The First Step

Bill McBride looks forward to reading David Leonhardt’s NYT series on middle class decline, the first installment of which I quote:

Since median inflation-adjusted family income peaked in 2000 at $64,232, it has fallen roughly 6 percent. You won’t find another 12-year period with an income decline since the aftermath of the Depression.

Mr. Leonhardt apparently distinguishes between income and compensation which is appropriate. Why is he so concerned with income rather than compensation? I don’t see the evidence that total real compensation is declining, quite the contrary. See here for median real wages in non-financial firms and here for total compensation and compensation less healthcare premiums.

They say that the first step in recovery is admitting that you have a problem. If the problem is that wage income is flat, maybe we should start taxing total compensation rather than wage income. Preferentially taking an increasing proportion of total compensation in the form of healthcare insurance is rational when wage income is taxed and benefits aren’t. It’s a policy that also bestows an advantage on large, established companies (that can self-insure) relative to small companies and, particularly, new companies. These are the very companies that create new jobs so perhaps we shouldn’t be too surprised that job growth is so sluggish.

2 comments

Change Is Inevitable

If you’d like some cheery reading so you can start out your day with a smile on your face and a spring in your step, by all means do not read Peter Morici’s op-ed. The University of Maryland eonomist warns of a pending economic collapse:

Having failed to adequately address what caused the Great Recession—China’s trade surplus and the imbalance in demand between the Middle Kingdom and the United States, the cowboy culture on Wall Street and the plight of underwater homeowners—not much can be done, having squandered the grace created by stimulus spending and easy money. Get ready for a bad ride.

Basically, policy has shot its wad.

I’m not quite that pessimistic but I do suspect that we won’t make the reforms that are necessary until all other alternatives have been exhausted. For one thing, those who benefit most from things as they are will see to it that we don’t.

3 comments

Everybody’s Doing It

My, my. The word of the day must be “nationalization”. In his column at the Washington Post Robert Samuleson calls for nationalizing Medicaid. How do we ease the budget woes of the states?

We could nationalize Medicaid — the federal-state health insurance program for the poor. We could transfer all its costs to the federal government; in exchange, the federal government would end state aid for K-12 education and transportation. Though initially a dollar-for-dollar swap, the change would give states more control over their budgets.

Created by Congress in 1965, Medicaid is hijacking state politics. Although the federal government covers a majority of costs (typically, 57 percent), the rapid rise in the states’ share compels cuts in other programs or steeper taxes. In the past decade, Medicaid spending has increased at nearly twice the rate of states’ tax revenue, notes the Volcker-Ravitch report.

The pressures will only intensify as America ages. Although Medicaid serves primarily a younger population (half are children), two-thirds of its costs stem from the 25 percent of much sicker beneficiaries who are elderly and disabled, reports the Kaiser Family Foundation. An older America will raise these costs and squeeze states’ other services.

I have severely mixed feelings about this proposal. As you undoubtedly remember I have written incessantly on the burden that Medicaid is placing on state governments’ budgets. And I sincerely believe that the federal government is proximally responsible for the mess in healthcare, at the very least on a “you broke it, you bought it” sort of basis. On the other hand I also think that the federal government is very poorly positioned to administer the Medicaid program and that the problems with our healthcare system can’t be fixed in the context of the fee-for-service system that the federal government appears to be determined to maintain.

You might want to take a look at this handy summary of Medicaid facts and figures. For example, the state with the largest absolute number and percentage of Medicaid enrollees is California with nearly one in three Californians enrolled in Medicaid. Between its public employee benefits problems and its high Medicaid bills is it any wonder that the state has budget problems? Medicaid is a big chunk of Illinois’s problems, too, which now impeached Gov. Rod Blagojevich aggravated by expanding Medicaid eligibility.

More than 30% of Medicaid bills nationwide are, essentially, paying for nursing homes. Long-term care of the elderly is an expensive proposition, too expensive for all but the most well off to be able to afford on their own.

We really do need to consider the question of the care of the elderly more seriously. To deal with the problem in a manner that’s both sensible and humane we’re going to need to change a lot of societal attitudes which, of course, will not happen other than kicking and screaming and at the very last minute. Or later.

16 comments

Dansons la Carmagnole

There is one post and one article that I wanted to bring to your attention. I think they’re best read in combination. The first is from Randall Wray, University of Missouri economist:

Mortgages that were designed to go bad would go bad. CDOs that were designed to fail would fail.

Suddenly there was no collateral behind the loans Wall Street’s thieves had made to one another. Each Wall Street thief looked in the mirror and realized everything he was holding was crap, because he knew all of his own debt was crap.

