The Council Has Spoken!

The Watcher’s Council has announced its winners for last week.

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

The announcement post at the Watcher’s site is here.

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The Iraqi Air Force

Somebody please refresh my memory on this. My recollection is that Iraq’s air force is in a pretty primitive state because that’s what we would allow them. I have a vague recollection of their chafing because we wouldn’t let them get jets, just a few helicopters.

It takes a while to create an air force from scratch. Even after we’d withdrawn there’s infrastructure to build, orders to place, and people to train, none of which can be done instantaneously.

But I’m fuzzy on this. Does anybody have better information?

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Don’t Envy Me Because I’m Canadian

A couple of Canadian researchers caution Americans about being too ready to admire the Canadian system. A big problem—wait times:

These wait times are not simply “minor inconveniences.” Patients experience physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and lost economic productivity while waiting for treatment. One recent estimate (2013) found that the value of time lost due to medical wait times in Canada amounted to approximately $1,200 per patient.

There is also considerable evidence indicating that excessive wait times lead to poorer health outcomes and in some cases, death. Dr. Brian Day, former head of the Canadian Medical Association recently noted that “[d]elayed care often transforms an acute and potentially reversible illness or injury into a chronic, irreversible condition that involves permanent disability.”

New research also suggests that wait times for medically necessary procedures may be associated with increased mortality. A recent report concluded that between 25,456 and 63,090 Canadian women may have died as a result of increased wait times between 1993 and 2009. Large as this number is, it doesn’t even begin to quantify the possibility of increased disability, poorer quality of life, and mental stress as a result of protracted wait times.

I think it’s also worth mentioning that Canadians who can afford it always have the U. S. healthcare system as a recourse. IMO any analysis of the Canadian system should take that into account.

While I think that the Canadian system overall is a good comparison for the U. S. system IMO there are a couple of things we should keep in mind. First, the Canadian system didn’t start off as a federal system and still isn’t a federal system. It’s a provincial system. Second, as a JAMA study I’ve mentioned from time to time points out, administrative costs in the Canadian system aren’t as low as some Americans seem to think they are. About 15% IIRC. That’s better than here but it doesn’t provide the savings it would take to cover everybody under a single-payer system without paying a considerable amount more than we do now.

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Status Report

I have now officially worked for one month at the new gig. I’ve also been paid and my earnings this month boost my total earnings for the year over my earnings for all of last year. Assuming I work through the end of the year, my earnings for 2014 will exceed my earnings for 2013 by several multiples. Money is not a primary motivation for me but having some does take the pressure off.

I had a chat with the guy who hired me on Friday. He told me he was delighted with what I was doing which is always reassuring.

As it turns out the pretext for retaining my services and the reason they hired me while not inconsistent were not identical. That is not surprising to me. The justifications for doing things and the reasons for doing them are frequently not the same. In this particular case I am routinely being asked to set policy for the company, something with which under the circumstances I’m not completely comfortable. Somebody needs to do it.

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Life in a Dog Pack: Exploring

Kara finds the house interesting.

Very, very interesting.

Exploring is exhausting.

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Figuring Out What’s Happening in the World

A question about sources for finding out about world events was asked in comments and this post is my attempt at answering it. I think that learning about what’s happening in the world from reading U. S. news sources is very difficult not so much because of partisanship but because that rather than getting 50 different opinions you’re more likely to get the same opinion 50 different times. Most U. S. news sources these days rely on the same wire services and those are two frequently just regurgitating press releases.

In the UK news outlets tend to be affiliated with political parties. You can always rely on The Telegraph (not so affectionately referred to as “the Torygraph”) to give you the Conservative on events, domestic or foreign. The Guardian usually has a Lib-Dem slant. I don’t know of a non-tabloid reliably pro-Labor news outlet. The Mirror is a tabloid, pretty reliably pro-Labour, but specializes in “weird news”. The BBC? I find the Beeb a good source for world news, better than American sources.

I think there’s an occasional analysis piece at Spiegel worth reading and I check in with Deutsche Welle every so often.

My preferred news source for events in Africa and the Near East, particularly former French possessions, is Le Monde. Sadly for Anglophones, there isn’t an English-language version.

If you don’t check in with Pravda’s English language version on world events, you’re really only getting half the story. You will get a drastically different version of the news. I also check in with a half dozen other Russian news sources but they’re all Russian language.

