The editors of the Tampa Bay Times identify the solution to our polarized politics as ranked-choice voting:

As this Editorial Board argued last year, Florida should consider ranked choice voting, perhaps modeled on Alaska’s system, where primary elections are open to all candidates regardless of party affiliation. The top four vote-getters go through to the general election, held weeks later. Voters then use ranked choice voting to select a winner from the final four. The basic idea is that voters don’t have to select only their top candidate — they can rank some or all of the candidates if they want. Either way, if no candidate receives a majority of the first-place votes on the initial tally, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated. When a voter’s first-choice vote is eliminated, then their second-choice vote is counted. It goes on until there is a winner with the majority of the votes.

Frankly, I’m skeptical. I doubt it’s that simple. I think that gerrymandering, too few representatives, and too much power being placed in the hands of party leaders all play roles in how undemocratic our system is. For one thing what good would representatives who espouse more moderate views when running do when they follow the party line in Washington?

Maybe ranked-choice voting would be a good step. I think we need to ban gerrymandering outright, increase the size of the House by at least 50%, and impose term limits or some other strategy for reducing the power of party leaders to have notionally more moderate representatives mean anything. That could only happen through a Constitutional Convention which is a risky strategy.

At, appropriately, Bloomberg Michael Bloomberg observes that House Democrats are to blame as well as what’s referred to as the “Chaos Caucus”, the eight Republicans who voted to oust House Speaker Kevin McCarthy:

Kevin McCarthy’s ejection from his seat as speaker of the US House of Representatives — an ignominy that hadn’t been attempted in more than a century — is a national embarrassment that deepens the Republican Party’s descent into dysfunction and extremism. But the fact is: The blame rests not just with the eight Republicans who voted to oust him, but also with both parties’ leaders — McCarthy and Democratic Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries — for failing to reach across the aisle to save the country from this mess.

Over the past several election cycles, I have strongly supported Democratic efforts to win the House, largely to save the country from the dysfunction and craziness of a party that has fallen captive to its extreme right wing. I disagree with McCarthy on virtually every issue, but in some critical moments this year, he showed that he was willing to stand up to his party’s right-wing extremists and take the heat.

Jeffries should’ve been willing to take the same risk, by rising above partisanship to save McCarthy’s job — if not for the good of the country, then for the good of the Democratic Party.

The numbers make that clear. Eight Republicans voted to remove McCarthy from the Speakership and 200 Democrats voted for it.

That wasn’t their only alternative. Minority Leader Jeffries might have negotiated a deal with Speaker McCarthy and allowed Democrats to vote against removing McCarthy. Democrats might have voted “Present”. There are other alternatives.

The eight Republicans who voted to remove McCarthy are objectively anti-government. Now, apparently, so are Democrats.

James Carville, political consultant to the Clinton campaign in 1992’s victory, is a walking sound-byte machine. One of his most famous: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Here’s another one:

If there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.

Keep that in mind if you read former Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal about what the bond market is telling us. Here’s a snippet from his opening:

Hold short-term interest rates at current levels, and threaten to raise them if inflation morale doesn’t improve. That’s current Federal Reserve policy. The trouble is that the central bank doesn’t set interest rates anymore. The bond market does.

and here’s its kernel:

The coming supply of Treasury securities required to fund U.S. government deficits will likely be substantially larger than official estimates. And purchasers of Treasury debt will demand higher yields, at least until something breaks in the economy.

First, on the supply side. The government currently funds $33 trillion of outstanding debt at an average interest rate of about 2.9%. Funding costs on the growing debt burden are forecast to average only a fraction of a percentage point higher over the next 10 years, according to the Congressional Budget Office. I’ll take the over.

The bond market is signaling heightened uncertainty about the range of possible outcomes. If the Fed’s recent rosy economic forecasts for growth and inflation are wrong and a recession ensues, there will be a gusher of new debt. Every additional 1-point increase in interest rates will add more than $2.5 trillion of expense in the next decade.

Next, on the demand side. After the global financial crisis, four of the largest purchasers of Treasury debt were price-insensitive. That is, they were buying Treasury debt for policy reasons—economic, geopolitical or regulatory. Price didn’t matter. How fortunate. These buyers, however, have largely exited the market. The Fed bought about a quarter of all Treasury debt in the past decade but warns that its Treasury holdings will shrink for at least another year.

China, another massive buyer in recent years, is unlikely to sell its existing holdings at a loss. But don’t expect Chinese leadership to do the U.S. any favors by showing up in size at the next Treasury auction. Japan’s domestic growth profile is the most robust in decades. The lion’s share of its excess savings will stay closer to home. And after the banking debacle in March catalyzed by Silicon Valley Bank, the largest banks—firmly overseen by their regulators—are no longer keen to load up on “risk-free” long-dated Treasury bonds.

He says pay more attention to the bond market than to what the Fed is doing.

I think that China’s “massive buying in recent years” depends on what you mean by recent and what you mean by massive:

and here’s Japan’s:

Were those adjusted to constant dollars they would look even worse.

Will much higher yields, as the bond market seems to be telling us, lead to the Chinese and Japanese resuming their purchases of U. S. Treasuries? Frankly, I doubt it.

Source of data: UN World Population Prospects Data Portal

I’m puzzled by Thomas Fazi’s latest piece at UnHerd. It purports to claim that NATO and Ukraine cannot win a prolonged war of attrition and simultaneously to assume that it will. Here’s what I think is the kernel of the piece:

The prospect of an Afghanistan-style war of attrition is worrying for a number of reasons. Firstly, because, if Ukraine had little chance of winning a blitzkrieg-style counteroffensive, it has even less chance of winning a long-term war of attrition, given Russia’s advantage in manpower and its ability to produce more artillery and ammunitions than Ukraine and the West combined (Russia’s current ammunition production is seven times greater than that of the West). “If the war goes on for long enough with this intensity, Ukraine’s losses will become unbearable,” a senior French official told the Wall Street Journal in February.

