This country is becoming one big cosplay convention.
True? False? Good? Bad? A little of all of the above?

This country is becoming one big cosplay convention.
True? False? Good? Bad? A little of all of the above?
Anthony Cordesman is unhappy with President Obama’s “dribble-in” strategy in Iraq and Syria:
This approach does not address the general pointlessness of training 5,000 supposedly moderate rebels a year when our key Arab allies are supporting the non-ISIL rebel forces, when the last report on recruits for the 5,000 man force totaled all of 90, when there is no clear political goal or way of dealing with Russia and Iran, when Syria’s economy has collapsed, and when more than 11 million of some 19 million people are refugees or internally displaced persons within homes or jobs of their own.
The announcement does nothing to address the critical issue of Iran’s role in Iraq and Syria, or of countering its growing influence in Iraq and Syria. It could lead Iran to try to use Shi’ite militias and its advisory efforts to block U.S. efforts to reach Iraq’s Sunnis, and they certainly seem unlikely to have an end game where the United States creates an Iraq independent enough to stand up to Iran, or do anything to address the role of Iran and the Hezbollah in Syria. It also does nothing to strengthen the weak to non-existent bridges between the Iraq government and our major Arab allies, or raise their flow of aid to Iraq, as a counter to Iran.
It does not address Iraq’s deep and growing internal political and military divisions between Arab Sunni, Arab Shi’ite, and Kurd – divisions likely to be steadily fueled by Iraq’s much lower oil revenues, Iranian pressure, and the Kurdish seizure of new disputed territory in Ninewa and around Kirkuk. It has been clear from the start that success in Iraq required a far better solution to its internal problems – and quite possibly some form of federalism – as well as much more effective governance.
I’m dissatisified with it as well but for somewhat different reasons, namely it’s complete lack of coherence in terms of its foreign policy objectives. That lack of coherence drives one to the supposition that the president’s “incrementalism” is not intended to satisfy foreign policy objectives at all but just to enable the president to run out the clock until Iraq is somebody else’s problem.
In his USA Today column Glenn Reynolds fulminates about the hacking of the Office of Personnel Management’s computer data on federal employees:
The U.S. military, even in its current somewhat shrunken state, remains an irresistible force in conventional warfare. But this trove of information is perfect for “fourth-generation warfare,” in which conventional strengths are bypassed in favor of targeted attacks on a stronger nation’s weaknesses. With this sort of information, China will find it much easier to recruit agents, blackmail decision-makers and — in the event of a straight-up conflict — strike directly at Americans in the government, all without launching a single missile.
That’s why experts are calling this security breach a “debacle” and “potentially devastating.” Some are even calling it a “cyber Pearl Harbor.”
Perhaps that’s a bit strong: Unlike the real Pearl Harbor attack, there are no burning and sunken ships full of American sailors. On the other hand, if the Japanese in 1941 could have kept the U.S. from interfering with their Pacific conquests through subtler means than air-dropped torpedoes, they no doubt would have been happy to do so. And that’s the situation that China, with cyberattacks such as this one, is trying to bring about.
What do we do? Well, so far the federal government is offering free identity-theft protection to its employees, but that response is like putting a Band-Aid on a severed limb — so pathetic it’s not even cosmetic. This isn’t like a broken code, where we can just change things around and be almost as good as new. Once out, this information will remain current for years, and there’s no easy or effective way of doing much about that.
He does make one important point, one I’ve made here: the federal government should refrain from putting sensitive records online. Hacking of computer records can be done in wholesale, making it much more tempting than paper records.
There’s something else he doesn’t point out and I haven’t seen mentioned anywhere else. This incident is a test for federal employees’ unions. If there were ever an issue made for fully justified collective bargaining, this is it. That’s how I interpret the recent remarks by the leaders of those unions.
Clarence Page wonders whether Hillary Clinton can “rally Obama’s coalition”:
A big looming question: How much have black voters gotten over hard feelings left over from Clinton’s long-running primary battle against Obama in 2008? A lot of people have long memories, especially in politics.
Another question: Are Obama’s core supporters so disenchanted over what he was unable to accomplish against his strong Republican opposition that they won’t bother to vote this time?
If Chicago is any gauge, the answer to Mr. Page’s question about rallying the Obama coalition is a resounding “No” unless Sec. Clinton picks a black running mate. Here the difference between the percentage of black voters who show up to vote when there’s a black candidate on the ticket is drastically different from when there isn’t. And I don’t just mean by two percentage points.
I don’t think that Matthew Schoenfield quite gets the point about income inequality:
From 2000-10, many of the 34 OECD countries propped up growth by launching expansive social programs with borrowed money. But not all. The five most “unequal†countries in the OECD report—Israel, the United States, Turkey, Mexico and Chile—largely abstained. They increased sovereign debt by 3% on average compared with a 40% average increase among other OECD members.
When austerity pressures caught up to debt-laden sovereigns in recent years, however, the less leveraged—and not coincidentally, less equal—member countries grew a lot faster than their peers. From 2011-13, according to the World Bank, the five most unequal countries grew nearly five times faster (3.9% cumulative annual average) than the others (0.84%). By using a 2010 cutoff, the OECD has skewed its findings.
Here’s the point. During the recovery the top 1% of income earners have captured 95% of the growth. Under the circumstances why should the lower 99% of income earners care whether the income is growing or not?
In addition the effective tax rate of the top 1% of income earners has been decreasing. That makes it darned hard to be sympathetic about the high taxes they pay, especially for those (like Warren Buffett) who effective tax rate is admittedly below that of his secretary.
