Jason Sigger of Armchair Generalist has offered a clear-sighted contribution to the discussion of nuclear weapons capability that concentrates on establishing a basis for determining how many nuclear weapons in the U. S. nuclear arsenal is the right number. He also emphasizes the importance of extending our deterrence policy to chemical and biological weapons. Here’s the meat of his proposals:
To summarize: The current “new triad†strategy articulates a correct approach to retaining a strategic deterrence capability against adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. The number of nuclear weapons should be adequate to 1) influence Russia, China, and two regional actors from considering first-strikes against US interests; and 2) protect US allies from nuclear attack. Plans ought to be realistic and avoid excessive multiple targeting of single sites to ensure success (standard AF target planning). This number will be classified, but the methodology needs to be articulated clearly.
We should invest in non-nuclear strike capabilities to the fullest extent possible, and maintain a minimal R&D effort in nuclear warhead reliability, safety, and efficacy (i.e., no RRW until it’s clear when current warheads will become unreliable). The DoE labs are an important resource that ought to be utilized to research both nuclear and non-nuclear global strike and defense capabilities. We ought to pull back on the idea of a global missile defense capability (specifically, plans for sites in Europe) and instead invest those funds into increased regional military/economic security discussions.
The US government should redouble its diplomatic efforts in nonproliferation and regional engagement. The NPT remains a noble vision toward which the US government ought to pursue, in that it will continue negotiations with nuclear states on reducing stockpiles and opening communications to reduce the chance of an aggressive action. Any ambiguity as to the US employment of nuclear weapons ought to be removed, to include articulating that non-nuclear states that attack US interests or allies with chemical or biological weapons will be engaged with non-nuclear strike weapons. Last, the US government must engage Israel, Pakistan, and India as seriously as Iran and North Korea on the issues of reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles and reducing the chance of a nuclear exchange.
Although I sense that I am more cynical over the prospects for total nuclear disarmament than J is, suspecting that overemphasizing disarmament over deterrence leads to feckless political agitation for total unilateral nuclear disarmament, I think it’s mostly a difference in emphasis. I especially like J’s start at determining the size of a prudent arsenal, his emphasis on clarity in policy, and evenhandedness. If there’s an area of disagreement it’s probably that I think that our diplomatic efforts are best focused on Russia, encouraging a joint approach to reducing the practicality of nuclear weapons for small nuclear or presently non-nuclear states. But I think that J’s is a very worthy contribution.