I have found Al Jazeera’s coverage of world news remarkably good.

For world opinion writing, world opinion about the U. S., you really should check out WorldMeet.us. The site features English language translations of opinion writing from all over the world. They’ve asked me to translate Russian opinion writing for them but I’ve demurred.

Anybody have any suggestions?

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What to Do About Iraq?

The situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate. From the Kurdish newspaper Rudaw:

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – Mosul is in the hands of al-Qaeda groups and former members of Saddam Hussein’s defunct ruling party and military, confirmed the spokesman of the Civil Committees that are now in charge of Iraq’s second-largest city.

Ghanim al-Aabed named the head of the new caretaker government in Mosul as Hashem Jamas, a former top general in Saddam’s army.

He added that the aim of the ongoing fighting, as the Sunni insurgents advance toward Baghdad, is to topple Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-led government.

Aabed refuted wide media reports that al-Qaeda breakaway. the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL), was behind the swift military advances that began in Mosul and continue toward Baghdad.

He named Ansar al-Sunnah and Ansar al-Islam, both known for ties to al-Qaeda, as two of the jihadi groups involved in the fighting. The unlikely coalition includes fighters of the Sunni Naqshbandi sect, which had many officers in Saddam’s army.

“But not with ISIS,” he added. “The reports in the media about that are not correct.”

Islamists are also in control of other major cities like Tikrit – Saddam’s birthplace — as well as Hawija, Fallujah and Ramadi, plus parts of Diyala province.

On a passing note unless you think it’s merely a coincidence that the heads of Iraqi Kurdistan’s two major political parties are the hereditary leaders of the Iraqi Kurds’ two major tribal factions IMO caution should be exercised in thinking of what’s going on there as democracy. The source for the report above is affiliated with the KDP’s boss and current president of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani. Barzani’s nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, is vice president.

Meanwhile Young Shi’ite Iraqis are turning out to defend against the advance of the ISIS terrorist army:

Hundreds of young Iraqi men gripped by religious and nationalistic fervor streamed into volunteer centers Saturday across Baghdad, answering a call by the country’s top Shiite cleric to join the fight against Sunni militants advancing in the north.

Dozens climbed into the back of army trucks, chanting Shiite slogans and hoisting assault rifles, pledging to battle the Sunni group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which has launched a lightning advance across the country.

“By God’s will, we will be victorious.” said one volunteer, Ali Saleh Aziz. “We will not be stopped by the ISIL or any other terrorists.”

The massive response to the call by the Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued via his representative Friday, comes as sectarian tensions are threatening to push the country back toward civil war in the worst crisis since U.S. forces withdrew at the end of 2011.

Could unseasoned untrained volunteers do better against the ISIS advance than the at least notionally trained Iraqi army? Could they do worse?

In Washington, if there may be need to airlift in hand surgeons to repair the repetitive stress injuries cause by marathon finger-pointing, there is equally no lack of prescriptions on how the U. S. should respond. President Obama is determined to keep the American profile low:

WASHINGTON — President Obama vowed again Friday to help Iraq’s government fight insurgents who are closing in on Baghdad, while a senior defense official told USA TODAY that American air power options are currently limited.

“The United States will do our part, but understand that ultimately, it’s up to the Iraqis, as a sovereign nation, to solve their problems,” Obama told reporters at the White House.

Obama also said: “We will not be sending U.S. troops back into combat in Iraq.”

A senior defense official said U.S. air power options in Iraq are limited because the closest aircraft that could wage a bombing campaign against Islamist militants who have captured several of the nation’s largest cities are at least 800 miles away.

In an op-ed in the Washington Post retired Gen. James Dubik recommends sterner measures:

So, what can we do now? Providing Iraq more “military stuff” isn’t a real answer, nor is the reintroduction of large numbers of U.S. or coalition troops. We have no easy options, but to start, the United States and its allies must commit to preventing an ISIS victory and assist the government of Iraq in halting and reversing ISIS’s progress. Although the long-term solutions for Iraqi stability are diplomatic and political, unless the Iraqi government can stop the ISIS offensive, such actions will be moot.