In an op-ed at the New York Times Tom Ginsburg agrees with me that the importance of Magna Carta is much exaggerated:
But its fame rests on several myths. First, it wasn’t effective. In fact, it was a failure. John was a weak king who had squandered the royal fortune on a fruitless war with France. Continually raising taxes to pay for his European adventures, he provoked a revolt by his barons, who forced him to sign the charter. But John repudiated the document immediately, and the barons sought to replace him. John avoided that fate by dying.
The next year, his young son reissued Magna Carta, without some of the clauses. It was reissued several times more in the 13th century — the 1297 version is the one on display in the National Archives and embodied in English law. But the original version hardly constrained the monarch.
A second myth is that it was the first document of its type. Writing in 1908, Woodrow Wilson called it the beginning of constitutional government. But in fact, it was only one of many documents from the period, in England and elsewhere, codifying limitations on government power.
A third myth is that the document was a ringing endorsement of liberty. Even a cursory reading reveals a number of oddities. One clause prevents Jews from charging interest on a debt held by an underage heir. Another limits women’s ability to bear witness to certain homicides. A third requires the removal of fish traps from the Thames.
The English Bill of Rights of 1689 had obvious influence on the Virginia Bill of Rights which in turn had a great influence on Jefferson. I’m not so sure about the influence of Magna Carta on the English Bill of Rights. Citing it as an influence doesn’t make it so.
While I’m on the subject of healthcare reform, one of the things that has baffled me for years about the subject is how narrow the debate is. Both sides treat the multiple possible different models for healthcare systems as though they were dangerous and foreign when the reality is quite different.
How would Americans have reacted to a single payer system? Pretty well, I’d say off-hand. The federal government runs the largest single-payer system in the world, Medicare. It also runs the largest fully socialized system in the world—the VA which, astonishingly, is larger than Britain’s National Health Service.
And then there’s the Medicaid system. IMO the inevitable trajectory of the PPACA is towards something resembling Medicaid for all, an outcome I strongly suspect that almost no one will like.
Just to put add a little fuel to this fire, here are the costs per patient of those three government health systems:
| System | Cost per patient |
| Medicare | $10,365 |
| Medicaid | 5,790 |
| VA | 6,000 |
By comparison present per capita healthcare spending in the U. S. is around $9,146 (which includes Medicare, Medicaid, the VA, and purely private spending).
I realize that to some extent I’m comparing apples to basketballs but it at least provides a basis for thought.
There appears to be an insurmountable difference of opinion over whether the PPACA is “working” or not. Here’s what the president said a week ago:
What’s more, the thing is working. I mean, part of what’s bizarre about this whole thing is we haven’t had a lot of conversation about the horrors of Obamacare because none of them come to pass. You got 16 million people who’ve gotten health insurance. The overwhelming majority of them are satisfied with the health insurance. It hasn’t had an adverse effect on people who already had health insurance. The only effect it’s had on people who already had health insurance is they now have an assurance that they won’t be prevented from getting health insurance if they’ve got a preexisting condition, and they get additional protections with the health insurance that they do have.
The costs have come in substantially lower than even our estimates about how much it would cost. Health care inflation overall has continued to be at some of the lowest levels in 50 years. None of the predictions about how this wouldn’t work have come to pass.
and here’s Stephen Moore’s retort:
Sometimes it seems President Obama lives in a parallel universe where facts are floating around to be plucked out of suspended animation. Never more so than on the effects of the Affordable Care Act.
after which he takes the president’s claims seriatim and presents evidence that there is, at the very least, room for doubt.
I think whether the PPACA is working or not is an unanswerable question if only because the operative definitions of “working” are so different. Some of its opponents reject any evidence that it might be working and vice versa. Some of the PPACA’s supporters will deem it to be working if one person who otherwise would not have healthcare insurance has it because of the plan or, even lower, as long as the law survives it’s working because of the way in which it has changed the nature of the debate over healthcare reform, as acknowledged even by William Kristol.
I’m surprised at my reaction Andrew Browne’s musings over whether China can be contained:
The U.S.-China relationship has weathered storms before. Recall the days following the Chinese army’s 1989 assault on pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square, when cooperation between the countries went into a deep freeze. But President George H.W. Bush calculated that the U.S.-China relationship was too important to sacrifice, and he quickly sent emissaries to Beijing to ensure that it remained intact.
Today, surely, that calculation carries no less weight. Moreover, trying to contain China would be immensely costly: Neither country can succeed economically without the other. Kennan’s containment strategy worked against the Soviet Union because it was economically weak, with almost no commercial ties to America. But today’s China is an economic powerhouse, and its double-digit military budgets are supported by a deep and diversified industrial base.
Set against these realities, however, is the fact that the U.S.-China relationship has lost its strategic raison d’être: the Soviet Union, the common threat that brought the two countries together.
On the one hand I agree with his skepticism over whether China can be contained. On the other I disagree with his implicit assumption that it needs to be.
China and Putin’s Russia are irredentist. Their policies are founded on an in some ways mythical view of past national greatness. They are not messianic or revolutionary if you’d prefer in the way that the U. S., Soviet Russia, or Iran are. They have very little soft power. No one yearns to emulate the Chinese system or the Russian system. And most of their hard power is directed against their own people.
While China cannot be contained, we don’t need to contain them. Containing ourselves might be a better strategy.
That doesn’t mean that China’s neighbors aren’t justifiably nervous as Russia’s are. That doesn’t mean that we should pursue their foreign policy objectives on their behalf. It means they need to come to a modus vivendi with their powerful neighbors—a difficult balancing act between preparedness and reassurance.