Hello Uncle Sam, Uncle Timmy, and Uncle Ben, we’ve got a problem. Can you spare $29 Trillion to bail us out?

And that is why we are screwed.

I see two scenarios playing out. In the first, we allow Wall Street to carry on its merry way, as the foreclosure crisis continues and Wall Street steals all homes, packaging them into bundles to be sold for pennies on the dollar to hedge funds. All wealth will be redistributed to the top 1% who will become modern day feudal lords with the other 99% living at their pleasure on huge feudal estates.

You can imagine for yourselves just what you’re going to have to do to pleasure the lords.

This will take years, maybe even a decade or more, but it is the long march Wall Street has formulated for us. To be sure, “formulated” should not be misinterpreted as intention. No one sat down and planned the creation of Western European feudalism when Rome collapsed. To be sure, the modern day feudal lords on Wall Street certainly conspire—to rig LIBOR and muni bond markets, for example—and each one individually wants to take as much as possible from customers and creditors and stockholders. But they are not planning and conspiring for the restoration of feudalism. Still, that is the default scenario—the outcome that will emerge in the absence of action.

In the second, the 99% occupy, shut down, and obliterate Wall Street. Honestly, I have no idea how that can happen. I am waiting for suggestions.

Fortunately, University of Maryland economist Gar Alperovitz has a suggestion ready at hand:

What about breaking up the banks, as many on the left favor? Recent history confirms another Chicago School judgment: while a breakup might work in the short term, the most likely course is what happened with Standard Oil and AT&T, which were broken up, only to essentially recombine a few decades later.

Nationalization isn’t as difficult as it sounds. We tend to forget that we did, in fact, nationalize General Motors in 2009; the government still owns a controlling share of its stock. We also essentially nationalized the American International Group, one of the largest insurance companies in the world, and the government still owns roughly 60 percent of its stock.

That neither the Republican Party nor the Democratic Party is willing to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs take such an extreme step does not seem to phase Dr. Alperovitz.

Under U. S. law there is also one pesky detail: the government is forbidden from seizing private property without just compensation. Leaving aside the question of just how well GM is actually doing, the federal government actually paid more to prop the company up than its full market capitalization. Go back and look through my archives. I calculated the value at the time.

The Wall Street banks on the other hand are worth trillions, possibly tens of trillions. Yes, the Treasury could just spend the money into existence. That’s a frighteningly large scale for such an activity. Would any move be more likely to cause a catastrophic loss of faith in the dollar?

I never cease to be amazed that people who make proposals of the sort forwarded by the good doctors have such a preference for public greed, theft, and corruption over private greed, theft, and corruption. They’re not unique to the private sector, you know. Clearly, neither one of them have ever lived in Chicago.

And remember, as Earl Long pointed out, the feds have the bomb.

I believe that anything that’s too big to be allowed fail is too big to be allowed to exist. We should have been moving to break the big banks up a decade ago. If they got too big again, we can break them up again. Better yet consider eliminating some of the props that allow them to get that big.

However, none of that will happen until people are very, very frightened. And when people are frightened they often grasp at solutions that are much, much worse than those they might have adopted when they weren’t in a state of panic.

16 comments

Nixon’s the One

This morning James Joyner has a post on the loss of connection between productivity and wages in the United States:

Real (that is, inflation-adjusted) weekly wages have been essentially stagnant since 1970 while productivity has continued its previous trend. This leads to an obvious question: What happened in 1970 to decouple wages and productivity?

He outlines several candidates for the cause of the change including technology, the end of hard metal-backed currency, globalization, the decline of the labor unions, and the rise of dual income households.

I would propose an additional candidate: the wage and price controls imposed under Richard Nixon.

On August 15, 1971, in a move intended to control inflation, President Richard Nixon announced the first of several policies of federally-mandated wage and price controls, known collectively as the Economic Stabilization Program. Although these moves were thoroughly discredited by 1974, they had dramatic, persistent, and deleterious effects.

For one thing the controls gave further impetus to something that had been under way since just after World War II (and which was also a foreseeable consequence of government policy): increasing non-wage compensation, i.e. employee benefits.

I’m not the only one to propose this idea and in this post I’ll mention several papers that suggest differing explanations for how the wage and price controls could have produced such varied and persistent effects.

