Between the present and a low-carbon future lies a technically vexing gap — building a better battery. Solar and wind power are cheaper than ever, but the sun doesn’t always shine and the wind doesn’t always blow. More powerful batteries could solve the problem of keeping the lights on, plus expand the market for electric cars by eliminating so-called range anxiety. Battery research today is hotter than any time since Thomas Edison and battery costs are falling faster than many had hoped. But the science is still daunting. There may be limits to how much better current technologies can be, and bolder new approaches depend on big breakthroughs. Price is an issue, too. Wind and solar were helped by tens of billions of dollars in global subsidies of a kind not available for the less-sexy work of storing power.
I think he needs to think outside the box a bit more. Although we’re not particularly good at storing electricity, we’re pretty good at storing heat. The problem there is what it’s always been: conversion loss.
What if we already have the best batteries we’ll be able to make? Or nearly so? What if the cost of developing the next generation of better batteries is exponentially higher than the cost of developing the last?
These are the considerations that make me believe that solar and wind will always be niche technologies. That and their requiring such huge subsidization to be competitive.
Noah Feldman argues that an Arab military coalition would be good for the United States and good for Israel. He opens with a conventional balance of power argument:
The Iranians see the Saudis as their adversary across the Persian Gulf, and any foothold on the Arabian Peninsula is a potentially important chess piece to use against Saudi Arabia. In any case, the Islamic Republic of Iran hasn’t insisted on a precise overlap of Shiite beliefs when choosing Arab allies.
Conversely, the last thing the Saudis want is an Iranian-supported regime in Yemen. That’s why they’ve been bombing Sanaa — to dispossess the Houthis. The challenge of the Saudi bombing is that, from a regional perspective, it looks simply as though Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in a proxy war in Yemen.
and closes with this:
If Egyptian-Saudi-Jordanian military cooperation succeeds in Yemen, then it becomes conceivable that Egyptian troops could provide the main body of an eventual ground force against Islamic State. Egypt would get money from the Saudis — but, more important, Sisi could help Egypt regain some of the international prestige it has lost in recent decades. This could help his domestic legitimacy considerably. It could also occupy the Egyptian Army in a military task, which would enable Sisi to consolidate his control of the military.
Even Israel would be unlikely to object. Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel, and Saudi Arabia has shown openness to such a treaty in the past. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu clearly sees Iran as the major geopolitical threat. In the Sunni-Shiite struggle, Israel increasingly looks like it’s on the side of Sunnis.
All of this assumes that the states involved are able to use all the hardware they’ve bought over the years effectively and that their ground troops are willing to fight. I think that Mr. Feldman exaggerates the role that sectarianism plays in what’s going on in the Middle East right now. IMO the evidence that whatever support the Iranians have provided to the Houthi in Yemen is substantial or relevant is pretty weak. I think it’s more along the lines of “the enemy of my enemy”. There’s a Bedouin proverb that may be relevant: I against my brother, my brothers and I against my cousins, then my cousins and I against strangers.
We have a proverb, too: he who sups with the devil should have a long spoon. We will always be the strangers and should be very cautious in evaluating our interests in so fractious a region of the world.
Is it any wonder the Fed has blown asset bubble after asset bubble with increasing amplitude over time?
I think I’d be a little kinder. I think that, when you get to define your terms in ways that are very different from the way ordinary people might define them, you have practically complete freedom of action and almost no accountability, the factors you consider in making your judgments will be pretty different from what the ordinary guy might have done. You don’t care about the effect on the ordinary guy. You’ve got the Buffetts and Dimons of the world to consider.
I sometimes wonder what it is with the Obama Administration and self-imposed deadlines. Do they ever work in our favor? At any rate the deadline for reaching an agreement with Iran is tomorrow. What are the prospects for arriving at an agreement all of the parties will accept?
Iran’s foreign minister met his counterparts from America and five other world powers on Monday as the opposing sides struggled to secure a nuclear deal by Tuesday’s deadline.
