I’m seeing a lot of breast-beating about the second major disruption in air travel in less than a month. Apparently, the problems are not limited to Southwest Airlines.

My own view is that what we’re seeing is at least in part a generational shift. Keeping the society running can’t be done on the sort of schedule and the level of effort that the younger generations are willing to accept. If I’m right, expect a lot more disruptions in all sorts of areas in the coming years.

I suspect that Doug Bandow’s latest piece in 1945 will cause some people’s faces to turn purple and their heads to spin. He says that defense spending should be decreased:

Washington spent the succeeding three decades with an inflated sense of power and destiny—believing the endless cant about America being the unipower, essential nation, indispensable power, and more. Yet contrary to former secretary of state Madeleine Albright’s self-serving claim that she and fellow members of the Washington Blob “see further … into the future,” they intervened foolishly yet promiscuously. They ravaged multiple nations, caused the deaths of thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands, or even more, of others, wasted money prodigiously, about $8 trillion, on “the global war on terrorism” alone, and left destruction and poverty in their wake.

Yet the bipartisan Washington War Party continues to engage in perpetual fear-mongering, claiming that the world is more dangerous than ever for America, as if the nation had not suffered through the Vietnam War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Cold War, Korean War, and World War II. In fact, the U.S. is the most secure great power ever, utterly dominating its own region and enjoying the protection of vast oceans east and west, and weak, pacific neighbors north and south.

along with this:

Change Washington’s behavior and most of its enemies would shrink if not disappear. Even before Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, Moscow posed no threat to the U.S. Russia and America had no clash of vital interests: to the contrary, Vladimir Putin once had adopted a friendly stance toward Washington, being the first foreign leader to call President George W. Bush after 9/11. In any case, Moscow lacked a truly globe-spanning military and had no means to attack the U.S. other with than nuclear weapons, which would result in its own destruction.

and this:

Which leaves China. It does not directly threaten the U.S. Beijing doesn’t plan a nuclear strike. It isn’t going to stage an amphibious invasion or burrow through the earth to launch a surprise attack. If there is going to be war with China, it will be over Washington’s determination to treat the Asia-Pacific as a U.S. sphere of interest. The American people should debate whether they believe imposing their will on that region is worth war and are willing to accept the high costs and risks of doing so, potentially forever.

In any case, the primary responsibility for defending the region should be borne by the nations located there.

I think he fails to understand the “grand strategy” that some have been quixotically pursuing for the last 30 years at least and probably going back all the way to World War II: keeping the U. S. secure by ensuring that it has the only military. Russia and China aren’t the only threats. So are our notional allies especially Germany and Japan. That they should be prepared to defend themselves flies in the face of.

Some consideration should be taken of the wargames I mentioned yesterday. One of the key findings was that Taiwan must be willing and able to defend itself for some period in the event of a Chinese attack. That’s in direct conflict with the “grand strategy” that’s dominated U. S. thinking for the last half century.

I also fail to understand the thinking of neocons and hawks. As I’ve said any number of times before U. S. military strength is downstream from U. S. economic strength and, simply stated, we can’t maintain that economic strength while buying most of what we consume from China.

I don’t know whether we should increase defense spending, decrease it, or keep it the same. I do think it should be re-oriented in directions other than its present course. Less spending for a standing army and more for a better, more resilient and durable navy and air force. But, of course, we’ll need to rebuild the stocks we’re dispatching to Ukraine. I doubt we can do that and reduce spending at the same time.

There is a beautiful sword, hanging from a tree, seemingly within reach. It can cut through anything without losing its edge. Do you seize it and wield it or destroy it?

There’s a brouhaha presently going on in Chicago around the Chicago mayoral elections. The Chicago Teacher’s Union is angrily denouncing Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot. From the official statement:

We learned today that Lori Lightfoot’s deputy campaign manager reached out to CTU members at their work addresses this morning, asking educators to help line up student ‘volunteers’ who will give at least 12 hours each week to the campaign. The campaign also claimed “Students are eligible to earn class credit through our volunteer program.”

This is unethical and wrong on so many levels — not least of which is our concern that CTU members who decline to volunteer for the mayor’s campaign or encourage their students to do so could face retaliation.

Their concern is not without basis. They’re already suing the mayor for just such “retaliation” in the past. Needless to say not just the CTU but the mayor’s opponents in the upcoming election are crying “Foul!”. It ain’t beanbag, folks.

Mayor Lightfoot must be bitterly disappointed that her predecessor, Rahm Emanuel, did not decertify the Chicago Teacher’s Union when he had the cause and the chance. Like her, Mayor Emanuel looked longingly at the sword presumably in the hope that he might wield it himself and not realizing that not only could it be wielded against him but that he would be the primary target.

Weapons that powerful should not be allowed to exist.

