The Saudi Purge

Like most others I have no idea what the purge that has taken place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia means or what its implications are. Here’s what Pat Lang says:

IMO what we are seeing here is the consolidation of power within the Salman branch of the Sudairi side of the Saudi royal family.

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IMO this purge is intended to achieve the intimidation or removal of those who are the crown princes’ rivals on the secular side of Saudi society. Mit’ab bin Abdullah was the head of SANG, a non MODA armed force for decades. Bin Talal is a major financial power in the world.

If there is not a successful coup against the crown prince in the next days, his follow up move will probably be to purge the Shia clergy of the Eastern Province.

I wish that John Burgess were still active. I’m holding my water until more knowledgeable people comment.

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What Are the Implications?

If a study from the Bank of England is to be believed, the “nominal risk-free interest rate” has not been lower in my lifetime nor in my grandfather’s lifetime nor in his grandfather’s lifetime, and so on going back more than 30 generations. That’s got to have implications. What are they?

If they persist at this low a level for an extended period of time, the obvious implication is that everybody’s instincts will be wrong.

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Entrenched

I’m hearing all sorts of breathless reports of polls showing that Trump’s job approval is falling. Nonetheless, if you look at the RealClearPolitcs average of polls it’s right where it’s been for the last several months which, ironically, is just about where it was on election day 2016. Trump’s approval among Republicans is around 80% while his approval among Democrats and independents is in the cellar.

As long as that’s the case President Trump should have no concern of impeachment. If you’re banking on removing Trump via impeachment, reconsider.

None of the foregoing should be construed as support of Trump. I didn’t vote for him in 2016; I disapprove of him now. I’m just pointing out what should be obvious but apparently eludes a lot of otherwise intelligent people.

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In What Capacity Is Lawrence Summers Speaking?

In his Washington Post op-ed in opposition to the Republican tax reform plan, Lawrence Summers combines good reasons for that opposition with bad ones or, at least hard to justify ones:

There are three aspects of the proposal that I find almost inexplicable, except as an expression of the power of entrenched interests.

First, what is the rationale for passing tax cuts that increase the deficit by $1.5 trillion in this decade and potentially more in the future, instead of pursuing the kind of revenue-neutral reform adopted in 1986? There is no present need for fiscal stimulus. The national debt is already on an explosive path, even without taking into account large spending needs that are almost certain to arise in areas ranging from national security to infrastructure to addressing those left behind by globalization and technology.

Borrowing to pay for tax cuts is a way to defer pain, not avoid it. Ultimately, the power of compound interest makes necessary tax increases or spending cuts that are even larger than those tax reductions. But in the meantime, debt-financed tax cuts would raise the trade deficit and reduce investment, thereby cheating the future.

Second, what is the case for cutting the corporate tax rate to 20 percent? For at least five years under the GOP proposal, businesses would be able to write off investments in new equipment entirely in the year that those investments are made. So the government would be sharing to an equal extent in the costs of and returns from investment, eliminating any tax-induced disincentive to invest. The effective tax rate on new investment would be reduced to zero, or less, even before considering the corporate rate reduction. A corporate rate reduction serves only to reward monopoly profits, other rents or past investments. Given the trends of the past few years, are shareholders really the most worthy recipients of such a windfall?

Proponents of the House approach defend it by pointing to international considerations. Unfortunately, the “territorial” approach being pushed by the House, which would renounce the objective of taxing the global income of U.S. companies, could easily encourage offshore production. Wouldn’t it be much better for the United States to lead an initiative to prevent a race to the bottom in global corporate taxation than for it to try to win a race to the bottom?

Third, why include new complexities that help the richest taxpayers while taking steps that hurt middle-income families? Why should passive owners of businesses that are already avoiding the corporate tax get a big rate reduction to 25 percent when those who actually operate and work in such businesses pay at a higher rate? What is the rationale for eliminating the estate tax when it is paid by only 0.2 percent of estates?

Whether they are good or not appears to depend on whether he’s speaking in his capacity as economist or in his capacity as politician or, alternatively, political camp follower.

The argument he expresses in his first sentence is solid from a Keynesian standpoint. You engage in deficit spending to offset the shortfall in aggregate demand during contractions. The economy has been expanding since June 2009. Consequently, using the same Keynesian argument, we should not have been exploding the debt since then. The Obama administration was in place during most of that period. I don’t recall his making that argument then. I do recall his repeatedly arguing that the amount of demand that should be offset was was $800 billion. Presumably, he was speaking in his capacity as politician then.