This paper suggests that the permanently altered the balance of power between capital and labor:

Nixon’s wage and price controls set in motion the post-1973 decline in real wages of U.S. production workers. The government-imposed wage- and price-setting institutions in place from August 1971 to April 1974 shifted the balance of power between capital and labor. When these formal institutions were eliminated in April 1974, the government-caused shift in the balance of power between capital and labor was not reversed. Rather, this shift in the balance of power was maintained through informal institutions, and these informal institutions set in motion the decline in real wages that started after 1973.

This paper attributes the high-inflation and low growth of the 1970s to a series of supply shocks induced by the imposition and removal of wage and price controls:

Blinder (1979, 1982), Gordon (1982), and others concluded decades ago that the two OPEC shocks, the two roughly contemporaneous food price shocks, and the removal of wage-price controls in 1973-1974 played starring roles in the macroeconomic events that constituted the Great Stagflation. Money and aggregate demand were, by comparison, bit players. This supply-shock explanation, which we summarized in the ten points in the Preamble, was never intended to exclude influences from the demand side, whether monetary or fiscal. But it did take the empirical view that, compared to the powerful special factors that were at work, conventional demand-side influences were minor during the years from 1973 to 1982.

That, in turn, had the effect of presenting advantages to sectors that were not so vulnerable to such supply shocks, e.g. finance, insurance, real estate, and healthcare, over sectors that were vulnerable, particularly low margin manufacturing. In particular, it was devastating to the domestic apparel manufacturing industry which never really recovered.

This paper, dizzyingly chockful of statistical information, makes a very interesting point. The wage and price controls of the ESP conferred an advantage on companies that, strategically, maximized profits over companies that maximized sales or that pursued target rate-of-return pricing in a way that had not previously been the case. It may seem remarkable now but every large company for which I worked in the 1970s was a sales-maximizer.

Profit maximizing firms are more predisposed to maintaining low payrolls than companies that strategically maximize sales or pursue targeted rate-of-return pricing. That, in turn, confers an additional advantage on larger companies that are better able to maintain the staff necessary to pursue a profit maximization strategy.

Despite the title of this post which those of you who are old enough will understand, I’m not suggesting that the ESP was the only reason for the change in the historic relationship between wages and productivity. However, I do think it was one of the mutually reinforcing factors that contributed to the situation we’ve seen for the last 30 years.

8 comments

Insight!

Suddenly, it all becomes clear. Zombie movies are Westerns. Zombies are politically corrrect Indians. George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead is The Great Train Robbery (or, to tighten the metaphor, 1903’s Kit Carson, the oldest “cowboys and Indians” picture I know of). Resident Evil is Fort Apache. Milla Jovovich is John Wayne (impossibly tall, slender, good-looking foreign-born female action hero—cool; impossibly tall, slender, good-looking native-born male action hero—un-cool). Sean of the Dead is The Paleface.

CGI is a stand-in for cinematography and Monument Valley.

The Walking Dead is Wagon Train.

Has it always been this obvious?

Where oh where are John Ford and Howard Hawks when you really need them?

10 comments

Elizabeth’s Secret

When I find old underwear, it isn’t of world-altering importance. It may be handy particularly if I haven’t done laundry for a while. However, when these archaeologists rummaged around an old Austrian castle and found some 600 year old bras, it may well have changed the way we think about the past:

A revolutionary discovery is rewriting the history of underwear: Some 600 years ago, women wore bras.

The University of Innsbruck said that archeologists found four linen bras dating from the Middle Ages in an Austrian castle. Fashion experts describe the find as surprising because the bra had commonly been thought to be only little more than 100 years old as women abandoned the tight corset.

Instead, it appears the bra came first, followed by the corset, followed by the reinvented bra.

One specimen in particular “looks exactly like a [modern] brassiere,” said Hilary Davidson, fashion curator for the London Museum. “These are amazing finds.”

We have a very distorted view of the past. The history books and novels that have been written, the movies that have been made, and the images we conjure up in our minds depend disproportionately on things made of bone, stone, pottery, metal, and, to some extent, glass. But those are just what survived the depradations of time. We have good reason to believe that much of the past didn’t consist of these more durable things but was constructed from more ephemeral paper, wood, rushes, leather, paint, and cloth. Not to mention even more elusive food and music. We know very little about the music of the ancient past. A few guesses, perhaps.

We know that the popular images of ancient Athens are almost completely wrong. The Caryatids (huge columns in female form) on the porch of the Erechtheion weren’t stately bare marble. They were painted, gilded, and decorated with glass beads. 18th and 19th century buildings with facades in imitation of the buildings of classical antiquity are imitating an antiquity that never was. The reality was brighter, gaudier, and much more ephemeral.