I found this article by bill Gertz at the Washington Times interesting:

The Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted 24 separate war game scenarios involving an amphibious assault by China across the 100-mile Taiwan Strait, setting off a war with Taiwan, the United States and Japan. U.S. military officials say Chinese strategists see a military “window” for action against Taipei in the next few years.

“In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan,” the report concludes. “However, this defense came at high cost.”

The cost, even in the “optimistic scenarios,” according to the report: “The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services.”

“China also suffers heavily,” the report noted. “Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war.”

The article did not include a direct link to the report on the exercise itself which is here.

The assumptions included conventional weapons only, participation only by China, U. S. Taiwan, and Japan, and no U. S. attacks on the Chinese mainland, all of which leave me skeptical. As I have pointed out ad nauseam in wargames in which it was allowed direct great power conflict inevitably led to a nuclear exchange. Here are the studies findings:

1. Taiwan must vigorously resist. If it does not, the rest is futile.
2. The United States must join hostilities within days and with the full range of its capabilities. Delays and half measures make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, and raise the risk of the Chinese creating an irreducible lodgment on Taiwan.
3. The United States must have use of its bases in Japan. Without them, the United States cannot use its numerous fighter/attack aircraft.
4. Finally, the United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range ASCMs.

I suspect that if anything the wargame underestimates the costs to both sides. Chinese military doctrine is almost completely untested. Its performance is likely to underwhelm. Conversely, damage to U. S. aircraft and ships is likely to be higher. Furthermore, I can’t help but imagine that if China were to actually invade Taiwan it would not attempt to disable U. S. airbases in Japan as a precursor. Somewhat similar to the Russian-Ukraine War the overwhelming likelihood is that Taiwan would not simply be harmed but economically destroyed.

Read the report for yourself. You might find it interesting.

Update

Here’s more commentary on the report from Blaise Malley at Responsible Statecraft:

The results of the simulations, and the recommendations offered in the report, in general reflect those found in the Quincy Institute’s earlier Active Denial report. Simulations conducted for that study produced similar results, and its recommendations were virtually identical, stressing the need for the United States to harden bases in Japan, employ smaller carriers, increase inventories of anti-ship missiles, and deploy more submarines and bombers equipped with missiles, among other things.

But even these actions will not by themselves ensure that China would be deterred from attacking Taiwan, if Washington backs Beijing into a corner. The ultimate lesson of these and other war games is that credible political and diplomatic assurances by the United States and China regarding, respectively, One China and the possibility of peaceful unification, are essential for keeping peace in the Taiwan Strait.

The only remark I can make about this is that China’s abandoning a claim to Taiwan is only slightly less likely than Russia’s relinquishing Crimea.

This snippet from Jason Riley’s most recent Wall Street Journal column caught my eye:

A national survey of large businesses showed that retailers recorded nearly $100 billion in thefts in 2022, up more than 26% from the previous year. Walmart CEO Doug McMillon recently told CNBC that the rise in shoplifting could lead to higher prices and even store closures.

Walmart is the nation’s largest private employer, and it’s known for locating its big-box stores in depressed areas that need well-paying jobs and low-price products. Social-justice advocates who want to make it harder to lock up repeat offenders are inadvertently raising costs and harming job prospects for law-abiding members of our most vulnerable communities.

There’s presently some disagreement about whether crime is decreasing, increasing, staying the same, or what. This NPR article discusses the matter:

The FBI’s annual crime report for 2021, released earlier this month, says violent crime decreased by 1% from the previous year. But the report is also incomplete, as only 63% of the country’s police departments submitted data — and New York City and Los Angeles were not among them.

The FBI tracks seven major types of crime, Asher explains on Morning Edition. Property crime — theft, auto theft and burglary — has been falling regularly for the last 20 years. Violent crime — aggravated assault, murder, rape and robbery — increased at least in 2020, but remains lower than it was in the 1990s.

“But even that, when we talk about crime, is not what people think of,” Asher says. “What they’re really thinking of is murder and gun violence, and murder makes up 0.2% of all big-picture crimes every year. But it’s the crime with the most societal harm. It’s the thing that people tend to care about the most.”

The problems in determining the crime rate are even graver than they suggest. As a commenter here pointed out since different jurisdictions define crimes in different ways comparing apples to apples can be hard. In addition in some jurisdictions police have stopped responding to some crimes. That doesn’t change whether the crimes occurred or not but it does mean they don’t even make it into the records.

How do you measure things when your measurement tools become unreliable? The answer is that you use proxy measures. So, for example, previously I’ve pointed out the sharp increase in 911 calls determine to require a police response that don’t get them. That’s a proxy measure for crime. The statistic that Mr. Riley quotes (major retailers’ theft reports) is one of those proxies.

