At ASPI Strategist Iain MacGillivray analyzes the prospects for Turkey after Erdogan and ultimately decides that it’s not Erdogan it’s Turkey:
A common argument among Turkey analysts is that if Erdogan and his executive presidential system, à la Turka, were replaced, Turkey’s ills would also disappear. But unravelling Erdogan’s influence is unlikely to be that simple. Would his departure mean that Turkey would go back to being a stalwart ally, polarisation would decrease and democracy would return? The answer is yes, and no.
According to recent polling, the AKP’s support oscillates around 35%. This suggests that the polarising, nationalist rhetoric that Erdogan employs is part of a bigger cultural shift that has been happening for decades.
With the 1980 coup, the military junta ushered in an ideological and cultural movement that sought to merge nationalist and Islamic elements of Turkish culture and politics. Its current manifestation, Turkish Islamic nationalism, is a reimagining of this original synthesis and is promoted by ultranationalist elements in Turkish society and, more recently, by the AKP and Erdogan.
Through AKP-controlled media, education and political discourse, Turkish Islamic nationalism has had a transformative effect on Turkish civil society. It manifests in a populist, nationalist and nativist understanding of Turkish culture and politics.
There are already individuals who are being groomed as potential leaders of the AKP after Erdogan goes. Possible contenders for leadership in a post-Erdogan Turkey include two key names, Erdogan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak and Minister for the Interior Suleyman Soylu, who represent two different sides of the same coin of this populist and nativist form of politics.
In a post-Erdogan Turkey with an AKP or opposition successor, it’s highly unlikely we’ll see any immediate change in its foreign policy. Turkey has shown itself to be an independent actor in the region, inclined to use force to bring its interests to the table. It is no longer anchored to an East or West orientation and views itself able to move multidimensionally in its neighbourhood and beyond.
It can’t be emphasized enough. Kemalist Turkey was an ally. Post-Kemalist Turkey is an ally in name only. It’s actually an adversary as it has demonstrated to us, the UK, France, Greece, and other NATO allies. Fear that it will make common cause with Russia assumes that it actually has common interests with Russia. The only common interest it has with Russia is opposition to U. S. imperialism in the region, with good reason. Its differences with Russia far outweigh its common interests as any student of Russian history and politics could tell you.
The same is true in spades with respect to Iran. We should have no fear of Turkey joining forces with Iran or that Russia, Turkey, and Iran will join forces. Russia is more feared by both Turkey and Iran than we will ever be.