Halting the offensive is Iraq’s nearest-term objective. What is needed is a coordinated air and ground action consisting of both a heavy dose of precisely applied firepower and a sufficiently executed ground defensive. The Iraqis are incapable of such action alone. The firepower will have to be delivered by United States and allied aircraft augmented by Iraqi assets. The Iraqis will also need a small group of advisers to target air support correctly and to help identify or create capable, well-led units that are properly employed and backed by sufficient sustainment capacity. The advisory and support effort must be substantial enough to help the Iraqis conduct an initial defense and then plan and prepare a series of counter-offensive campaigns to regain lost areas. This will be a multi-year effort, but it cannot become a second surge.

carried on in the context of a vigorous diplomatic and political campaign to, in essence, get the Iraqi prime minister to relinquish much of his authority.

Michael Gerson points out the risks of risk aversion:

But risk aversion, it turns out, can multiply complication. Because the United States refused to coordinate an effort to arm the responsible opposition in Syria, there has been no pressure for the regime to engage in serious peace negotiations. Bashar al-Assad has found barrel bombs more effective. In Geneva talks last November, American officials were left with no plan except to (pathetically) hope for Russian and Iranian diplomatic favors, which never came. Countries such as Turkey and the Gulf states, left leaderless in the region, have often funneled support to radicals. The United States has supplied weapons to the Iraqi government to fight militants in western Iraq while (incoherently) refusing to arm people fighting the same enemy 100 miles to the west in Syria. Now a few thousand militants, with roots in the Syrian conflict, threaten to destroy the Iraqi government, along with the remnants of U.S. credibility in the region.

This should be the end of illusions. Sometimes risk aversion can be a very risky option. The mere containment of Syrian chaos would have required a more activist U.S. policy — coordinating Middle Eastern and European powers to create a balance of forces on the ground that might have encouraged a power-sharing agreement among less horrible regime elements and less horrible opposition groups. Some variant is still Syria’s best (but fading) hope.

The editors of the Washington Post are concerned about the position the president is staking out:

The temptation to let Iraq fend for itself is strong and, given the history, understandable. Some may even see a chance for stability in reconfiguring the country along its sectarian Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish lines. But there are no neat dividing lines. A breakup of Iraq is likely to bring endless violence to its people and many others around the world. Not to do everything possible to avert that outcome would be a dereliction, and one that Americans might greatly regret for years to come.

The editors of the Christian Science Monitor urge caution.

Jessica Lewis, who has been studying ISIS and has warned about the likelihood of events not unlike those unfolding in Iraq now urges action much along the lines of that proposed by Gen. Dubik:

There are no political solutions available to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki —ISIS doesn’t engage in peace talks. What is needed is a coherent military strategy to halt the present ISIS offensive, and a concerted effort to rebuild Iraqi security forces so that they are armed and trained well enough to oust ISIS from territory it now controls.

In other words, Iraq needs the United States. U.S. Special Operations forces would provide invaluable early-targeting support to Iraqi army units preparing for battle. Airstrikes on ISIS strongholds between Mosul and Bayji would help Iraqi ground forces maneuvering to retake Mosul and Tikrit. The U.S. Army could also provide logistics and other support to the Iraqi military. The Iraqi forces will require additional training, maintenance assistance and battlefield planning support before launching a full counteroffensive. The U.S. can provide it. Drone strikes and other measures suited for combating a terrorist group won’t suffice against ISIS. This is a terrorist army, bent on having its own country.

I would like to see President Obama make a clear, unambiguous statement of the U. S. interests in the region and in Iraq in particular. I don’t find strategic ambiguity called for in this particular situation. Whatever our position we should “suit the action to the word”, as Shakespeare put it.

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Failure Is an Orphan

When Mao’s People’s Liberation Army defeated Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist army in 1949, practically overnight China transmogrified from a staunch ally of the United States to a bitter adversary. In Washington a debate broke out. The question on their minds was “Who Lost China?” In Washington today, propelled by the blitzkrieg of the terrorist army of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham in Iraq, the World Series of Finger-Pointing has begun over “Who Lost Iraq?” As it turns out, there’s plenty of blame to go around.

Fareed Zakaria identifies the primary culprit as Nouri al-Maliki:

The first answer to the question is: Nouri al-Maliki lost Iraq.