Another proxy is businesses and individuals leaving certain jurisdictions. Here in Chicago, for example, there is a notable flood of small and large businesses leaving the city. There are many factors behind that exodus to be sure but many of those leaving say outright they’re leaving because of crime. Take them at their word.

I was saddened this morning to read a post from James regarding the death of Blake Hounshell who, apparently, took his own life yesterday. A quick check of my older posts revealed that my earliest reference to him was in 2004 almost 20 years ago.

It highlighted to me that the artificial intimacy created by this online medium obscures a lot of invisible demons. You just don’t know what things people are struggling with.

In my own case I’ve been pretty open about it. Blogging keeps me focused and engaged. Without it I think my brain would turn to mush.

But you just can’t know what much more deadly invisible demons others may be struggling with.

I don’t read opinion pieces at Fox very frequently and I can’t remember the last one I linked to one. Too predictable. This morning I took the bait based on the caption regarding solving our biggest problem. The “biggest problem” to which the writer was referring was the debt.

I suppose one could debate whether the debt is our greatest problem. It’s certainly growing rapidly. Not quite out of control but too rapidly:

Find more statistics at Statista
Please note in the graph above that the increase in the public debt from 2017 to 2020 exceeds that since 2020 or, in other words, it’s a bipartisan problem—the parties are equal opportunity offenders.

But I think we have bigger problems. For example, the “Doomsday Clock” of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is the closest it has been to midnight ever including at the height of the Cold War.

Another example of a major problem: diminishing returns to scale. That’s an umbrella factor presently affecting a broad range of issues from scientific research to building infrastructure to just about everything related to government at all levels. We don’t get enough bang for the buck.

So, here’s my question. What’s our biggest problem?

In a piece at Foreign Affairs Ivo H. Daalder and James Goldgeier present their plan for a “long war” between Russia and Ukraine. Here’s the meat of it:

There is a limit to what Washington and its allies can and will provide in terms of weapons and military assistance. Part of that limit is the reality that even the United States is running out of excess capabilities to provide to Ukraine. Take artillery shells. In the past year, Ukraine fired as many of them in a week as the United States can produce in a month. Similar shortfalls exist for more advanced weapons. Germany sent its modern IRIS-T air defense system to Ukraine in October, but it has struggled to supply the quantity of surface-to-air missiles necessary for Ukraine to maintain an effective defense. Given the extensive military aid it has already provided and dwindling available supplies, the West is likely to ship a significantly smaller amount of weaponry to Ukraine over the next six months than it did over the last six months.

In addition to supply constraints, Washington and its allies have also been held back in furnishing some sophisticated weapons to Ukraine because of the extensive training that would be required and the risk that such weapons could fall into Russian hands if used in the war theater. Combat aircraft, from F-16s to newer-generation models, fall into the first category. In the second are sophisticated drones such as the Gray Eagle, which, if they were captured by Russian forces, would give Russia crucial insights into U.S. military capabilities and technology.

Then there is the danger of escalation. Moscow has repeatedly warned Washington not to send long-range missiles to Ukraine, including the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which has a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) and could strike deep into Russian territory. U.S. President Joe Biden has consistently rejected calls to send these highly capable missiles to Ukraine, arguing that doing so would divide NATO and risk setting off a direct military confrontation with Russia, even a third world war. It is easy to dismiss these fears, as many seasoned observers do. But it is crucially important that the United States take the risks of escalation seriously and continually weigh the risks of not doing enough to help Ukraine against the consequences of doing too much, including the possibility that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons. The undeniable reality is that there is an inherent limit to how much Ukrainian and American interests overlap in responding to Russia’s aggression.

with this their conclusion:

To develop an effective approach to dealing with a prolonged war, the West must also keep providing sufficient support to Ukraine to defend the territory it now controls—and to liberate more wherever possible. As Ukraine over time pursues its economic future in the European Union, the United States and NATO countries need to offer a security commitment to ensure that Ukraine has the weaponry it needs to defend itself against Russia over the long term, just as the United States has done for Israel for decades. Washington should also explore with its allies the possibility of augmenting Ukraine’s promised EU membership with eventual membership in NATO itself.

Meanwhile, Western leaders need to get back to the business of containing the Russian threat. That will require maintaining all the financial, trade, and economic sanctions they have put in place since Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014. It also means continuing their efforts to end dependence on Russian energy exports. And it entails doing everything possible to prevent Russian access to technologies necessary to sustain its economy, including in the defense sector.

An effective long-term containment policy will require the continued political isolation of Russia. Moscow’s exclusion from sporting and cultural events helps to ensure that isolation, as do votes in the UN General Assembly that demonstrate the lack of support for its illegal war against Ukraine. But a more concerted Western effort is necessary to demonstrate to the countries in the global South that alignment with Moscow—or nonalignment itself—ultimately erodes the foundations of peace and security on which the international order is based. That does not mean that all countries need to adopt the economic strategy of the West; it does mean convincing them that Russia is at fault and that its behavior is the fundamental cause of their economic plight. As part of that effort, Washington and its Western partners can do much more to address the food, energy, and economic crises that have emerged in the wake of Russia’s unprovoked actions—starting by relieving debts and providing food aid to countries most in need.