Each point he raises in his second “inexplicable”, e.g. lower corporate tax rate, current year expensing, merely places the U. S. on a comparable footing to other OECD countries. We’re the outlier on both of those issues with higher taxes and our byzantine depreciation system. It would make our tax code more efficient and reduce the propensity for large U. S. companies to move their headquarters out of the United States (and the HQ jobs with them). I found this:

the government would be sharing to an equal extent in the costs of and returns from investment, eliminating any tax-induced disincentive to invest

interesting. Is there actual empirical evidence that a high corporate tax rate results in higher business investment than would otherwise be the case? There’s ample evidence that it results in companies holding large cash balances overseas and engaging in rent-seeking to reduce their tax bills. That latter measure is an effective subsidy to large corporations who hire fewer new employees to the detriment of smaller, newer ones who hire more. Presumably, he’s speaking in his capacity as politician in that paragraph.

Since there are no economic argument contained in his third inexplicable, he’s presumably speaking in his political capacity there. IMO it would be very helpful if Dr. Summers were to carry two flags, one white, one blue and raise the white flag when speaking as an economist and the blue one when taking a political stand.

But that’s the point, isn’t it?

There are plenty of things to argue against in the Republican tax plan. As an economist, why not make economic arguments? And why not make economic arguments in which you didn’t take the opposite stance when Democrats were in power?

I believe that tax cuts are a slender reed on which to base one’s plans for economic growth. They may be helpful but unless much more directed won’t result in as much growth as might otherwise be the case. Given his opposition to tax cuts, I believe that Dr. Summers has a moral obligation to explain to us how he would produce more economic growth in the United States. Hundreds of government programs are already failing because their assumptions of higher growth aren’t being met. We can’t turn those programs back; we need to grow more.

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Damage Control

George Stephanopoulos interviewed or, should I say, debated with Donna Brazile on this morning’s This Week on ABC. He was clearly desperate to rationalize the unusual relationship between the Clinton campaign and the Democratic National Committee that Ms. Brazile complained about in her book, released this week. She, in her most polite Southern way, stuck to her guns and stuck up for herself, stopping short of saying he was full of it.

One of the interesting aspects of the matter is that none of the guests on the program including those with deep insider involvement with the DNC said it was untrue, merely expressed astonishment that Donna Brazile would say things that reflected so badly on the Democratic Party in public.

That seems to me to be of a piece with the reactions to the revelations from the hacked DNC emails. They didn’t deny them; the only concern was that they reflected badly on the party.

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The Black Catholic Experience

There’s an interesting article at the Atlantic on black American Catholics. Among its several interesting aspects is that it makes the claim, counter-intuitive to me, that there are more black Catholics in the United States than members of the AME Church (African Methodist Episcopal).

I don’t know whether this is actually the case but it has been my observation and experience that there is a social aspect behind black church membership in particular. As blacks rise in the social scale they go from being Baptists or AME to Catholics, Episcopalians, and Lutherans.

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The Peasants Rulers Are Revolting!

There’s a passage from a recent PBS News Hours featuring David Brooks that I think is significant. From the transcript thoughtfully provided by RealClearPolitics:

David Brooks: Yes, I don’t know about that.

But those of us who are trying to rebut populists like Trump have the disadvantage that our elites really do stink. And this is an advantage — example of that.

It was sort of an open secret that the DNC was on Hillary Clinton’s side. We saw it from the schedule of the debates all through the year. They didn’t want to have them, because they didn’t want to give Sanders the platform.

But this goes beyond what even I imagined was the level of collusion. It’s a pretty sleazy economic takeover of a party apparatus, against the bylaws of that apparatus.

It’s just not something a normal campaign that respects institutions and how things should work should do. And so they colluded, apparently, according to Donna Brazile, in a pretty major way. And if you were a Sanders person, you have every right to be completely upset.

A point Pat Lang has been making for some time is that the establishments of both political parties and their apparat, the media, and the federal bureaucracy are presently attempting what he refers to as a “soft coup”. The worst thing that could happen to the country isn’t if they should fail, as many anti-Trumpers think. It’s if they succeed because if they do we cease even having a façade of democracy and the rule of law.