The first full negotiating session between Mohammad Javad Zarif and the “P5 plus 1†group of countries began shortly after 9am in the Swiss town of Lausanne. This meeting ended after a little over an hour.
At stake is a final agreement that would settle the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. John Kerry, the US secretary of state, is pressing for a deal to guarantee that Iranian scientists would need at least a year to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb, in return for sanctions being lifted.
That the Iranian foreign minister has announced that Iran will not export its nuclear fuel which would seem to me to be a fundamental component of a workable agreement, that the Iranians are insisting that all sanctions be lifted immediately, and that they’re insisting on a Security Council resolution recognizing Iran’s right to enrich do not seem to me to bode particularly well for an agreement.
I think that the Iranians are reading President Obama very well. The president has a history of upping the ante in negotiations at the last minute so they’ve preempted that by changing their own demands. In the trade that’s referred to as “negotiating in bad faith”. I think they’ve also pegged the president as desperate enough for any agreement that they can pretty well name their terms.
Seven Arab states participated in the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991. After the war, the GCC agreed in principle to build a regional military inclusive of Egypt and Syria, but the effort stalled. The delay led then-chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton, to take Washington’s Gulf allies to task: “What they are really doing is relying on the U.S. as their security guarantor. And if they get into trouble again, they are going to blow the whistle.â€
Notwithstanding Mr. Hamilton’s warning, Washington has served reliably as the guarantor of Gulf security for much of the past 25 years. But lately, as the Obama administration has moved closer to a nuclear deal with Iran—and as Tehran has expanded its influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen—Washington’s traditional Sunni allies are increasingly concerned about a diminished U.S. commitment.
They do give some lip service to my view of the development:
The willingness of Arab states to finally sacrifice blood and treasure to defend the region from terrorism and Iranian encroachment is a positive development.
but the overall tone of the op-ed is apprehensive.
How bad would it be, really, if the Gulf States actually took responsibility for their own defense? Or, horrors, if the countries of Europe were to do the same? Our NATO frenemies have committed to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Many of the largest NATO economies are spending far less than that which means that overall the European members are spending far less than 2% in aggregate. Basically, they’re free riders on our defense spending. It’s ever so much easier and more comfortable to whine about the warmongering Yanks when you’re spending 1% of GDP on defense while we’re spending 4%.
I think the real unstated worry of the authors is that an Arab League defense force might present a threat to Israel and history suggests that’s a possibility. Ultimately, Israel’s problems are Israel’s problems. We do have interests other than Israel. And the U. S. security umbrella has been a cause of instability in the Middle East for the last several decades rather than a stabilizing one.
Private equity is done. Stick a fork in it. With Kraft singles and Heinz ketchup as toppings, there are many signs that private equity has peaked as an asset class.
Here’s his description of the sector:
When it comes down to it, private equity is pretty simple. You buy a company, putting up some cash and borrowing the rest, sometimes from banks but often via exotic instruments that Wall Street is happy to sell. Then you manage the company for cash flow, making sure you can make interest payments with enough left over for fees and investor dividends. With enough cash flow, you either take the company public or sell it to someone else. And how do you generate cash flow? You can expand the company, but more likely you slash costs, close divisions, cut staff, curtail marketing, eliminate research and development and more. In other words, cutting to the bone.
While that may be a fair characterization of some private equity funds does it apply to all of them? Here are his reasons for predicting the “decline of the asset class”:
Interest rates are going up.
Banks are less eager to lend for leveraged buyouts.
Tax reform may make it less profitable.
Private equity funds are bad for the economy.
It’s already picked the low-hanging fruit.
I think there’s some reason to question his claims. For one thing private equity investment today as a proportion of GDP is substantially below its pre-recession level. Since interest rates have gone down even as private equity investment has decline it suggests that either a) the dynamics are somewhat different than he’s suggesting or b) the “glory days” of private equity ended some time ago. It may be that he’s predicting the past, a somewhat easier chore than predicting the future.
What is a highly leveraged buyout? Is 6:1 typical or is it at the margins? That would make quite a bit of difference in his analysis.
