Sharing the Concern

Washington Post columnists are similarly concerned. After noting that the Russia-Ukraine War has passed the “opening salvo” point and entered the longer, more deliberate phase of each side attempting to “gain advantage on the battlefield”. He, too, urges us to redouble our efforts. “Redouble” seems to be the word of the day:

While there are real limits to how much the Ukrainians can absorb, Washington (and its allies in Europe and elsewhere) must redouble their efforts. They also need to help Ukraine break the Russian blockade around Odessa. People have focused on the collapse of the Russian economy, which will probably shrink by about 11 percent this year. But Ukraine’s economy is likely to contract by a staggering 45 percent in 2022. Unless the country can export its grain out of its Black Sea ports, it could face economic calamity for years to come.

While I’m glad that he, at least, acknowledges that there are actual limits to the degree to which the Ukrainians can make productive use of equipment or training, I remain unconvinced that we are able to accomplish the breaking of the “Russian blockade”. My recollection is that wargames of U. S. naval action in relatively cramped quarters have tended not to go well for us. And will the Turks allow transit? The Montreux Convention limits what we can do there and gives the Turks broad discretion. In my view the Turks have not provided full-throated support to NATO efforts in the Russia-Ukraine War. Just to cite one example, Turkey has provided no aid to the Ukrainians to date.

He reiterates a point I have made:

In the short term, this favors Russia. It has taken control of much of Donbas. And because the West hasn’t completely banned Russia’s energy exports, the Russian government has actually profited during this war. Bloomberg projects Russia’s oil and gas revenue for this year will be about $285 billion, compared with $236 billion last year. Meanwhile, it can now thwart Ukraine’s ability to export.

but he’s more sanguine than I about the prospects for the economic sanctions working in the future:

In the longer term, one has to hope that the sanctions will hit Russia harder as the war goes on. At the same time, Ukraine has massive Western assistance, high morale and a willingness to fight to the end.

I think the opposite is more likely. For practical purposes only the G7 countries are imposing sanctions and even those continue to buy Russian oil and gas; the remaining countries of the world have no imposed sanctions. He also fails to mention the possibility of the Russians interdicting our supplies to the Ukrainians.

Finally, he gets around to his real point—we (meaning Ukraine, the U. S., and the EU) need to decide on the “endgame”:

In the final phase of the war, the West — and the United States in particular — become the pivotal players. Right now Russia is battling Ukraine directly. But if and when the conflict becomes something of a stalemate, the real struggle will be between Russia and the West. What will Russia give to get a relaxation of sanctions? What will the West demand to end Russia’s isolation?

So far, Washington has punted on this, explaining that it is up to the Ukrainians to decide what they want and that Washington will not negotiate over their heads. That’s the right message of public support, but Ukraine and its Western partners need to formulate a set of common war aims, coordinating strategy around them, gaining international support and using all the leverage they have to succeed. The goal must be an independent Ukraine, in full control of at least as much territory as it had before Feb. 24, and with some security commitments from the West.

The alternative to some kind of negotiated settlement would be an unending war in Ukraine, which would further devastate that country and its people, more than 5 million of whom have already fled. And the resulting disruptions to energy supplies, food and the economy would spiral everywhere, with political turmoil intensifying across the globe. Surely it is worth searching for an endgame that avoids this bleak future.

It is on that turmoil “across the globe” that David Ignatius focuses in his column:

Global food shortages are a largely invisible consequence of the Ukraine war, whose combatants happen to be two of the world’s largest grain exporters. The ripple effect in global markets is just beginning. But a senior White House official warns that unless steps are taken quickly, the war could trigger “a potential mass starvation event.”

The numbers are frightening. Samantha Power, the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, estimates that the conflict has blocked export of 30 percent of the world’s wheat and barley. The Center for Global Development predicts that price spikes for food and energy will push 40 million people into extreme poverty and food insecurity. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reports that global food prices are 30 percent higher than a year ago.

The world’s food supply “has quite literally been held hostage by the Russian military,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken told the United Nations last month. He described Ukrainian farmers attempting to harvest their crops wearing helmets and bulletproof vests.

I’m left a bit confused by his column. Russia is actually a larger exporter of both wheat and barley (not to mention fertilizer) than Ukraine. Is it Russia’s blocking Ukrainian exports of wheat and barley, the Russian embargo on trade with the EU, or some of both that are causing the problem?