The prime minister and his ruling party have behaved like thugs, excluding the Sunnis from power, using the army, police forces and militias to terrorize their opponents. The insurgency the al-Maliki government faces today was utterly predictable because, in fact, it happened before. From 2003 onward, Iraq faced a Sunni insurgency that was finally tamped down by Gen. David Petraeus, who said explicitly at the time that the core element of his strategy was political, bringing Sunni tribes and militias into the fold. The surge’s success, he often noted, bought time for a real power-sharing deal in Iraq that would bring the Sunnis into the structure of the government.

That did not happen.

However, he gives both George W. Bush and Barack Obama a share of the blame:

If the Bush administration deserves a fair share of blame for “losing Iraq,” what about the Obama administration and its decision to withdraw American forces from the country by the end of 2011? I would have preferred to see a small American force in Iraq to try to prevent the country’s collapse.

But let’s remember why this force is not there. Prime Minister al-Maliki refused to provide the guarantees that every other country in the world that hosts U.S. forces offers. Some commentators have blamed the Obama administration for negotiating badly or halfheartedly and perhaps this is true.

David Ignatius, too, blames Maliki:

The stunning gains this week by Iraq’s Sunni insurgents carry a crucial political message: Nouri al-Maliki, the Shiite prime minister of Iraq, is a polarizing sectarian politician who has lost the confidence of his army and nation. He cannot put a splintered Iraq together again, no matter how many weapons the Obama administration sends him.

Maliki’s failure has been increasingly obvious since the elections of 2010, when the Iraqi people in their wisdom elected a broader, less-sectarian coalition. But the Obama administration, bizarrely working in tandem with Iran, brokered a deal that allowed Maliki to continue and has worked with him as an ally against al-Qaeda. Maliki’s coalition triumphed in April’s elections, but the balloting was boycotted by Sunnis.

Given Maliki’s sectarian and authoritarian style, a growing number of Iraq experts are questioning why the Obama administration continues to provide him billions in military aid — and is said to be weighing his plea for lethal Predator drones. The skeptics include some who were once among Maliki’s champions.

As you might expect, the editors of the Wall Street Journal blame President Obama:

Iraq was largely at peace when Mr. Obama came to office in 2009. Reporters who had known Baghdad during the worst days of the insurgency in 2006 marveled at how peaceful the city had become thanks to the U.S. military surge and counterinsurgency. In 2012 Anthony Blinken, then Mr. Biden’s top security adviser, boasted that, “What’s beyond debate” is that “Iraq today is less violent, more democratic, and more prosperous. And the United States is more deeply engaged there than at any time in recent history.”

Mr. Obama employed the same breezy confidence in a speech last year at the National Defense University, saying that “the core of al Qaeda” was on a “path to defeat,” and that the “future of terrorism” came from “less capable” terrorist groups that mainly threatened “diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad.” Mr. Obama concluded his remarks by calling on Congress to repeal its 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force against al Qaeda.

If the war on terror was over, ISIS didn’t get the message. The group, known as Tawhid al-Jihad when it was led a decade ago by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was all but defeated by 2009 but revived as U.S. troops withdrew and especially after the uprising in Syria spiraled into chaos. It now controls territory from the outskirts of Aleppo in northwestern Syria to Fallujah in central Iraq.

I think that we should also keep in mind that the “diplomatic surge” and weapons we promised Iraq after our withdrawal never materialized. This is a movie we’ve seen before: once American forces have been withdrawn, don’t expect our promises to be kept.

I find all of these analyses terribly short-sighted. The path of least resistance in reconstructing Iraq was alway replacing Saddam Hussein, the Sunni Arab strongman, with a Shi’a Arab strongman. Any number of old Iraq hands said as much at the onset of our invasion of the country in 2003. I think that any Shi’a Arab strongman would have done much as Nouri al-Maliki has: shored up his constituency. That they had old grievances to address contributed to the problem.

While we’re assigning blame I’d give some to David Petraeus. COIN has always had the underlying assumption that those employing felt a right to stick around and manage things and would do so. That was never an alternative in Iraq so, consequently, COIN was not an appropriate strategy there. While it might be a good strategy for the colonizing British, it’s far less appropriate for Americans eager to beat a hasty path to the exit door.

I don’t think there’s any question that the Bush Administration botched the entire post-9/11 period from its invasions and occupations to its mismanagement of the tenuous peaces. There was never a good strategy of invading Iraq or Afghanistan. Not unless we were willing to remain in both places indefinitely, something I did not see then and still don’t.