There’s a post over at FP’s blog that makes an interesting point. In providing air support for the joint Iraqi Army-Shi’ite militia offense to retake the city of Tikrit from DAESH, the U. S. is supporting a violent ethnic cleansing:
Sunni villages in Amerli and Suleiman Bek, in the Salah ad-Din province, have been looted or destroyed by militiamen operating on the specious assumption that all inhabitants once ruled by IS must be IS sympathizers or collaborators. Human Rights Watch has also lately discovered that the “liberation†of Amerli last October — another PMU/Iranian-led endeavor, only this one abetted by U.S. airstrikes in the early stages — was characterized by wide-scale abuses including the looting and burning of homes and business of Sunni residents of villages surrounding Amerli. The apparent aim was ethnic cleansing.The apparent aim was ethnic cleansing. Human Rights Watch concluded, from witness accounts, that “building destruction in at least 47 predominantly Sunni villages was methodical and driven by revenge and intended to alter the demographic composition of Iraq’s traditionally diverse provinces of Salah al-Din and Kirkuk.â€
As of this writing we are being treated to a very bizarre spectacle. In Syria we’re at least implicitly supporting DAESH and opposing Iran by opposing the Assad government. In Iraq we’re implicitly supporting Iran and opposing DAESH by supporting the Iraqi government. If there is clearer evidence that our Middle East policy is in disarray I don’t know what it would be.
As a thought experiment let’s list the possible combinations of policies we might be adopting.
Support the established governments. That would mean we would support the Assad government in Syria and the present government in Iraq. That’s essentially the Russians’ position.
Oppose the established governments. That would mean we would oppose the Assad government in Syria and the present government in Iraq. We’re obviously not doing that but it would have some consistency to it. We would be opposing pro-Iranian governments.
Foster chaos. Support the Assad government, the Syrian rebels (implicitly DAESH), the Iraqi government. Let ’em beat each other to a pulp. We don’t like any of them so why not? Don’t laugh. I’ve actually heard people articulate this as a strategy.
Incoherence. Which is where we are. We’re supporting DAESH in Syria and opposing it in Iran. We’re supporting Iran in Iraq and opposing it in Syria.
Let’s engage in a thought experiment. Let’s say you’re a middle aged white man on a commuter train in St. Louis. A young black man sits next to you and asks you your opinion on the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson would you be within your legal rights to draw your legally licensed firearm and shoot the young man dead? It’s beginning to look to me as though you might be:
(CNN)When one man sat down next to a second man in a St. Louis light rail car and asked him his opinion on the shooting of Michael Brown, it was not the beginning of a discussion.
It was the start of an assault, police said.
The second man, who was white, didn’t want to answer the question. Then the first man, who was black, boxed him in the face. Two more African-American men joined in the beating, according to a police report about Monday’s incident.
It was caught on surveillance cameras on the MetroLink train and a passenger recorded it with a cell phone and posted the video online. It has gone viral.
Police confirmed to CNN that the online images came from the attack.
The victim, 43, was commuting home when a young man in a red T-shirt and cap walked up to him. The victim asked not to be named in media reports.
The man asked to use the victim’s cell phone. He declined, and the young man sat down beside him.
“Then he asked me my opinion on the Michael Brown thing,” the victim told KMOV, “and I responded I was too tired to think about it right now.”
The suspect, in his 20s, stood up.
“The next thing I know, he sucker punches me right in the middle of my face,” the victim said. The video showed the suspect unleashing a barrage of punches at the head of the victim, who covered himself with his hand and forearms.
The two other men, also in their 20s, joined in, police said. As the train pulled into a station, a security guard saw part of the beating and alerted police.
Lest there be any doubt I do not view the developments of recent months as benign and this is one more piece of evidence. It also makes me wonder what the heck Howard Schultz was thinking when he started his “Race Together” project at Starbucks. He should have known better. In the neighborhood that he grew up in (and the one I spent my early years in) starting a racial dialogue was a good way to get yourself killed. Or at least beaten up.
