David Kilcullen has a high level overview of the coming invasion of Gaza by Israel at Foreign Affairs. Here’s a sample:
Hamas is a technologically enabled, socially embedded force fighting on its home terrain. Its fighters operate in small networked teams that are armed with lethal weapon systems of the kind that, in recent memory, were largely only available to the armed forces of nation-states. Hamas’s tactics are likely to involve network defense: holding strongpoints to delay and disrupt IDF advances while keeping mobile forces in reserve, ready to counterattack or re-infiltrate cleared areas. They will make extensive use of military off-the-shelf weapons as well as booby traps and improvised explosive devices. Hamas has also already demonstrated its ability to fight a sophisticated information war to mobilize international support.
What started as a horrific attack on Israeli civilians, exploiting shock and surprise, is now likely to congeal into a grinding, slow, contentious, and costly battle in the air, on land, on the sea, and in cyberspace. In Gaza’s complex, cluttered, heavily populated and densely urbanized environment, it will be extraordinarily difficult to make sense of what is happening, even for those on the ground. The effect of emerging technologies, the enduring features of urban combat as identified by NATO—friction, density, complexity, and all-directional threats—along with the physical, human, informational, and infrastructure constraints that cities impose on military forces will all inform what is about to unfold.
Understanding the tactical difficulty of urban warfare adds context that Israel can use to evaluate the wisdom (or otherwise) of any full-scale ground assault in Gaza. IDF planners are likely concerned that once their forces are decisively committed to ground combat in Gaza, other regional players—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian-backed militias in Syria, or Iranian forces themselves—might attack Israel, creating a multifront war. This possibility might prompt Israel to mount a preemptive strike on regional players before entering Gaza, but such a strike would be a high-stakes gamble.
I don’t really have a lot to add to that article which I recommend. The present conflict began with a multi-pronged surprise attack. I doubt that will be the last surprise in the conflict.
Nice piece. Have liked him for a while. Israel has avoided a ground attack in Gaza with the goal of eliminating Hamas, I believe, because the costs are too high. Kilcullen lays those out. The easy availability of drones now may make things even worse. However, as he notes in the ending it’s what they need to do if they want to try to eliminate Hamas. Otherwise, it’s just back to the revenge loop.
Steve
One big factor in addition to the standard urban terrain difficulties, is/will be Hamas’ tunnel network.
I have an odd sort of secondhand connection with him. His godmother is a close family friend.
As I’ve suggested my prediction at this point is that the Israelis will start their invasion in an attempt at ending Hamas but as the costs mount they’ll reconsider that goal.