What has been verified this week is that it isn’t only Donald Trump who has a lack of respect for our civil institutions and the rule of law. If Hillary Clinton had won the election, the president would have had exactly those same failings.

One of the other things I found interesting in the exchange cited above is that Mark Shields very clearly has the same take on President Obama that I did and was beaten about the head and shoulders for on several occasions: he didn’t actually like being president, doing what presidents do:

And President Obama just didn’t like politics. He didn’t like the company of politicians. The Democrats lost 979 state legislative seats, 63 House seats, 12 Senate seats. In 19 states, they lost control of both houses of legislature and the governorship during his time.

He didn’t go out and recruit. He was great himself, but not much for — he didn’t like the business. He didn’t like the company of politicians.

But here’s the critical point: President Obama had those failings, too. That’s demonstrable from the miserable record of losses his administration had in cases before the Supreme Court, in his handling of DACA, and any number of other moves by him and his administration.

If we’re going to have a government that is “of laws, not of men” as John Adams put it, we will need to care for process more or at least as much as outcomes. I think that will require lowering the stakes.

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The Insanity Bubble

At the Washington Free Beacon Matthew Continetti in a pretty good post explains why the Obama coalition fell apart and why the Democratic Party is self-destructing after their election loss, now one year ago. Here’s the concluding paragraph:

“Obama and Clinton,” writes Stan Greenberg, “lived in a cosmopolitan and professional America that wasn’t very angry about the state of the country, even if many of the groups in the Clinton coalition were struggling and angry.” But Bernie Sanders, and later Donald Trump, was angry, and offered alternatives that, however flawed, at least seemed to acknowledge the crisis. So the Obama coalition fell apart. And as long as Democrats prefer the safety of the sanity bubble to the realities of America in 2017, that coalition is not likely to be put back together anytime soon.

I’m not sure there ever was an “Obama coalition”. I think that whatever it was supported Obama personally and without Obama it couldn’t be depended on.

What I think that Mr. Continetti misses is the sense of entitlement that the technocrats that have been running the Democratic Party feel. They don’t own the positions they hold. They were put there, ultimately by people with real life needs, and catering to their most reliable supporters alone while ignoring those real people with real life needs is a ticket to Nowheresville.

A trailer in Hope, Arkansas is the real world. A posh meeting at the Marriott Marquis isn’t. It’s a bubble but not a “sanity bubble”.

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Risk Assessment

Let’s consider some major near term national risks:

  1. Major recession
  2. Nuclear exchange with North Korea
  3. Terrorist attack within the United States in which more than 100 people are killed.
  4. Environmental catastrophe (storm, earthquake, etc.) that seriously affects 10% or more of the American people and in which 1,000 or more people die.
  5. Civil war
  6. Cyberattack, solar storm, or EMP with serious real consequences which affects 10% or more of the American people and in which people die.
  7. Epidemic, particularly of some new disease.

To place some of those into perspective the fires in Northern California this year don’t qualify under D but Hurricane Katrina does.

Here are my questions. Which of those have a 50% or greater likelihood of occurring within the next 2 years? Can we mitigate the risks of any of the items in the list? Should we?

I don’t think that any of those risks have a 50% or greater likelihood and I think the only one against which we should take steps to mitigate is F.

If you can think of any other comparable disasters I haven’t mentioned, put them in comments and I’ll consider adding them to the list.

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Jihad Is Endemic

I hate to try to lecture someone about issues about which they should know more than I but I have a basic disagreement with Husain Haqqani’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. In it Mr. Haqqani urges us to “prepare for Jihad 3.0”:

Just as the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan soon after 9/11 did not mark the end of al Qaeda, extremist forces in the Muslim world will continue to resuscitate themselves in other forms, in other theaters. If al Qaeda was Jihad 1.0 in our era, and ISIS was Jihad 2.0, we should now prepare for Jihad 3.0. Islamism will continue to be a U.S. national-security concern for years to come.

The New York attacker, Sayfullo Saipov, did not match the standard profile of a jihadi terrorist. He was likely self-radicalized, did not overtly belong to a major terrorist group, and would not have been denied entry under President Trump’s “travel ban” due to his country of origin.

