Can We Deter Iran’s Proxies?

I am frankly puzzled by Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.’s Wall Street Journal op-ed. He opens by establishing his credentials in case you don’t know who he is:

Four years ago this week, at the direction of the president, forces under my command struck and killed Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. He was arriving there to coordinate attacks on our embassy and coalition targets across the region. Our successful strike threw Tehran’s plan into disarray. The Iranian response—a barrage of missiles against Al Asad air base in western Iraq—was largely a punch that landed against air. The attack was designed to kill Americans, but commanders on the ground ensured there were no fatalities. I don’t minimize the injuries our forces absorbed in that attack, but it could have been much worse. The Iranians subsequently backed down.

He then turns to his main message:

Here is the lesson: The Iranians’ strategic decision-making is rational. Its leaders understand the threat of violence and its application. It takes will and capability to establish and maintain deterrence. We were able to reset deterrence as a result of this violent couplet. The Iranians have always feared our capabilities, but before January 2020, they doubted our will. The bombing of the memorial ceremony for Soleimani in Iran on Wednesday that killed dozens of civilians isn’t an example of deterrence but likely internal factions struggling for power.

After exchanging fire with the U.S. four years ago, Iran continued to pursue its long-term trifecta of strategic objectives: preserving the theocratic regime in Tehran, destroying Israel, and ejecting the U.S. from the Middle East. The mullahs’ actions, however, were muted and hidden behind proxies, from the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria. The Iranians remembered the result of a straightforward confrontation with the U.S.

That brings me to what puzzles me. What does he want us to do? Strike back at Iran whenever someone in the Middle East attacks U. S. forces there? I’m skeptical that militias and even individual actors in the Middle East take their orders from a Central Command or in fact can be deterred by our using military force. Yes, we taught Iran a lesson: don’t attack U. S. forces directly. They aren’t. Mission accomplished.

But, as Gen. McKenzie observes, deterring Iran from taking direct military action against U. S. forces does not mean that Iran abandons its national interests. It just means they pursue them through means not deterred by American military might.

For me this is the crucial passage in the op-ed:

If avoiding escalation is the highest U.S. priority, then it is only logical to withdraw our forces from the region. That would ensure attacks on our bases don’t continue but ultimately endanger the future of the Mideast.

He raises a very interesting point. Why are U. S. troops stationed in the Middle East? As he notes if our primary objective is avoiding escalation the prudent course of action would be to remove them. If it’s to preserve peace in the Middle East, pretty clearly that’s a flop. There is precious little peace to preserve. Israel is attacking the Palestinians. Hamas, Hezbollah, and who knows how many others are attacking Israel right back. The Turks are attacking the Kurds and vice versa. DAESH is attacking Iran. Presumably, Iran will retaliate against DAESH in due course.

What national interests are we promoting with our troops in the Middle East? Because we import our oil from the Middle East? Our oil imports from the Middle East aren’t what they once were:

Are we there to preserve the flow of oil to our allies? France imports a much larger percentage of its oil from the Middle East than we do. Shouldn’t France be doing more to preserve the flow of oil?

Are our troops stationed there in case they’re needed? That would suggest that they’re there not to prevent escalation but in case of escalation.