’t have a problem with reducing the economic incentives for Russia to go to war but I think you’re overestimating their importance and how effective they can be. How do we impose effective economic sanctions on Russia without imposing them on Russia’s major trading partners? Russia’s main customer for its wheat is Egypt. It’s largest customers for oil and gas are China, Belarus, Germany, and Netherlands. Here’s another example: imagine that Russia sells oil to Serbia and Serbia sells that oil to Germany.

    Reducing the economic incentives to go to war while increasing all of the other incentives will probably have perverse consequences.

  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    As a critique; national security motivations will always trump economic motivations — as an example, look at Australia’s deteriorating relations with its number one trade partner, China. This war makes it likely there will be another war since it validated the national security concerns Russia had with respect to Ukraine alignment with NATO.

    From a Russian hawk viewpoint; they would note
    Ukraine can fire ballistic missiles deep into Russian territory
    Ukraine can challenge the Russian navy in the Black Sea, and endanger Sevastopol
    Ukraine has access to Western weapons, intelligence as if it was a NATO member
    Ukraine claims Crimea, which is a part of the Russian Federation according to the Russian government

    Also, the strategy listed doesn’t address my point #1. Suppose the EU doesn’t buy Russian energy so Russia’s GDP goes down 10%. Ukraine’s economy is still down 50%. That means in relative terms Ukraine is now weaker vs Russia after the war then before the war — which means a 2nd war would favor Russia more than this war.

    PS: Has anyone done an honest assessment about the economic strategy the West has done during the war. It hasn’t failed but it hasn’t gone to expectations either — recall Biden stated the Russian economy would be cut in half, the Ruble rate would be 200 rubles to a dollar, its stock market would be disbanded… none of those things has happened. I note that the NSC official responsible for the sanctions left the government for “family matters”.

  • It depends on your operative definition of “honest assessment”. Here are four different assessments:

    Congressional Research Service
    Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
    Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
    Vox.com

    My intuition is that the sanctions need to be considered in a different way. Are they isolating Russia and punishing it by imposing pain on it or are they isolating the G7 and imposing pain on them?

  • steve Link

    “This war makes it likely there will be another war since it validated the national security concerns Russia had with respect to Ukraine alignment with NATO.”

    No it did not. Russia validated Ukraine’s concerns about not belonging to NATO.

    Steve

  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    How did it not do so — are any of the 4 facts I stated incorrect?

    It is correct that Russia validated Ukraine’s desire to have an article 5 security guarantee. The problem is to have war requires only one party. To have peace requires 2 parties.

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