However, let’s not lose track of the senators who voted in favor of the invasion of Iraq. Those included not only the usual Republican suspects, most notably John McCain, a man who apparently has never met a war he didn’t like, but the following Democratic senators: Clinton, Biden, Kerry, Feinstein, and Reid. Don’t believe the mealy-mouthed and self-serving statements they’ve made since 2004. They saw all of the same intelligence that the White House did. If they believed that we shouldn’t have invaded Iraq, they should never have voted to do so.

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Will There Be an Anti-Incumbent Wave?

I see that Ron Fournier is echoing a point I made in the wake of Eric Cantor’s primary defeat:

Americans see a grim future for themselves, their children, and their country. They believe their political leaders are selfish, greedy, and short-sighted—unable and/or unwilling to shield most people from wrenching economic and social change. For many, the Republican Party is becoming too extreme, while the Democratic Party—specifically, President Obama—raised and dashed their hopes for true reform.

Worse of all, the typical American doesn’t know how to channel his or her anger. Heaven help Washington if they do.

[…]

Which side of the barricade are you on? Populists from the right and the left—from the tea party and libertarian-leaning Rand Paul to economic populist Elizabeth Warren—are positioning themselves among the insurgents. Sosnik pointed to six areas of consensus that eventually may unite the divergent populist forces:

  • A pullback from the rest of the world, with more of an inward focus.
  • A desire to go after big banks and other large financial institutions.
  • Elimination of corporate welfare.
  • Reducing special deals for the rich.
  • Pushing back on the violation of the public’s privacy by the government and big business.
  • Reducing the size of government.

I could point out right populist websites without difficulty; I’m not sure I could point out a left populist website if you held a gun to my head. Naked Capitalism? Are left populists really interested in reducing the size of government? Or are they interest in expanding benefits in ways that would require a substantially larger federal government? That’s not a rhetorical question. I’d like to know the answer.

I’m not particularly interested in Eric Cantor any more than I’m interested in the Congressional caucus of any state other than my own. I figure that the other states can elect any tomfool representatives that suit them. Cantor’s position as House Majority Leader gives his defeat a more national character.

Cantor’s defeat might be just a defeat of Cantor and nothing more. It could be a repudiation of amnesty of illegal immigrants by the voters of his district. It might mean all sorts of things, few of them particularly interesting.

But if his defeat portends an anti-incumbent wave in November that could be very interesting, indeed.

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The Children’s Invasion

I wanted to draw your attention to an editorial at the Christian Science Monitor on the sharp increase in the number of unaccompanied minors coming into the United States across the Mexican border:

Some observers suggest that the US has earned a reputation in Latin American countries for being “soft” on undocumented women and children, a policy, they say, that only encourages more of them to cross the border. Some of the children are being allowed to join family members already in the US legally. Others are being passed along to private aid organizations for temporary shelter.

Politicians in both US political parties, as well as private aid agencies, wonder how the US will be able to afford to care for such an influx of vulnerable children and, in some cases, their mothers. The cost of dealing with children entering the US illegally is expected to rise to $2 billion in 2015, up from $868 million in 2014, the Obama administration estimates.

It is in the nature of Americans – as well as in American self-interest – to want to help improve, through aid and diplomacy, the economic and political situations south of its border so that fewer desperate individuals, including children, will try to cross into the US illegally. The US can also try to put a stronger fence around its “yard” to keep unwanted immigrants and their problems outside.

But once a child is here, on the doorstep, Americans know that bringing that child inside and providing help is their only choice.

Something that has gone too long unremarked upon is that this isn’t just another American problem. Children aren’t coming from Guatemala and Honduras through 1,000 miles of Mexico by transporter beam. I do not believe such a thing could occur without Mexican acquiescence or connivance. This is a regional issue and we should be engaged in multi-lateral talks that include not just Mexico but the “donor” countries as well. Aid to assist these countries in helping the desperate people coming here would be cheaper than stemming a humanitarian disaster after it’s already arrived on our doorstep.

This is yet another example of unexpected secondary effects. There are so many to choose from! Dilatory American policy. Public musing by high officials. Confused immigration policy. The dangers of agricultural monoculture.

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