And second, because as the conflict drags on, and potentially escalates, direct Nato involvement in the conflict — and thus the risk of an all-out war between Nato and Russia — will inevitably increase. Europeans should be especially worried by the prospect of a long war: if American military assistance starts to wane, Europe will need to carry more of the burden. Indeed, it would appear that the EU has already taken its cue from events on the other side of the Atlantic. On Monday, two days after the no-deal in the US Congress, the EU’s foreign ministers paid a surprise visit to Kyiv to express their unwavering support for Ukraine.

Why does he think that, if the U. S. curtails its support for Ukraine, Europe, i.e. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, will pick up the slack? His conclusion directly contradicts that:

If this seems foolish, let alone dangerous, we can find some solace in the fact that reality would appear to be standing in the way of this plan. There is, after all, simply no way for the EU to plug the gap — in military, financial or political terms — if Washington scales back its support. For those of us who yearn for peace, the EU’s dysfunction might be, for once, a silver lining.

Doesn’t experience tell us that Germany and France, in particular, are more likely to seek some sort of accommodation with Russia rather than picking up the slack should the U. S. end support for Ukraine?

My view continues to be that we should continue to support the Ukrainians but that we should audit Ukraine’s use of our support more closely and use whatever leverage our support provides to encourage the Ukrainians to settle for some armistice short of their stated strategic objectives. As to Ukraine’s objective of ensuring long-lasting security, I think that’s impossible and know of no realistic proposals for accomplishing it.

Sometimes I don’t think the editors of the Washington Post read the Washington Post. In their editorial they assert that there are some straightforward strategies for increasing life expectancy:

Fixing the country’s life-and-death problem, in this light, will require confronting some of its broadest and deepest rooted issues. But focusing on incentives to promote better health, so that the tide moves with the project instead of against it, will provide a manageable place to begin.

After considering and rejecting many of the ideas that motivated the ACA, they finally light on raising the taxes on tobacco and imposing taxes on processed foods, for example, on foods containing high fructose corn syrup. Somehow I doubt that the decline in our national life expectancy was caused by tobacco or high-fructose corn syrup. Maybe we’re accumulating new bad habits faster than we’re shedding bad old ones.

Unmentioned is that there is evidence that religious people live longer.

My own view is that for the very young, health care may well be the deciding factor on whether you live or die, for the young adults up to middle age behavior is probably the most significant determining factor, while for the elderly heredity is of increasing importance.

Why did Jim Fixx die at 52? He did a lot of things right—some very right and yet he died in early middle age. His father had died at 43 and it has been found that he was predisposed to the heart problems that caused his death and he had behaved very poorly as a young man.

I consider myself fortunate in my choice of when I was born and who my ancestors were. Childhood care enabled me to survive past childhood, my own good judgment (and the bad examples of several of my ancestors) persuaded me to avoid some of my ancestors’ bad behaviors, and barring those bad behaviors or even in spite of them the ancestors whose DNA I’ve inherited tended to be quite long-lived. We tend not to be predisposed to the diseases of aging, e.g. arthritis and heart disease. I’ve already outlived my father, all of my grandparents, and I’m catching up to my great-grandparents.

So, the House of Representatives has removed Speaker Kevin McCarthy. My reaction was materially the same as James Joyner’s: now what? Mr. McCarthy has said he won’t seek the speakership again. There won’t be a vote until next week.

IMO the Republicans have shot themselves in the foot. I fail to see how a new speaker will accomplish anything other than stalemate. That’s what a very closely divided House in which neither side will vote with the other means.

I must say that I disagree pretty drastically with George Friedman’s assessment of the war in Ukraine:

The U.S. reached its goal, while Russia and Ukraine have not and will not. However, neither have they been crushed. Ukraine is now a divided country but enough of it is intact to claim victory, and Russia has pushed past its old border enough to claim a small victory. Both could claim humanitarian reasons for ending the war.

But now the dead creep. They gave their lives for nothing but the pretense of victory, as no rational person will think of the outcome as contempt for the dead. So having fought and defended for coming on two years, how the war ends is reasonably clear. How long will it take for the leaders to admit what is obvious? Everyone lost this war, and in due course so will the leaders. And that is what will delay the inevitable peace.

We agree in that everybody will lose. I disagree that the United States has gained anything. It may even be that Russian military strength has actually grown—there’s nothing like field experience to hone military doctrine. Furthermore, it illustrated the limits of economic sanctions and the futility of trying to teach others the American way of war.

At Foreign Affairs three scholars, Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Michael Pettis, and Adam Posen, weigh in on what has produced the Chinese economy’s present situation. All three are worth reading but my views align most closely with Mr. Pettis’s:

The problems facing the Chinese economy are not the consequence of recent policy shifts; they are the almost inevitable result of deep imbalances that date back nearly two decades and were obvious to many economists well over a decade ago. They are also the problems faced by every country that has followed a similar growth model

In particular China has depended, like the Soviet Union before it, on moving relatively unproductive labor from agriculture to manufacturing. Unlike the Soviet Union it did so without reducing agricultural production, a notable triumph.

But that has run out and it won’t produce the additional growth it needs to transform China into a high income country through malinvestments. And malinvestments are inevitable in a planned economy, particularly with incentives that local officials have.

Twenty years ago I believed that China could transform itself adequately. Now I’m not so sure.