I am frankly puzzled by Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.’s Wall Street Journal op-ed. He opens by establishing his credentials in case you don’t know who he is:

Four years ago this week, at the direction of the president, forces under my command struck and killed Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. He was arriving there to coordinate attacks on our embassy and coalition targets across the region. Our successful strike threw Tehran’s plan into disarray. The Iranian response—a barrage of missiles against Al Asad air base in western Iraq—was largely a punch that landed against air. The attack was designed to kill Americans, but commanders on the ground ensured there were no fatalities. I don’t minimize the injuries our forces absorbed in that attack, but it could have been much worse. The Iranians subsequently backed down.

He then turns to his main message:

Here is the lesson: The Iranians’ strategic decision-making is rational. Its leaders understand the threat of violence and its application. It takes will and capability to establish and maintain deterrence. We were able to reset deterrence as a result of this violent couplet. The Iranians have always feared our capabilities, but before January 2020, they doubted our will. The bombing of the memorial ceremony for Soleimani in Iran on Wednesday that killed dozens of civilians isn’t an example of deterrence but likely internal factions struggling for power.

After exchanging fire with the U.S. four years ago, Iran continued to pursue its long-term trifecta of strategic objectives: preserving the theocratic regime in Tehran, destroying Israel, and ejecting the U.S. from the Middle East. The mullahs’ actions, however, were muted and hidden behind proxies, from the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria. The Iranians remembered the result of a straightforward confrontation with the U.S.

That brings me to what puzzles me. What does he want us to do? Strike back at Iran whenever someone in the Middle East attacks U. S. forces there? I’m skeptical that militias and even individual actors in the Middle East take their orders from a Central Command or in fact can be deterred by our using military force. Yes, we taught Iran a lesson: don’t attack U. S. forces directly. They aren’t. Mission accomplished.

But, as Gen. McKenzie observes, deterring Iran from taking direct military action against U. S. forces does not mean that Iran abandons its national interests. It just means they pursue them through means not deterred by American military might.

For me this is the crucial passage in the op-ed:

If avoiding escalation is the highest U.S. priority, then it is only logical to withdraw our forces from the region. That would ensure attacks on our bases don’t continue but ultimately endanger the future of the Mideast.

He raises a very interesting point. Why are U. S. troops stationed in the Middle East? As he notes if our primary objective is avoiding escalation the prudent course of action would be to remove them. If it’s to preserve peace in the Middle East, pretty clearly that’s a flop. There is precious little peace to preserve. Israel is attacking the Palestinians. Hamas, Hezbollah, and who knows how many others are attacking Israel right back. The Turks are attacking the Kurds and vice versa. DAESH is attacking Iran. Presumably, Iran will retaliate against DAESH in due course.

What national interests are we promoting with our troops in the Middle East? Because we import our oil from the Middle East? Our oil imports from the Middle East aren’t what they once were:

Are we there to preserve the flow of oil to our allies? France imports a much larger percentage of its oil from the Middle East than we do. Shouldn’t France be doing more to preserve the flow of oil?

Are our troops stationed there in case they’re needed? That would suggest that they’re there not to prevent escalation but in case of escalation.

Jeffrey Sachs’s remarks on the White House’s Ukraine strategy, quoted at length by Tim Hains at RealClearPolitics, align pretty well with my own:

Jeffrey Sachs, a professor at Columbia University known for his work with the United Nations, told podcast host Andrew Napolitano last week that President Biden’s gambit in Ukraine has backfired and caused “a bloodbath and a disaster.”

“This is a plan that has just gone over the cliff. it was a terrible idea based on a set of miscalculations by the U.S. military-industrial complex with Biden out there as the front person,” Sachs said. “And it has gone horribly wrong.”

“They can’t admit it because they are all parties to this horrible outcome, so they would rather double down. It’s not them fighting after all, it’s not their money. Everybody is doing it on deficit spending. And it is not their soldiers, only Ukrainians are dying.”

“We now have foreign policy in the hands of a few people, and they happen to be incompetent, aside from everything else. Or, there’s another theory, which is they don’t really care about the outcome, it is the war itself that is the desire because it is big business,” Sachs said.

