Puzzled

I’m puzzled by Thomas Fazi’s latest piece at UnHerd. It purports to claim that NATO and Ukraine cannot win a prolonged war of attrition and simultaneously to assume that it will. Here’s what I think is the kernel of the piece:

The prospect of an Afghanistan-style war of attrition is worrying for a number of reasons. Firstly, because, if Ukraine had little chance of winning a blitzkrieg-style counteroffensive, it has even less chance of winning a long-term war of attrition, given Russia’s advantage in manpower and its ability to produce more artillery and ammunitions than Ukraine and the West combined (Russia’s current ammunition production is seven times greater than that of the West). “If the war goes on for long enough with this intensity, Ukraine’s losses will become unbearable,” a senior French official told the Wall Street Journal in February.

And second, because as the conflict drags on, and potentially escalates, direct Nato involvement in the conflict — and thus the risk of an all-out war between Nato and Russia — will inevitably increase. Europeans should be especially worried by the prospect of a long war: if American military assistance starts to wane, Europe will need to carry more of the burden. Indeed, it would appear that the EU has already taken its cue from events on the other side of the Atlantic. On Monday, two days after the no-deal in the US Congress, the EU’s foreign ministers paid a surprise visit to Kyiv to express their unwavering support for Ukraine.

Why does he think that, if the U. S. curtails its support for Ukraine, Europe, i.e. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, will pick up the slack? His conclusion directly contradicts that:

If this seems foolish, let alone dangerous, we can find some solace in the fact that reality would appear to be standing in the way of this plan. There is, after all, simply no way for the EU to plug the gap — in military, financial or political terms — if Washington scales back its support. For those of us who yearn for peace, the EU’s dysfunction might be, for once, a silver lining.

Doesn’t experience tell us that Germany and France, in particular, are more likely to seek some sort of accommodation with Russia rather than picking up the slack should the U. S. end support for Ukraine?

My view continues to be that we should continue to support the Ukrainians but that we should audit Ukraine’s use of our support more closely and use whatever leverage our support provides to encourage the Ukrainians to settle for some armistice short of their stated strategic objectives. As to Ukraine’s objective of ensuring long-lasting security, I think that’s impossible and know of no realistic proposals for accomplishing it.