This morning James Joyner has a post on the loss of connection between productivity and wages in the United States:
Real (that is, inflation-adjusted) weekly wages have been essentially stagnant since 1970 while productivity has continued its previous trend. This leads to an obvious question: What happened in 1970 to decouple wages and productivity?
He outlines several candidates for the cause of the change including technology, the end of hard metal-backed currency, globalization, the decline of the labor unions, and the rise of dual income households.
I would propose an additional candidate: the wage and price controls imposed under Richard Nixon.
On August 15, 1971, in a move intended to control inflation, President Richard Nixon announced the first of several policies of federally-mandated wage and price controls, known collectively as the Economic Stabilization Program. Although these moves were thoroughly discredited by 1974, they had dramatic, persistent, and deleterious effects.
For one thing the controls gave further impetus to something that had been under way since just after World War II (and which was also a foreseeable consequence of government policy): increasing non-wage compensation, i.e. employee benefits.
I’m not the only one to propose this idea and in this post I’ll mention several papers that suggest differing explanations for how the wage and price controls could have produced such varied and persistent effects.
This paper suggests that the permanently altered the balance of power between capital and labor:
Nixon’s wage and price controls set in motion the post-1973 decline in real wages of U.S. production workers. The government-imposed wage- and price-setting institutions in place from August 1971 to April 1974 shifted the balance of power between capital and labor. When these formal institutions were eliminated in April 1974, the government-caused shift in the balance of power between capital and labor was not reversed. Rather, this shift in the balance of power was maintained through informal institutions, and these informal institutions set in motion the decline in real wages that started after 1973.
This paper attributes the high-inflation and low growth of the 1970s to a series of supply shocks induced by the imposition and removal of wage and price controls:
Blinder (1979, 1982), Gordon (1982), and others concluded decades ago that the two OPEC shocks, the two roughly contemporaneous food price shocks, and the removal of wage-price controls in 1973-1974 played starring roles in the macroeconomic events that constituted the Great Stagflation. Money and aggregate demand were, by comparison, bit players. This supply-shock explanation, which we summarized in the ten points in the Preamble, was never intended to exclude influences from the demand side, whether monetary or fiscal. But it did take the empirical view that, compared to the powerful special factors that were at work, conventional demand-side influences were minor during the years from 1973 to 1982.
That, in turn, had the effect of presenting advantages to sectors that were not so vulnerable to such supply shocks, e.g. finance, insurance, real estate, and healthcare, over sectors that were vulnerable, particularly low margin manufacturing. In particular, it was devastating to the domestic apparel manufacturing industry which never really recovered.
This paper, dizzyingly chockful of statistical information, makes a very interesting point. The wage and price controls of the ESP conferred an advantage on companies that, strategically, maximized profits over companies that maximized sales or that pursued target rate-of-return pricing in a way that had not previously been the case. It may seem remarkable now but every large company for which I worked in the 1970s was a sales-maximizer.
Profit maximizing firms are more predisposed to maintaining low payrolls than companies that strategically maximize sales or pursue targeted rate-of-return pricing. That, in turn, confers an additional advantage on larger companies that are better able to maintain the staff necessary to pursue a profit maximization strategy.
Despite the title of this post which those of you who are old enough will understand, I’m not suggesting that the ESP was the only reason for the change in the historic relationship between wages and productivity. However, I do think it was one of the mutually reinforcing factors that contributed to the situation we’ve seen for the last 30 years.