“This is an end game. And it’s a shame for Biden, who caused this, because Biden stopped negotiations that would have ended the conflict in March or April 2022.”

There’s a lot more. Note in particular the observation about “foreign policy in the hands of a few people”.

My first question is whether Dr. Sachs is right or wrong? It seems clear to me that it is a bloodbath. Is it a disaster?

There is a third alternative that has been suggested (other than the two mentioned by Dr. Sachs): that the U. S. objective of the war in Ukraine has been to degrade Russia’s military and that has succeeded splendidly. Leaving aside the incredible cynicism of that strategy, has it succeeded? Has Russia’s military been degraded? How and how do you know? Take into account the differences between our way of war and Russia’s.

Based on the figures I’ve seen the total number of Russian casualties (killed plus wounded) is around 350,000 and the number of Russian regulars killed in action is about 80,000 with the balance of killed being partisans and Wagner Group. That’s on the order of U. S. losses in Vietnam. Did those losses degrade the U. S. military?

That’s a question not an answer. I would honestly like to know.

I wanted to call attention to one passage in Karl Rove’s most recent Wall Street Journal op-ed:

If these margins don’t change dramatically, they’ll have a catastrophic effect on Mr. Biden’s re-election.

Take Georgia, which Mr. Biden won by 11,779 votes. Blacks made up 29% of Peach State turnout and cast some 1.45 million votes. They broke for Mr. Biden by 88% to 11%. A falloff of about 0.9% among black Democratic voters would have flipped Georgia’s 16 electoral votes to Mr. Trump.

In Arizona, Mr. Biden’s margin was even narrower—10,457 votes. Hispanics, 19% of the electorate, cast roughly 640,000 votes and broke for Mr. Biden 61% to 37%. A decline of just 2.7% in the Hispanic Democratic vote would have turned the Grand Canyon State’s 11 electoral votes red.

Finally, there’s Wisconsin. In 2020 Mr. Biden’s margin was 20,682. Voters 18 to 29 were 14% of the state’s 3,298,041 votes and broke 59% to 36% for the Democrats. A drop of 7.6% among young voters would have caused the Badger State’s 10 electoral votes go Republican.

Small changes in voter turnout among key demographics could be enough to move Mr. Biden out of the White House and Mr. Trump back in. The combined weakness among these groups could cause other close states—Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania—to flip as well.

on the challenges that President Biden faces in being re-elected. Mr. Rove’s ultimate point is that Joe Biden’s biggest asset is Donald Trump. The highlighted portion (highlights mine) is nearly verbatim an observation I made in the immediate aftermath of the 2020 election. That’s not “woke”. It’s just arithmetic.

The strategy the Democrats appear to have decided on is to use lawfare to remove Trump from the ballot. They apparently don’t recognize how risky that is. At this point the risk I’m more worried about is the prospect of an increase in spending producing another round of inflation. There’s good evidence for increased use of grants in election years and why it is the case—it works, cf. Kriner and Reeves, 2012:

However, in a county- and individual-level study of presidential elections from 1988 to 2008, we present evidence that voters reward incumbent presidents (or their party’s nominee) for increased federal spending in their communities. This relationship is stronger in battleground states. Furthermore, we show that federal grants are an electoral currency whose value depends on both the clarity of partisan responsibility for its provision and the characteristics of the recipients. Presidents enjoy increased support from spending in counties represented by co-partisan members of Congress. At the individual level, we also find that ideology conditions the response of constituents to spending; liberal and moderate voters reward presidents for federal spending at higher levels than conservatives. Our results suggest that, although voters may claim to favor deficit reduction, presidents who deliver such benefits are rewarded at the ballot box.

As I read Andrew Bacevich’s post at Responsible Statecraft on Israel’s war against Hamas:

Today challenges to the nation’s erstwhile indispensability premier abound: the rise of China, a stalemated conflict in Ukraine, porous borders at home, the pressing existential threat posed by climate change. Yet none poses a more urgent test than the ongoing war in Gaza. Here, more than anywhere else, events summon the United States to affirm its claim to primacy. Right now, without delay.

Doing so would mean employing U.S. power and influence to bring this wretched war to an immediate end.

