Strategic Failure

Anthony Cordesman issues a broadside against the Obama Administration’s foreign policy:

This administration does face an extraordinary mix of challenges, ones it cannot easily prioritize and certainly cannot afford to simplify, spin, and ignore. These challenges include the broad need for changes in the U.S. and allied force posture and strategy in Europe and Asia. They also include dealing with a broad series of actual conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, where the United States must rely on strategic partners to an extraordinary degree.

There often are no good options, no ways to shape even the near-term outcome with a high probability of success, and no ways to eliminate uncertainty and the need to react. At the same time, this overview of U.S. challenges shows again and again that the United States has relied far too much on concepts and rhetoric and failed to develop and implement credible strategic plans, provide the required resources, and create that kind of transparency that can win congressional and public support.

The short version of his post is that every foreign policy issue the Obama Administration has touched has turned to crud. In the lengthy post he outlines all of the present debacles in turn and explains the lack of strategic vision that lead to the problems at hand.

I find myself in the unusual position of being more optimistic than the author. I think that the U. S. policy of infantilization of its allies that has been our dominant strategy at least since the end of the Cold War has always been defective. The reality is that other countries have interests, too. They should be expected to follow them and we shouldn’t be expected to effectuate their interests for them. If they’re not willing to back up their interests, they’re not really interests.

I don’t view the reassertion of their interests by regional powers as a disaster but as an inevitability. Germany will always be powerful country in the middle of Europe. There is nothing we can do to stop Russia from being a regional superpower. Iran will be a major power in West Asia. China will want to pursue its interests in East Asia.

In addition there will be friction between Germany and Russia, Between Russia and Iran, between Russia and China, between China and India, and between China and Japan. We can’t stop that and we shouldn’t want to. Our interest should be in preventing these frictions from turning into war and, failing that, from turning into nuclear war.

We need to consider where our interests actually lie with a dispassionate eye. We can’t consider being the only power in the world as one of those interests. That’s just beyond our capabilities.

6 comments… add one
  • steve Link

    This idea that we can force or coerce every other country in the world to do exactly what we want seems to be uniquely American and completely wrong. I suppose we could get partway to that goal if we were willing to spend a lot more money and lives, but there is no guarantee things would be better. Sometimes we make things worse.

    I think we certainly could have done better in the Ukraine. Pushing NATO to their doorstep was a bad idea. We weren’t willing to go to war over the place, and why push economic unification in a place that is so poor, corrupt and tied to the Russians. We broke Iraq and there is no way we can fix it. We couldn’t make the Sunni and Shia get along while we occupied the country and we don’t know how to do it now. Syria we should just stay out of.

    On China I think you are correct. The old Cold War warriors want China weak like it was in the old days. It is unrealistic to think that with their economic growth they will not also want to play the role of regional power.

    I agree that we need to determine our interests and advance or protect them.

    Query- I think he worries too much about terrorism. We spend way too much money and lives on this given the real threat it represents. What do you think?

    Steve

  • jan Link

    In earlier eras nations could isolate themselves from the rest of the world with fewer concerns of blow-back from such disengagement. However, with all the military and technological advancements this is no longer the case, IMO. What happens in the ME, or any other part of the world, can come back to haunt us in any number of ways, be it cyber/biological/EMP/terrorist attacks, border infiltrations, currency manipulation, trade disruptions, etc.. In fact, there are so many ways the United States’ well being is tied to the well being of it’s global cohabitants that I personally don’t believe simply “minding our own business” is a viable option — at least in the long run. Basically, we need to strike a balance dealing with our participation in world matters, as well as maintain a strong image of power which can act as a constraining line for those countries wanting to test their limits of power.

    We broke Iraq and there is no way we can fix it.

    Going into Iraq proved to be mistake — at least when looking into the rearview mirror of geopolitical outcomes. However, once errors are made, much like when we take a wrong turn on a road trip, recalculations are required. IOW, the current administration should have renegotiated it’s SOFA agreement with Iraq, listening to it’s military and foreign policy advisors, in order to maintain a greater stabilizing force on the ground. Remember, when the U.S. left Iraq Biden/Obama were eager to initially take credit for a fairly well-functioning Iraq, as part of spinning a positive foreign policy legacy on behalf of Obama. However, as soon as Iraq begin to fail, and ISIS surprisingly (to mainly the WH) became a lethal menace in Iraq, they quickly reverted to the old remedy of Blame Bush, rather than be accountable for their own years of myopic strategy, meager oversight, and inadequate, ideologically-based leadership decisions in that country.

  • steve:

    I would have approached securing the country against terrorism very differently than the Bush Administration did. I’ve written so much on that subject over the years I hardly want to rehash it.

    Although I think that our fears of terrorism are exaggerated, I think that Europe’s concerns and, even more so, Israel’s are substantial. They have real problems ahead of them and I don’t honestly know how they’ll deal with them. To date their approach has largely consisted of “Let Uncle Sam do it.” Now they’re being forced to reconsider.

  • TastyBits Link

    If I understand correctly, the president who f*cked up Iraq and knew that if he signed the 50 year deal needed to unf*ck what he had f*cked refused to sign the deal because he knew that his party would be out of power for the next 50 years. This was the hero of the 21st century. This the man that all parents want their sons to be like.

    Shirking responsibility has become the 21st century’s highest character trait. What a wonderful world.

    Newsflash for the delusional hawks: During the Cold War, the US had enough active duty military and equipment to fight two wars simultaneously plus the Reserves & National Guard to protect the States. (Nobody called it the homeland.) Units would be on alert (48hrs.) for rapid deployment into a hot zone. (Not as a tripwire, but for a full-blown holding/blocking position as follow-on troops were brought in.)

    Russia and China are somehow supposed to be intimidated by the US, but President Reagan could not even intimidate Grenada. Honestly, Grenada, Cuba, Venezuela, N. Korea, Sudan, Somalia, and every other sh*thole in the world is not intimidated by the US, but two of the largest nuclear powers are supposed to quake whenever the US president farts.

  • steve Link

    jan- So how long would you suggest we occupy Iraq? How long before the Sunnis and Shia get along well together in that area of the world?

    Steve

  • Andy Link

    That’s a good and depressing article. We have no strategy to speak of and the further we get from the Cold War the more apparent that fact becomes.

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