In trying to re-create an Islamic state, radical Islamists draw inspiration from 14 centuries of history. It is important to understand the various Muslim “revivalist” movements, involving various degrees of violence and challenges to the global order of the time. Contemporary radicals often reach into the past to find models for organization and mobilization

It is not a coincidence that al Qaeda (literally “the base”) tried to establish itself first in Sudan before finding a home in Afghanistan. Both Sudan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region had experienced jihad against European powers resulting in short-lived Islamic states in relatively recent times.

ISIS’ choice of Syria and Iraq to declare a caliphate was also a function of the Islamist reverence for historic precedents. Damascus was the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750), and Baghdad was the base of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258).

In Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad declared himself Mahdi (“the reviver”) and established an unrecognized state from 1885-99 before being defeated by the British. The Mahdists terrorized locals, persecuted religious minorities (notably Coptic Christians), revived the slave trade, and challenged Egypt and its protector, Britain. The death of the movement’s founder in 1885 did not mark the end of jihad.

Eventually, the British defeated the Mahdists militarily with an Anglo-Egyptian force. They also used traditional religious and tribal structures and institutions to challenge Mahdist ideology. Today the Mahdists exist as a Sufi order rather than an extremist group.

Similarly, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area became the base for the jihad movement of Syed Ahmed Barelvi in 1826. Just as Osama bin Laden moved from Saudi Arabia, giving up a comfortable life, Syed Ahmed came from northeastern Indian nobility. He mobilized funds throughout the subcontinent, moved it through the hawala system, and bought arms to use against the British-aligned Sikh empire along the border of modern-day Afghanistan.

Although he was killed in 1831, ending his short-lived Islamic state, Syed Ahmed’s followers continued their random stabbing campaign against the British for another 70 years. Driving cars or trucks into crowds is today’s equivalent of that terrorist campaign.

Eventually, the British deployed military and intelligence means to defeat the jihadists. They also discredited the terrorists’ beliefs by supporting Muslim leaders who opposed radical ideas.

In the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire had less success in dealing with the Wahhabis, who fought the empire for control over the Arabian Peninsula through much of the 19th century. After creating the modern state of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the Wahhabis modified their approach to international relations, though not their theology. Al Qaeda and ISIS manifest the more radical beliefs of the Wahhabis and, though opposed by the modern state of Saudi Arabia, can be construed as a continuation of their Wahhabi teaching.

The U.S. is not capable of whole-scale changes to Islamic theology, nor is it in America’s purview. And portraying the contemporary struggle as a battle with Islam risks making the world’s Muslim population—1.8 billion people—Islamic State’s recruiting pool.

Islam means different things to different people and has been practiced in many ways among various sects across the world and throughout time. The doctrine of jihad is open to interpretation, much like the Christian notion of “just war.” Muslims who consider Islam a religion, not a political ideology, and who pursue piety, not conquest, remain important partners for the U.S.

The U.S. must re-evaluate its alliances in the Muslim world based on whether or not partners encourage extremism. Saudi Arabia’s recent avowal to teach moderation in religion, emulating the United Arab Emirates’ campaign against radical Islamism, deserves American support, as does Morocco’s decision to work with the Holocaust Memorial Museum to educate its people about the Holocaust and teach tolerance.

On the other hand, Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s decision to include jihadi teachings in its school curriculum indicate their support of radicalism.

Above all, the U.S. must focus on defeating radical Islamist ideology, not just its periodic manifestation in terrorist attacks.

Here’s the problem. Violent radical political Islam is endemic in Islam because

  1. Like Christianity Islam is a universal religion.
  2. Islam has no magisterium (officlal and authoritative interpretation of doctrine).
  3. Islam isn’t just theology. It’s also a legal, social, and political system.
  4. Unlike Christianity Islam was spread by the sword from its very beginnings, something of which Muslims are aware.

My point isn’t that all Muslims are violent radicals. I think that’s an error. My point is that there will always be a certain number of violent radical Islamists, modern technology makes it easier for them to associate with one another, and for them the incentives all point in the direction of violent jihad.

The notion that we can “defeat” violent radical Islamism is based on false premises. Our choices are to tolerate it and a few thousand people murdered in its name every year, eradicate it along with the a billion Muslims, or quarantine it also along with a billion Muslims. I reject the second alternative outright and there just isn’t support for the last so we’ll try the first alternative.

It’s a gamble. Islam tends not to survive prolonged contact with modernity (Christianity is having its problems there, too). Maybe we can outwait it. That’s the gamble.

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