I see that in his Washington Post op-ed Stephen Hadley continues to sustain the fantasy that creating a stable state in Afghanistan is within our powers:
The United States has vital national interests in Afghanistan. Since 9/11, preventing another terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland has remained our key objective. While the cost in lives and treasure has been too high, this objective has largely been achieved. But it has required a sustained U.S. troop presence, the active participation of our NATO allies and a close partnership with the Afghan government.
If the Trump administration now opts to draw down U.S. military forces, the NATO allies would go home and the Afghan state would likely collapse. The result would be a victory for the terrorists. It would undo the Trump administration’s recent success against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and provide the Islamic State a haven in Afghanistan from which to foment attacks on the United States.
Instead, the Trump administration can deliver another major blow against terrorism. The Islamic State and al-Qaeda seek to expand their presence in Afghanistan, but virtually none of the Afghan groups — including the Taliban — support them. They can be defeated in Afghanistan just as they are being pushed out of Iraq and Syria. This natural extension of the Iraq/Syria campaign would help consolidate the victory against the Islamic State. But it will require U.S. counterterrorism forces to continue operating alongside Afghan security forces.
The challenge will then be to preserve the victory and help the Afghan people stabilize their country so that the Islamic State and al-Qaeda do not return. This can be done with a political/diplomatic strategy that seeks an inclusive settlement among all Afghan political factions while creating a more legitimate, popularly supported government that addresses the conflict’s root causes.
However, it is this passage that caught my attention:
The big question is what to do about the Taliban. The answer: Test its interest in peace.
Defeating terrorist groups that threaten the United States does not include or require defeating the Taliban. The United States and NATO must make clear that they will fully support an Afghan-led political settlement involving all sectors of Afghan society — including the Taliban.
Is it merely that largely secularized Americans are incapable of understanding religious conviction? The Taliban are not liberal democratic politicians. For the Taliban to compromise is to relinquish what they believe their religion admonishes them to do. They aren’t interested in peace; they are interested in righteousness, in salvation.
And they aren’t going anywhere. There will be people in Afghanistan who hold beliefs like those of today’s Taliban for far the foreseeable future, possibly for as long as there are human beings in Afghanistan.
I agree with Mr. Hadley that our primary goals in Afghanistan should be counterterrorism. Propping up the Afghan government isn’t counterterrorism—it’s counterinsurgency.
Update
The editors of the Washington Post, unsurprisingly, share Mr. Hadley’s fantasies:
Mr. Trump should chose a strategy with a clear, limited goal: shore up the Afghan government, help it gain greater legitimacy and strengthen its security forces. The point is not some kind of flashy victory but avoiding a terrible defeat. Achieving stability in Afghanistan is worth a modest commitment of U.S. troops, Special Operations forces and air power. A major surge of the size that President Barack Obama approved early in his first term is not being discussed. The point is to show the Taliban that it can’t topple the central government, and coax the Taliban, if possible, toward negotiations. Maybe the Taliban will never agree, but a continued U.S. effort is preferable to Afghanistan falling apart.
There is an alternative other than “abandoning Afghanistan” or continuing with the futile dream of a stable Afghan government but it is deeply unpopular and difficult for politicians to swallow. That’s why they hold on to visions of triumphant returns home accompanied by victory parades.
There hasn’t been a stable Afghanistan for over half a century, and there won’t be one for the foreseeable future. The best we can do is prevent the Taliban from returning to power. They had their chance and it went miserably. Also, they have not disassociated from al Qaeda and I doubt they ever will. Any talk of rapprochement with these militant Islamists is the real fantasy.
What would we do differently from the present if our goal is counter terrorism vs counter insurgency? Would it require more, same, or less forces in Afghanistan?
As long as they a) stop fighting us and b) don’t invite Al Qaeda or DAESH in, we’d stop fighting the Taliban. Nearly all of the U. S. men and women who’ve been killed have been lost fighting the Taliban. Fighting the Taliban is a fool’s errand. The Taliban doesn’t have a fixed membership list. It’s just composed of people who agree on certain things.
We’d need to maintain a military force in Afghanistan for counterterrorism, what Ralph Peters has called a “compact, lethal force”. We’d have bases. We’d establish safe areas around our bases. That’s basically it.
It’s basically what Rory Stewart has been recommending for the last 15 years.
Victory in Afghanastan is one of the few things in life, or policy, that I think are just about impossible to talk me into. Ain’t gonna happen.
You make an interesting point about religious fanaticism. No, many can’t fathom its influence. But it holds for all the Muslim issues we confront. You have regular people, the just plain evil and the religious nuts. You have the evil everywhere, but the religious driven seems a problem that dominates only in Islam, today.
It’s fascinating that the public discourse is of (in many cases feigned) horror at bizarre people like white supremacists, but many of the same people can’t see the same or bear to hear about the same in Islam. I guess some evil and philosophically demented are better than others.
No Guarneri, with Islam, they see it, and fear it. For good reason. See Charlie Hebdo.
And also, the KKK is lynching no one these days, they’re toothless, and fair game, not so, ISIS.
Thank you for the explanation Dave. I buy most of the idea. The only strategic issue I see (vs a political one) is what to do if neither (a) or (b) happens. I think there’s a non-substantial chance that the Taliban won’t quit attacking until the US/Nato are driven out — even if US/Nato stopped attacking.
I don’t buy the idea that we will be able to keep small contingents of troops there w/o major problems. Expect suicide bombers and maths whenever you leave the base. Expect a major loss of US life and then a call to escalate.
Steve