Finally, containment of Russia will require the West to maintain a strong deterrence posture against not just military threats but threats to its own institutions and societies as well. This means that Europe will have to increase its defense spending more than it already has in response to Russian aggression since 2014. The United States will need to stay engaged in Europe even as it devotes more and more effort to the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, NATO and EU countries need to bolster their individual and joint efforts to thwart Russian interference in their elections and respond forcefully to economic intimidation, political interference, and other forms of hybrid warfare. Although parts of Russia’s military have been decimated, Moscow remains a significant threat to the West.

with the addition of a “communications channel”, something for which I see no prospect.

What the authors don’t seem to realize are:

1. Economically, the Ukrainians are already on their backs. It’s more building from scratch than rebuilding.
2. Germany undoubtedly understands that any money thrown at Ukraine for economic development will be wasted. Uncle Sugar will bear the costs while the Germans (not to mention the Egyptians) reap the benefits.
3. If this were a war between equals it might progress as they suggest. But it isn’t and the greatest likelihood is that the “long war” they plan will end with a collapse in organized resistance from Ukraine. They will continue to resist the Russians but it will be small scale and not organized. Furthermore in all likelihood the Ukrainians will hate us just as much as they do the Russians. After all when the Ukrainians lose it will be our fault, won’t it?

In answer to my question in the title, there won’t be many winners in a “long war”. Some arms dealers in the U. S., a few highly placed U. S. government officials, and that’s pretty much it.

Here’s the kernel of Alex Tabarrok’s explanation at Marginal Revolution for why there are so few semiconductor manufacturing companies:

In the entire US workforce there are approximately 3.7 million workers (2.3%) with an IQ greater than two standard deviations above the mean. (Mean 100, sd, 15, Normal dist.) Two standard deviations above the mean is pretty good but we are talking professor, physician, attorney level. At the very top of semiconductor manufacturing you are going to need workers with IQs at or higher than 1 in a 1000 people and there are only 164 thousand of these workers in the United States.

164 thousand very high-IQ workers are enough to run the entire semiconductor industry but you also want some of these workers doing fundamental research in mathematics, physics and computer science, running businesses, guiding the military and so forth. Moreover, we aren’t running a command economy. Many high-IQ workers won’t be interested in any of these fields but will want to study philosophy, music or English literature. Some of them will also be lazy! I’ve also assumed that we can identify all 164 thousand of these high-IQ workers but discrimination, poverty, poor health, bad luck and other factors will mean that many of these workers end up in jobs far below their potential–the US might be able to place only say 100,000 high-IQ workers in high-IQ professions, if we are lucky.

It’s very difficult to run a high-IQ civilization of 330 million on just 100,000 high-IQ workers–the pyramid of ability extends only so far. To some extent, we can economize on high-IQ workers by giving lower-IQ workers smarter tools and drawing on non-human intelligence. But we also need to draw on high-IQ workers throughout the world–which explains why some of the linchpins of our civilization end up in places like Eindhoven or Taiwan–or we need many more Americans.

From that first sentence in the last paragraph above, I gather that he sees the flaw in his reasoning. That sentence is a succinct summary of what has happened over the last 300-400 years. Areas of fabrication that were once the exclusive province of extremely skilled artisans have been democratized through automation. Rather than a master smith, weaver, or potter being needed to make an eating utensil, garment, or dinner plate, all of those are now highly automated.

Paradoxically, that doesn’t mean that we don’t need smiths, weavers, or potters but it does place a premium on the technicians who are able to master the new skills necessary for the new methods of fabrication. You can see that happening even now in many areas.

Today’s guilds are much more successful in preventing their artisanal ways of doing things from being democratized through mass production than the guilds of 400 years ago were but I don’t believe that will go on forever. It isn’t burger flippers whose livelihoods are most at risk due to automation today but doctors, lawyers, computer programmers, and college professors. That doesn’t mean we will no longer need doctors, lawyers, computer programmers, college professors, or, indeed, semiconductor designers but it does mean we will need better, smarter ones and there will never be enough of those to satisfy our needs.

One more word of caution about the last clause of Alex’s piece quoted above. We should heed Joschka Fischer’s advice: “We wanted workers; we got people”. Unless we are willing to be coldheartedly selective, to import a single prospective American with an IQ three standard deviations or more above normal we will need to import a thousand total prospective Americans, half of whom will never be able to support themselves. Shorter: it isn’t 1883 any more.