As measured by actions rather than rhetorical gestures, however, the Biden administration has done just the opposite. By providing immense quantities of ordnance to one side, it ensures the war’s perpetuation and facilitates the continued slaughter of noncombatants. By vetoing UN Security Council efforts to force a ceasefire, it stands virtually alone in defiance of world opinion. While American diplomats travel hither and yon, their efforts cannot be rated as other than ineffectual.

and Jack Watling’s piece at Foreign Affairs on Russia’s war against Ukraine:

If the Ukrainian military’s 2023 offensive had gone according to plan, its forces would have punched through Russia’s so-called Surovikin Line in Zaporizhzhia Province and liberated Melitopol, severing the roads connecting Russia to Crimea. Combined with Ukrainian naval operations, that would have put Crimea under siege. This objective was ambitious but achievable. The foremost reason it failed was that the Ukrainian units assigned to lead the offensive had insufficient time to train and prepare.

In July 2022, the United Kingdom, alongside other Ukrainian partners, established Operation Interflex to train Ukrainian troops. At the time, Ukraine desperately needed more units to hold defensive positions, so Interflex set the training program at five weeks, prioritizing skills vital to defensive operations. That five-week regimen still exists, but the mission has fundamentally changed.

During World War II, the British military considered 22 weeks the minimum time necessary to prepare a soldier for infantry combat. After this initial period, soldiers would be assigned to units and take part in collective training in battalions. Even before May 2023, it was evident that Ukraine’s troops were undertrained for offensive operations and had barely had time to learn how to operate newly donated equipment. But as Russian forces strengthened their defensive positions, the offensive could not be delayed.

the question that occurred to me was is prolonging wars actually in the best interest of the United States? I don’t think so. I think that short, swift, decisive wars tend to favor our interests while long, drawn out wars have generally gone against us for the last 50 years. The White House is rather clearly pushing to continue both wars.

Yesterday I remarked on Joe Biden’s approval rating. Today at Gallup Megan Brenan reports that President Biden ended 2023 with a lower approval rating than when he began it:

WASHINGTON, D.C. — President Joe Biden’s job approval rating is 39%, marking a slight improvement from the 37% low points in October and November but the fifth time his rating is below 40% in 2023.

During the latest poll’s Dec. 1-20 field period, the war between Israel and Hamas continued after a late November pause in fighting, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Biden at the White House to ask for the United States’ help in his country’s war with Russia, and House Republicans unanimously voted to open an impeachment inquiry into Biden.

While rank-and-file Republicans’ ratings of Biden have been firmly entrenched in the single digits since August 2021, independents’ ratings have been more variable. After hitting a record-low 27% in November, approval of Biden is up seven percentage points this month. Approval of Biden among Democrats is currently 78%, down slightly from last month’s 83%.

That’s no actually the punchline which is that President Biden’s approval rating at this point in his presidency is lower than that of any president in post-war period including Jimmy Carter who failed to be re-elected.

As I observed in comments to be re-elected his approval rating’s trend must change and it must change soon.

There are all sorts of retorts to that. His approval rating doesn’t matter; his approval rating relative to Donald Trump’s does (Trump’s approval rating is presently higher than Biden’s). It’s still early. A lot could happen between now and November 2024 (will what happens improve his approval rating or hurt it?). The only poll that matters is the one in November 2024.

My only points are that I’m sure that President Biden’s re-election campaign is looking at the same polls, should be expected to act accordingly, do it soon, and their actions may have unanticipated results.

Tonight I completed playing Baldur’s Gate 3. I started playing shortly after it came out in pre-release in October 2020. The game consists of three acts and only the first act was in the pre-release. The complete release came out in August 2023, I start a playthrough as a monk (a character class unavailable until then). And I’ve just completed.

It is an enormous, complex, beautiful game—probably the closest to playing a tabletop game of Dungeons and Dragons that a video game can be but with all of the advantages of a video game. Art, music, voice actors. The credits are enormous.

The first act is probably the most fully realized followed by the second act followed by the third. During pre-release I played through the first act at least a half dozen times, each time as a member of e different character class. I know from long experience that I am best suited by character to play as a bard, a rogue, or a monk. I also found playing as a sorcerer fun.