The oldest cloth found to date is approximately 10,000 years old (in Turkey) and it’s quite sophisticated, suggesting a lengthy tradition of manufacture. In all likelihood cloth was a commonplace but, because it’s fragile relative to, say, stone we don’t think of ancient buildings as having floors and walls covered with rugs, drapes, and walls covered with tapestries.

Some of the oldest pottery found, roughly 20,000 years old, is studiedly made to resemble basketry models. The baskets have not survived but the pottery has.

It’s possible that human beings of the Paleolithic didn’t wear skins, as portrayed in every movie from One Million BC (the one with Carole Landis and Victor Mature) to Year One, but wore clothing not terribly different from the clothing we wear. No zippers, of course. Or polyester.

Just as an exercise look around your home. How many of your possessions are made of stone? Pottery? Glass? Wood? Cloth? Plastic? How many of them will still be around in 1,000 years? If an archaeologist of the future knew nothing about us other than the things we made of stone, pottery, and, to a lesser extent (since it degrades, too), metal, would they arrive at an accurate imagining of our lives, our culture?

5 comments

The Great Divide

Scott Sumner remarks on the same phenomenon I asked about here:

I think there’s a deeper problem here. Progressives see their ideology as being somehow more rational. Perhaps in some ways it is (although I’d argue not in all ways.) Then they assume those on the other side must somehow reflect dark irrational forces. Again, there are people like that on the right. But here’s what can happen when you start thinking that way. Tyler Cowen is probably the most reasonable, moderate, open-minded, thoughtful thinker on the right. The sort of voice that open-minded people on the left should welcome. He writes a column in the NYT that has a very balanced view of the issue of health care, coming out for a mixed public/private system. Saying there are no easy answers, etc. Then Aaron Carroll responds with a ridiculous post that accuses Cowen of making all sorts of claims that he never made. Pure fabrication. Perhaps Carroll assumed the worst because Tyler is on the “other team.” Anyone who read Tyler’s column and the Carroll post, would immediately see that it was completely inaccurate, not even close. That is anyone who doesn’t view the world through politically-tinted glasses. Thus Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong both linked approvingly to the Carroll post. This is really really sad to see. Especially because these two individuals are so brilliant, so talented at blogging. Krugman’s recently had great posts on everything from the Fed to the euro to noise in restaurants. But when it comes to politics he becomes completely unhinged.

Read the whole thing.

We do not and cannot discern the inner thoughts, motives, and intentions of others. They cannot even be deduced with any great reliability from their stated beliefs, the policies they support, or even, in general, their affiliations. Some people believe that you help people by giving them money. Some people believe that you help people by not giving them money. Both may have the same intention: helping people. There is a difference of opinion as to how to effect that.

7 comments

Heroes

The other day Doug Mataconis mused over why superheroes were so commonly orphans. My answer is that it’s a storytellling convention that goes back at least 4,000 years and probably much farther. Here’s a partial list of historical and literary heroes who were either “sons of the widow” or foundlings, each dating from 1,000 years ago or more:

Sargon the Great
Horus
Tammuz
Moses (the story of his being found in the bulrushes is a retelling of the earlier story of Sargon the Great)
Cyrus the Great
Theseus
Perseus
Oedipus
Romulus and Remus
Jesus of Nazareth
Muhammad
Andal
Arthur
Parzifal

The list is practically endless. Why? I suppose one answer would be “because that’s the way it happened.” My response would be that there are vast numbers of details about those individuals that are not considered important enough to report. Why is it important that they are “sons of the widow” or foundlings?

It’s also been suggested that it makes it easier for the storyteller who doesn’t have to explain their relationships with their families. I don’t think that stands up to scrutiny, either—the detail could merely be omitted.

I think the reason is that it’s a shorthand notation for growing up under conditions of extreme deprivation and adversity. Being the son of a widowed mother or a foundling was not uncommon but, conditions being what they were, it meant that the child would have a difficult life. It’s something that most people would readily understand. Heroes have not only survived great adversity but risen above it in triumph.

9 comments

Priorities

Yves Smith comments on former Special Inspector General of the TARP Neil Barofsky’s new book, its release clearly timed to maximize the White House’s discomfiture over it. Here’s her most telling analysis:

Barofsky proves that the Obama Administration didn’t give a damn about protecting taxpayer money or protecting homeowners, only shoveling dough at banks and AIG (the auto companies were treated like unwanted stepchildren). It’s one thing to surmise that, another to deliver the goods

If this is populism, I’ll have elitism. If it’s elitism, I’ll have populism.

1 comment