Fine-scale genetic variation between human populations is interesting as a signature of historical demographic events and because of its potential for confounding disease studies. We use haplotype-based statistical methods to analyse genome-wide single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) data from a carefully chosen geographically diverse sample of 2,039 individuals from the United Kingdom. This reveals a rich and detailed pattern of genetic differentiation with remarkable concordance between genetic clusters and geography. The regional genetic differentiation and differing patterns of shared ancestry with 6,209 individuals from across Europe carry clear signals of historical demographic events. We estimate the genetic contribution to southeastern England from Anglo-Saxon migrations to be under half, and identify the regions not carrying genetic material from these migrations. We suggest significant pre-Roman but post-Mesolithic movement into southeastern England from continental Europe, and show that in non-Saxon parts of the United Kingdom, there exist genetically differentiated subgroups rather than a general ‘Celtic’ population.
I’ve mentioned it before but my maternal line and, consequently, my mitochondrial DNA derives from Ireland and I find the map from the study (above) very interesting. I ran the genetic testing information I’ve obtained through a more sophisticated analysis than provided by my testing company and it determined that my mtDNA haplogroup is J1c3g. That particular mtDNA haplogroup is pretty common in northwestern Europe and Russia. Most Americans don’t know it but the Norsemen travelled long distances up Russia’s rivers and were very influential in ancient Russia. The very first Russian kingdom, known as “Rus”, was founded by Norsemen. It’s my understanding that about 80% of the Norse are J1c3g. And that haplogroup occurs in Ireland as well. I may even break down and buy the study.
One of the things all of the genetic testing that’s going on now has done was called into question some long-held ideas about history. You only inherit your mitochondrial DNA from your mother who got it from her mother, who got it from her mother, etc. A reasonable rule of thumb is that a particular subgroup probably originated where the highest proportion of the population has it so that suggests that J1c3g originated in Norway. If the Norsemen were just raiders, what’s a Norse mtDNA haplogroup doing in Ireland and Russia? Perhaps the Norsemen were settlers rather than just raiders.
I suspect that as these maps become available for more parts of the world prehistory will be re-written (so to speak).
I’ve watched the first couple of episodes of the new CW television series iZombie. It’s sort of a mashup of The Walking Dead and Veronica Mars if you can imagine such a thing. It’s original, I’ll give it that. It suffers from the same problems as most American TV shows do: bad writing and constant mugging on the part of the actors. I don’t know that I’ve ever explained what I mean by “mugging”.
Mugging is mostly what passes for acting here in the United States. It consists of making faces and striking poses. It’s most common in but not exclusive to young actresses. One of the reasons I find British, Canadian, and Australian television programs so much more watchable than American ones is that the acting is so much better.
Right now I’m streaming an old British detective program called Lovejoy which stars Ian McShane. Here in the States detective programs are either police procedurals or private eyes (and private eyes have almost completely disappeared) with the occasional criminology professor or physician. In the UK there are detective programs in which the detectives are gossipy old ladies, clergymen, cooks, or gardeners. There isn’t the straitjacket there is here in the States.
Lovejoy is a sort of detective program in which the detective is a slightly shady antiques dealer. I haven’t mentioned it for a while but for several years I was an antiques dealer. Part time not full time. And I wasn’t much into fine arts as Lovejoy is but I knew guys like Lovejoy in the trade. Not as handsome, of course. I was more into what I suspect the Brits might call “collectables” or just plain junk rather than antiques. Antiques of the sort that Lovejoy deals in are in very short supply here in the U. S.
Selling furniture is hard work. You frequently need to deliver your sales which means you need a truck and must be willing to carry heavy pieces. Glass and china break. I knew a number of dealers who made an amazing amount of money selling old costume jewelry. That had the advantages of being light, portable, and not particularly fragile. The margins could be very good if you knew what you were doing. It’s something about which I know nothing.
There’s a lot of money in selling fine antique jewelry. I knew a dealer or two who could carry their inventory in their pockets (and did).