Tomorrow if I have the time I plan to play the final battle again (I saved just before the start of the battle), using a different strategy. Then I’ll start a new playthrough. I’m not sure what character class I’ll choose.

If you like role playing games, I highly recommend Baldur’s Gate 3 if you have a device capable of playing it and an Internet connection fast and stable enough to download it.

It’s available for PC, mac, Playstation, and XBox.

Here’s some food for thought:

The source of most these statistics is Zippia.com. College enrollments and on-time graduation rates come from the National Center for Educational Statistics.

The college enrollment and on-time graduation rates don’t really fit together with the job statistics (they’re measuring very different things) but I included them because I think they are illuminating. There aren’t actually many actuaries in the U. S. I only included because for me it represents the “path not taken”. When I graduated from high school I was offered a four year scholarship if I became an actuary. Actuary is a pretty good job but it wasn’t something I was interested in.

You might look at the job statistics and shout “Systemic racism!”. Depending on how you define that I might agree with you. That seems to be a term like “woke” for which the definition changes depending on the individual. Considering the relatively younger age of all of the construction trades jobs (and actuaries) we’re talking about relatively recently not historic racism. The population by race in the United States is 75.5% white, 19.1% Hispanic, 13.6% black, 6.3% Asian. Counting the adult population only doesn’t change that by much.

Need I point out that there are a disproportionately high number of Hispanics in the construction trades and a disproportionately high number of Asians are physicians, accountants, and actuaries? And that the percentage of blacks in all of those jobs is disproportionately low?

Here’s what I think:

• I think that young black Americans can pursue and succeed in any job that’s important enough to them and for which they will do what’s necessary.
• I think that expectations (their own; their teachers’ their parent’; others’) tend to channel young black Americans towards certain jobs. That’s why, for example, a disproportionate percent of black college students major in public administration.
• The table above illustrates a point I have been making. Our immigration system along with stereotypical expectations (see above) is stacked against black Americans.
• The system by which we train physicians, too, is stacked against black Americans. It might have made sense in 1910. It doesn’t make the same amount of sense now.

As an aside, note the low percentage of on-time college graduation rates among young black Americans attending college. IMO that’s explains the politics of the Biden Administration’s fixation on forgiving college loans.

You might want to take a look at Vox’s predictions for 2024, by Bryan Walsh, Dylan Matthews, Sigal Samuel, Kenny Torrella, Marina Bolotnikova, and Izzie Ramirez. All told they make 24. Here are the first eight:

• Donald Trump will return to the White House (55 percent)
• Republicans will recapture the Senate (85 percent)
• Democrats will recapture the House (55 percent)
• Inflation will come in under 3 points (65 percent)
• 2023 US car crash deaths will again exceed 40,000 (60 percent
• Netanyahu will be unseated as Israeli prime minister (75 percent)
• The world will be hotter in 2024 than it was in 2023 (80 percent)
• Narendra Modi will remain as prime minister of India after the country’s 2024 elections (85 percent)

It might be more interesting to consider the first three predictions together. On face value they’re telling us it’s more likely that a Republican wave will be more likely than a Democratic one and no wave at all is more likely than a wave for either.

It also might be interesting to consider which of their predictions is the most likely to be wrong. I suspect it’s their prediction about Netanyahu.

Here’s what I want for Christmas and the New Year:

• I want Congress to pass the bill funding aid for Ukraine and Israel, increasing staffing at the border, and changing our policy on asylum and for the president to sign it and enforce it.
• I want the U. S. Supreme Court to define clearly and unambiguously what is and is not an insurrection, whether Trump can be disqualified from seeking re-election under the terms of the 14th Amendment, and who has the authority to make the determination.
• I want Russia to stop making war on Ukraine.
• I want Hamas to surrender.
• I want Israel to stop funding settlements on the West Bank.
• I want Congress to raise the debt ceiling and enact a budget.
• I want Hollywood to make a movie I genuinely want to go to the theater to see.
• I want neither Joe Biden nor Donald Trump to seek re-election.
• I want the city to correct what their contractors screwed up in our alley.
• I want the bozos at work to start taking my advice, start doing their own jobs, and stop trying to do mine.

Nothing big or ostentatious. I’m under no illusions. I don’t think I’ll get any of those things.